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SUMMARY 
Since 1973, the price of oil has increased from $2.70 
to $34 per barrel in November 1981. Due to the limited 
absorptive capacity of some of the OPEC countries, a large current 
account surplus accrued to the OPEC group. Many economists have 
expressed views about the significance of the surplus and its 
disposal, and have proposed methods to remove the surplus or to 
improve the efficiency of the 'recycling' of the surplus. 
This thesis provides an empirical investigation of the 
OPEC surplus and its disposal, in an attempt to both shed some 
light on the importance of the surplus, and to give some 
indication of its likely size and the pattern of its disposal in 
the future. 
A macroeconomic model is developed to examine the OPEC 
economies empirically from which equations are estimated using 
both normal time series analysis and a pooled sample of time 
series and cross section data. However, for the purposes of 
forecasting the surplus in the future, it is concluded that an 
econometric model has limited usefulness due to the instability 
of the relationships between variables over the time period 
considered. 
A two stage decision model based on the theory of portfolio 
selection is developed to empirically explore the disposal of the 
OPEC surplus. The estimated results suggest that OPEC investors 
have chosen their asset holdings on a rather ad-hoc basis with 
little importance being attached to the relative rate of return 
available on alternative assets. Investors have preferred to 
adjust asset holdings mainly in response to exchange rate 
expectations and have diversified their portfolios over time 
irrespective of normal economic criteria. Consequently, the future 
pattern of the disposal of the surplus is rroAj ba -Aw#w- %}-- 
basis, and therefore, any mechanism to improve the efficiency of 
the recycling mechanism, based on economic theory, is unlikely to 
be successful. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE OPEC SURPLUS 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the balance of payments 
current account surplus of the OPEC countries, which has 
emerged since 1973. This introductory chapter gives a 
description of the main characteristics of the OPEC member 
countries which are fundamental to the existence of the surplus. 
We then go on to consider the question of the importance of 
the surplus, and the purpose of this thesis. 
1.2 OPEC, Its Formation and History 
The Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was formed in 1960, the original members being Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The reasons behind 
its formation, and its objectives have been discussed in detail 
elsewhere. (Adelman (1972), Al-Otaiba (1975), Rouhani (1971) 
and Seymour (1981) are good examples). It is sufficient for 
our purposes to point out that the main reason for its 
formation was the concern over oil revenues received by the 
-2- 
oil exporting countries, and its objectives became to 
maintain these revenues at least at the same level. Since 
1960, OPEC membership has increased to 13 countries, by the 
addition of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, 
Nigeria, Quatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 
An historical development of OPEC's position in the 
world petroleum and energy markets has received widespread 
documentation in the literature. (Adelman (1972), Al-Chalabi 
(1980), Al-Otaiba (1975), Park (1975), Rouhani (1971) and 
Seymour (1981). The current position of OPEC has been well 
reviewed by Robinson et al (1981). Consequently an historical 
guide as such is not provided here, although many points 
featured in the previous literature may arise. 
1.3 Characteristics of the OPEC Countries 
One of the main characteristics of the OPEC countries 
is their position as neither developed countries, nor developing 
countries. On the one hand, the OPEC countries show many of 
the features of developing countries, whereas on the other they 
have highly developed oil sectors in their economies, which has 
led to high income per head of population in some of the OPEC 
countries. 1 The lack of development of the OPEC countries can 
1: see UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
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be highlighted with some statistics. 
In 1976, total energy consumption was 200 Million Metric 
Tons of coal equivalent (MMT)1 in the OPEC countries. UK energy 
consumption in the same year was approximately 300MMT. In Saudi 
Arabia, total consumption of energy was under 13MMT. 
Most developed economies have important steel industries. 
In 1977 for example, West Germany produced approximately 40MMT 
of crude steel ingots. 2 The declining UK steel industry produced 
20MMT. In the USA, total production was 114MMT. The only 
significant producer amongst the OPEC countries was Venezuela, 
who produced less than 700,000MT in 1977. 
In 1977, Japan launched nearly 800 non-tanker seagoing 
vessels. 
2 In the USA, the total was approximately 100. In the 
same year, the UAE and Kuwait launched one vessel each, whilst 
Indonesia launched two. No other OPEC countries have a ship- 
building industry. 
These statistics give some indication of the lack of 
industrial development in the OPEC countries. 
1: Source - UN World Energy Supplies 1973-1978 
2: Source - UN Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 1978 
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By way of contrast, the following figures show the 
size and importance of the oil industry in the OPEC countries. 
In 1980, the production of crude oil in Saudi Arabia was 
approximately 490MMT. 
1 Production in Iraq was approximately 
130MMT, in Libya approximately 90MMT. In the USA, total oil 
production was approximately 480MMT, 10 million less than that 
produced by Saudi Arabia. The UK North Sea oilfields produced 
approximately 80MMT in the same year. Total OPEC oil production 
in 1980 was approximately 1352MMT, about 44% of the world total. 
The contribution made by oil to the national income of 
the OPEC countries is clear to see. In 1977, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita in Saudi Arabia was 8,319 dollars, 
nearly double GDP per capita in the UK. 
2 In Kuwait, GDP per 
capita was 11,884 dollars. This exceeded GDP per capita in 
Germany by more than 3,000 dollars, and GDP per capita in the 
USA by about 3,000 dollars. 
It is quite obvious that to categorise the OPEC countries 
as either developed or developing countries in the usual manner 
is quite difficult. 
The dependence on oil by the OPEC countries can be seen 
from Table 1 which shows the export earnings of the individual 
OPEC countries in millions of US dollars at current prices 
1: Source - BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry 1980 
2: Source - UN Yearbook of National Accounts 1978 
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for 1970,1975 and 1979. The first three columns of the 
table show the vast increases in revenues from oil exports 
during the 1970's. The earnings from oil for Saudi Arabia 
increased 30 times over from 2 billion dollars in 1970 to 
nearly 60 billion by 1979. The importance of these revenues 
to the economies of the OPEC countries can be seen from the 
remaining columns of Table 1.1. The last three columns show 
the proportion of total export earnings made from oil exports. 
In 1979, oil exports provided more than 90% of total export 
earnings for all the OPEC countries except Ecuador, Gabon and 
Indonesia. The middle three columns show oil export earnings 
as a proportion of total GDP. For Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE in 1979, more than 50% of total income was made 
from oil exports. This was probably the case for Iraq and 
Quatar also. 
1 
The dependence of the OPEC countries on petroleum 
exports means that the individual countries are susceptable to 
any fluctuations in both world energy prices2, and world 
consumption of petroleum. Table 1.2 shows the posted price 
of crude oil for Libya, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in dollars 
per barrel. These prices represent a broad guideline to the 
contract prices paid for oil from the individual OPEC countries, 
1: suitable data on GDP was not available for Iraq and Quatar. 
2: it is assumed that individual OPEC countries are not in 
general capable of affecting world crude oil prices. This may 
not be true for Saudi Arabia to some extent. Prices may have 
been affected by the OPEC cartel as a group, however, see 
Robinson et al (1981) for a review of the effects of OPEC on 
world oil prices. 
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during the 1970's. The table shows the vast increase in 
crude oil prices that has occurred during the 1970's from 
just over $1 per barrel in 1970 for Saudi crude to nearly 
$17 per barrel in 1979. By November 1981, the price had 
reached $34 per barrel. The table also shows the higher 
price for the higher quality Libyan oil over the period. 
These vast price increases have contributed to the large 
increase in export earnings of the OPEC countries, and 
indicate that the individual countries' economies are 
vulnerable to the prices set in world crude oil markets. 
Table 1.3 shows the world consumption of crude oil 
in MMT of coal equivalent during the 1970's. The table shows 
that despite the vast oil price increases, world consumption 
of oil was higher in 1979 than in 1973. The figures do show 
there was some response to the higher oil prices in 1974 and 
1979 as the levels in each of those years was less than 1973 
and 1978 respectively. 
The resulting revenues from oil to the OPEC countries 
are shown in more detail in Table 1.4. The effects of the 
vast price increases over the period are demonstrated in the 
revenues of the individual countries from 1973 to 1979. 
Revenues have more than trebled for all the countries over 
this period. Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are 
particularly notable as examples of the vast increase in revenues. 
-7- 
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The effects of lower world consumption in response to 
the higher prices can be seen also in Table 1.4. In 1975 
revenues fell for Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, 
Quatar, Saudi Arabia and Venuzuela in response to the 
1973-74 price rises. The loss of revenues was more dramatic 
for those countries which generally produce higher quality 
crude oil. For example, Nigerian revenues fell by 17%. Revenues 
fell by 21% in Venezuela. In contrast the level of revenues 
fell by only 10% in Saudi Arabia in 1975 over the previous 
year's total. A similar picture probably occurred by the 
end of 1981. 
By coincidence, the countries which require all the 
revenues that are available at current periods in time are 
generally those which suffered more from the short term 
response to higher prices. Table 1.5 shows the population of 
the OPEC countries in 1970,1975 and 1977. The most 
populated countries are Indonesia, Iran and Nigeria with Algeria, 
Iraq and Venezuela also having a population exceeding 10 million 
by 1977. These countries require oil revenues to keep their 
developing economies above subsistence level, and cannot cope 
with rapid decreases in oil revenues of the type experienced 
in 1975 as easily as the other OPEC countries, particularly 
Kuwait, Libya, Quatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. On the 
contrary, these low population countries have difficulties in 
spending the vastly increased revenues in the short term, and 
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could still develop their economies quite rapidly with such 
temporary cuts in revenues from oil. In fact, the low 
population levels of these countries act as a constraint on 
their spending abilities, and it is these countries that 
provide the major proportion of the OPEC surplus zfs a result 
of their inability to spend large amounts of oil revenues. 
In addition to the lack of developed industry, and 
small populations, these 'low spending' countries are 
characterised by their lack of native skilled labour, which 
also places a constraint on their spending ability. Skilled 
labour is a necessary pre-requisitLfor the development of an 
industrialised economy and its absence has inhibited these 
OPEC countries' economies. 
In order to increase their rate of development, these 
'low spending' countries have imported large amounts of 
foreign skilled labour, and all these countries are 
characterised by ex-patriates providing nearly all the skilled 
labour, and a large percentage of the total population. In 
Saudi Arabia for example, it is estimated that possibly two 
million people or 20% of the population are ex-patriate. 
1 
The absence of these factors of production have also 
meant historically, undeveloped infrastructures in these 
countries. Consequently in 1974 following the vast increase 
1: Published figures are difficult to obtain, if at all attainable. 
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in incomes from oil, the absence of well developed road and 
rail networks created bottlenecks which placed a further 
constraint on spending ability. 
1 
The industrialised economies are characterised by 
having highly developed domestic financial systems, which have 
developed over time with industrial growth. The financial 
institutions re-direct excess savings from surplus sectors of 
the economy to deficit sectors. The absence of these 
institutions on any significant scale in the OPEC countries 
further restricts the spending ability of the 'surplus' OPEC 
countries consequently. For example, there were no more than 
100 banking offices, including head and branch offices in 
Saudi Arabia in 1978.2 This is probably less than the number 
of banks in an English city. Total financial intermediaries' 
claims on the domestic sector were approximately 14 billion 
Riyals in Saudi Arabia in 1978. This was about 5% of the 
total of foreign assets held, again indicating the lack of 
domestic financial intermediaries relative to the wealth of 
the country. 
3 Since the vast oil price increases in 1973, 
there has been some development of financial intermediation 
in the surplus countries, but this has been mainly on the 
international scene. 
4 
1: see Fallon (1976) for a more detailed discussion. 
2: see J. Town end (1978) 
3: Source: IMF, IFS Annual Yearbook 1980 
4: see Business Week, October 1980 on "Arab Banks Grow". 
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The combination of small population levels, lack of 
industrial development, absence of skilled labour, -undeveloped 
infrastructures and financial markets has placed severe 
constraints on the ability of these OPEC countries to spend 
their increased revenues from oil exports. It is the low 
absorptive capacities of these countries that has led to the 
surplus since 1973. The low absorptive capacities of these 
countries restricted the growth of imports relative to the 
growth of export earnings, although still substantial. 
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 show the value of imports and exports in 
millions of US dollars at current values during the 1970's. 
The tables show substantial growth in both exports and imports 
from 1973 onwards, although for many countries, the growth of 
the latter has not kept pace with export growth. The 
resulting positive net trade balances are shown in Table 1.8. 
The table is divided into those countries which are generally 
regarded as high absorbers and those which are regarded as 
1 
low absorbers. It can be seen that on visible trade alone, 
some of the supposed high absorbers have substantial positive 
trade balances in some years. For example, in 1979, Nigeria 
had a positive net balance of nearly 7 billion dollars. 
However, the table shows that it is the low absorbers that 
contribute the higher proportion to the total net balance in 
each year. This is further clarified in Table 1.9 which shows 
the total current account surplus or deficit for each country, 
as well as the totals for both low and high absorbers, and OPEC 
as a whole unit. 
1: It is open to some debate as to which category Iraq, and 
to some extent Iran should appear. 
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The inclusion of official government transfers and 
invisible trade has reduced the positive balance on the 
current account for most countries, and pushed many of the 
high absorbers' group into current account deficit for most 
years of the 1970's. In all probability, the current account 
surplus of the low absorbers' group will have been smaller 
due to the financing of expatriate labour, but data is generally 
unavailable on the invisible account for those countries noted. 
Consequently, the total current account surplus of the OPEC 
countries is generally lower than the combined trade balance 
in any one year. Furthermore, it is the low absorbing countries 
of the Middle East which in the main provide this substantial 
surplus. In 1979, the total surplus was approximately 87 billion 
dollars. Probably about 40% of this total was provided by 
Saudi Arabia alone. Furthermore, it has been estimated that 
the total surplus could have been approximately 100 billion 
dollars in both 1980 and 1981, following further increases in 
oil prices1, and may be substantial in the following years due 
to the low absorptive capacities of some of the OPEC countries, 
unless there is a large reduction in oil consumption. 
1: Accurate figures were unavailable at time of printing. For 
the latest survey of estimates, see MEES, June 1981. 
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1.4 The OPEC Surplus and the Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine the OPEC 
surplus, both its emergence and disposal, in an empirical 
framework. We have already discussed how the surplus has 
emerged during the 1970's. Much has been written in the 
literature about the importance of the surplus on the world 
economy. 
CAgmon 
et al (1978), Bhattacharya (1977), 
Bluff (1980), Corden (1974) , (1974), (1976), Corden and 
Oppenheimer (1976), Crocket and Ripley (1975), Fallon (1976), 
Fieleka (1974)l First National City Bank (1975), Fried and 
Schultze (1975), Johnson (1976), Levy W. (1975), Mabro and 
Monroe (1974), Park (1975), Rybczynski and Ray (1976), 
Tumlir (1976), Williamson (1975) 
- 
The points raised can perhaps be summarised as follows: 
1. The emergence of the surplus resulted in a redistribution 
of wealth from the developed and less developed 
countries (LDC's) to the surplus OPEC countries. 
2. Many oil consuming countries, particularly the LDC's had 
difficulties in sustaining economic growth. 
3. Doubts were raised about the ability of the international 
financial system to transfer the savings of the OPEC 
countries to the oil consuming countries. 
The points raised can perhaps be summarised in a diagram 
as depicted in Figure 1a). The diagram imagines 'world' income (Y) 
- 22 - 
and 'world' rates of interest (R) to be measured on the 
horizontal and vertical axes respectively. World savings 
are represented by an upward sloping schedule (S1), as 
savings are higher at higher income levels, and rates of 
interest. World investment is represented by a downward 
sloping schedule (I, ) as investment increases as income 
increases, and interest rates fall. Equilibrium is imagined 
at Y, and R, the intersection of the two curves. The OPEC 
surplus represents an increase in world savings, which results 
in a shift of the savings schedule from Seto S2. This gives 
a new equilibrium of Y2R2, a position of higher interest 
rates and lower income. Consequently, the OPEC surplus may 
have contributed to higher rates of interest, and lower income 
and employment levels, world-wide. 
In order that world income levels may be restored to 
their original position, a shift in the savings schedule from 
S2 back to S1 or a shift in the, Investment schedule from 
I1 to 12 is required; i. e. either the surplus must be removed, 
or the excess savings of the OPEC countries must be rechannelled 
to the consuming nations through the financial markets of the 
world. 
Various suggestions have been made in the literature as 
to how a position such as Y1 may be restored. W. Levy (1980) was 
one of many to suggest the introduction of index-linked bonds to 
Rý 
R3 I-- _' 
R2 ý--- 
r--- R1 
Figure 1a). 
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encourage OPEC investors to accept financial instruments, 
to assist the 'recycling' problem. Others have suggested 
greater involvement by the IMF (Bird 1981) or an increased 
role to be played by other international institutions 
(Robinson N. 1980). It has been suggested that a new 'oil 
payments' currency should be introduced to reduce the pressure 
on the dollar in international markets, (The Economist, March 
1980). The Brandt report (1980) suggested that greater 
global co-operation between the world's developed and 
developing countries through aid and development of alternative 
energy sources may have beneficial effects. 
Against this background, it is the purpose of this 
thesis to examine the surplus empirically, to see whether any 
implications for its likely future size and its disposal can be 
found. This"may allow us to make some tentative suggestions 
about how the most suitable method of arriving at a more 
desirable level of world income may be achieved. The thesis 
does not attempt to provide an optimum strategy for recycling 
the surplus, rather it examines the surplus historically since 
1974 with econometric methods, to see if any implications for 
the future can be found. 
1.5 Methodology 
Theoretically, the emergence of the surplus and its 
disposal should be examined within the same framework. 
- 25 - 
An outline to such a model is provided at the start of 
Chapter 3. However, whether such a theoretical approach has 
any practical relevance is questionable. Furthermore, it is 
not possible to examine such a model empirically due to the 
unavailability of data. 
As an alternative, a partial equilibrium approach is 
adopted. The emergence of the surplus and its likely size in 
the future is examined using a macromodel to describe the OPEC 
economies, the model being based on the absorptive capacities 
of each country. The disposal of the surplus is examined within 
the framework of the theory of portfolio selection developed 
by Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952). 
The empirical results of the models developed are not 
rigorous tests of the underlying theories, rather the theories 
provide a framework for the models which empirically examine 
the surplus and its disposal. For example, the macromodel to 
determine the surplus is similar to that developed by 
Ezatti (1976). However, it differs in that it does not have 
any implicit underlying assumptions of the OPEC countries' 
welfare function. To this extent, the model resembles the 
'energy balances' approach associated with the Workshop on 
Alternative Energy Strategies for example (1977). The model 
for the surplus differs from this approach in that more attention 
is given to the economies of the OPEC countries in order to 
determine the surplus. 
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Furthermore, the empirical analysis does not provide 
the basis for any conclusive results. Due to the statistical 
inadequacies of the data available, a strong interpretation of 
the results would be ill-advised. In addition, the data 
problems have led to the choice of relatively simple estimation 
techniques. It was felt that more sophisticated estimating 
procedures would not allow a more accurate interpretation of 
the results, in view of the data problems. 
1.6 Plan of Research 
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical background to the 
models, mainly with reference to previous research. This 
includes a discussion of previous empirical research relevant 
to the field. In Chapter 3, the models are developed more 
formally, initially in a general equilibrium framework. This 
is replaced by a partial equilibrium approach where the models 
to be estimated are derived. Chapter 4 presents the results of 
the model estimated for the surplus, and includes a discussion 
of the statistical problems. In Chapter 5, the results of 
the disposal model are presented. This chapter also includes 
a discussion on statistical problems. In Chapter 6, some 
tentative conclusions are drawn from the analysis undertaken 
in the thesis. This is supplemented with suggestions for 
further research. 
CHAPTER 2: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
This chapter discusses the previous research relevant 
to the development of the model. The surplus has emerged 
since 1973 due to the vast growth in oil revenues of the OPEC 
countries. Consequently, an analysis of previous research on 
energy modelling, with specific reference to the OPEC 
countries, is provided in Section one. The size of the surplus 
has also been determined by the growth of the OPEC economies. 
Therefore, the discussion gives attention to the previous 
research which has also considered the economies of the OPEC 
countries. 
Although the holdings of foreign assets by the OPEC 
countries, i. e. the disposal of the surplus, is perhaps ideally 
examined within the same framework as that which determines 
revenue requirements1, i. e. the size of the surplus, little 
research has been undertaken in this manner. On the contrary, 
economists have explicitly regarded the two issues independently 
in their research. This has probably been due to the large size 
of the surplus since 1973, which would suggest decisions which 
1: see H. Hotelling (1931), for a presentation of the relative 
rates of return on assets in the ground, and other assets, 
and their effect on resource depletion. Levy and Sarnat 
(1975) provide a similar arguement to show the different oil 
production strategies of the low, and high absorbing member 
countries of OPEC, and their holdings of foreign assets. 
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lead to the emergence of the surplus to be unrelated to 
those that determine foreign asset holdings1. Consequently, 
Section two discusses the theory of portfolio selection, 
which provides a theoretical basis for the analysis of the 
disposal of the surplus. Some discussion on previous empirical 
research based on the theory of portfolio selection, 
particularly related to international capital flows, is provided. 
2.1 Previous Research. on Models of OPEC and the Price of Oil 
Since the 1973-74 oil price increases, a substantial 
amount of research has been published on world energy models, 
particularly with reference to OPEC and the price of world 
oil. These models have been both formal and informal. The 
informal models are characterised by their lack of rigidity 
concerning the functional relationships of variables. However, 
such models are rich in institutional detail and explicit in 
their incorporation of the economic and political environment. 
This approach has become known as the 'energy balances' 
approach. Good examples are provided by WAES (1977), OECD (1977) 
and the CIA Report (1977). A good discussion of their strengths 
and weaknesses are provided by Hammoudeh (1979) and Ulph (1980). 
Further examples of such an approach. are provided by 
1: The real rate of return on financial assets in OECD 
economies was less than the discounted rate of return on oil 
in the ground in the 1970's, for example. In many cases, 
the real rate of return on financial assets was negative. 
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Houthakker (1975), Al-Janabi (1979), Al-Sabah (1979) and 
Jaidah (1979). A very recent survey of the 'energy balances' 
approach is provided by Deagle, Rahmani and Huff (1981). 
As suggested by Hammoudeh this approach is restrictive in 
that the informality makes evaluation difficult and 
speculative. 
The more formal approaches can be subdivided into 
simulation and optimization models. Examples of the former 
approach are provided by Blitzer, Meerans and Stoutjesdijk 
(1975), Kennedy (1974) and Kalymon (1975). Such models have 
explicit assumptions about, not only the relevant variables, 
but the actual values of parameters such as growth rates of 
the consuming countries, and the price elasticities of supply 
and demand. Various scenarios are projected on the basis of 
these parameter values with the most likely being chosen as 
the representative projection. Cleron (1978) used a similar 
approach in his specialised analysis of Saudi Arabia. In a 
recent detailed study of the OAPEC countries1, the ENI (1981) 
use parameters estimated from an econometric model to simulate 
alternative projections for both the economies of the OAPEC 
and the OECD countries. This more formal approach allows a 
more stringent evaluation. However, there are problems 
resulting from the instability of the parameters over time, 
particularly with the use of data before the upsurge in oil 
prices in 1973. 
1: The OAPEC countries include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Quatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE. 
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Optimization models represent an even more formal 
approach. They have been used to predict the optimal price 
and production strategies for the OPEC countries given some 
specific criterion function. Examples of such approaches are 
Ben-Shahar (1976), Bohi and Russel (1975), Cremer and Weitzman 
(1976), Ezatti (1976), Hnyilicza and Pindyck (1976) and 
Kalymon. Their strengths and weaknesses are also reviewed 
in Hammoudeh (1979). These approaches are characterised by 
the importance attached to OPEC as a one or two part cartel 
in the optimization process. As suggested by Hammoudeh, this 
line may not be consistent with the empirical evidence. It 
is perhaps more appropriate to identify each country of OPEC 
separately, and to apply some weighting procedure in the final 
optimization model. This would allow the relative importance 
of member countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to be identified. 
To this extent, the Ezatti model is exempt from the above 
comment. 
Ezatti suggests an interactive cartel approach to be 
appropriate, in which the decision makers are the individual 
members of OPEC. The model determines crude oil production 
requirements of each country at different oil prices, in order 
that present values of future consumption are maximised. This 
approach allows for the varying characteristics of the OPEC 
countries such as their economic infrastructures, abilities to 
absorb revenues, politics, and volume of oil reserves, to be 
taken into consideration. Whether such a formal model is a 
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realistic account of the decisions made by the OPEC countries 
is questionable. However, this approach does give a realistic 
degree of importance to each of the OPEC countries in the 
optimization process. Furthermore, Ezatti recognises the 
importance of the absorptive capacities of the OPEC countries 
explicitly by estimating macroeconomic models for each of the 
countries, which are used as inequalities in the programming 
model to be optimized. Ezatti used his model to examine the 
stability of the OPEC cartel in the future, as well as to derive 
oil production requirements. 
His preliminary results indicated that total OPEC oil 
production requirements might amount to 25.40 MBD in 1980, 
whereas demand for OPEC oil was projected to be 32MBD, at an 
oil price of $11 per barrel. This represented a 'stability' 
gap of 6.6 MBD, and suggested according to Ezatti that the 
OPEC 'cartel' will be stable during the 1980's. His results 
also showed that the production decisions of Saudi Arabia are 
crucial to this stability. 
Whereas Ezatti was primarily concerned with the oil 
production requirements of the OPEC countries, and the stability 
of the cartel, his model has implications for the current 
account surplus of the OPEC countries, as do the other studies. 
Furthermore, the technique of specifying econometric models to 
analyse the absorptive capacities of the OPEC countries is a 
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useful method to predict the surplus, as the surplus is a 
residual between exports and the domestic economy. 
Consequently, Ezatti's model has had much influence on the 
model developed in this thesis. Other less formal studies 
that give important attention to the absorptive capacities of 
the OPEC countries are Abolfathi (1977) and Fallon (1976). 
To this extent, they have also influenced the development 
of the model in Chapter 3. 
Let us consider the macroeconometric models developed 
by Ezatti in some detail. For each of the OPEC countries, 
Ezatti proposed a simple, aggregated model to identify the 
major components of demand. His equations recognised the 
important role played by. governments in determining total 
expenditure by the specification of sectors for both govern- 
ment spending and government investment. Ezatti also specified 
an equation for earnings from foreign assets, along with the 
other equations of his model. 
The equations were estimated for nine OPEC countries1 
from 1960 to the most recent year available, depending on data 
availability, using annual data. A discussion of some of the 
results is provided in Chapter 4, as they are compared with 
results estimated from my own model. The interpretation of 
the estimated equations is subject to the usual econometric 
problems. Firstly, Ezatti did not take into account the 
1: Due to data unavailability, no equations were estimated 
for Ecuador, Gabon, Quatar and the U. A. E. 
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simultaneous nature of some of the relationships in his 
model in the estimation procedure employed. Secondly, the 
use of annual data restricted the number of degrees of 
freedom for useful interpretation of his results. Thirdly, 
and perhaps most importantly, the resulting parameters may 
be subject to instability over time, as the OPEC countries 
are developing many sectors of their economies. Despite these 
problems, Ezatti's model has been a useful prompt in the 
research undertaken in this thesis. 
As suggested earlier, many of the papers discussed 
above either failed, or did not attempt to recognise the 
disposal of the 'surplus' funds in their models. Most of 
these models were developed so that a large surplus would not 
appear, as economic theory would suggest this to be the case1. 
Consequently, this thesis attempts to analyse the disposal 
of the surplus within a different framework. 
2.2 The Disposal of the Surplus and Portfolio Selection 
Given that the disposal of the funds is not to be 
examined within the same framework as that determining the 
emergence of the surplus, some alternative theoretical basis 
is required for the development of a model to examine the 
disposal of the surplus. Table 2.1 indicates the actual 
deployment of the OPEC surplus from 1974 to 1979 in US $ billions 
1: see footnote (1) on page 28. 
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at current prices. The table shows that in general a 
diversified pattern of asset holdings has emerged over the 
period. For example in 1974, of the total 53 billion dollars 
identified, some 37 billion dollars or 69% were held in short 
term assets. These were divided amongst short term government 
securities and bank deposits. Of the remaining 16 billion 
dollars held in long term assets, portfolio and direct 
investments provided the largest share, with long term 
government securities, funds to the IMF and IBRD, and flows 
to the developing countries providing the rest of the total. 
In 1979, approximately 75% of the total identified surplus 
entered short term deposits, with both government securities, 
domestic and foreign bank accounts, being held by the OPEC 
countries. Of the 25% held in long term assets, most was 
invested in portfolio and direct investments, with negative 
flows being recorded for yearly holdings of long term govern- 
ment securities, and money with the IMF and IBRD. 
This diversified pattern of asset holdings suggest a 
suitable basis for examining the disposal of the OPEC surplus 
may be found in the theory of portfolio selection, developed 
independently by Tobin (1958) and Markowitz (1952). Markowitz 
in fact proposed that it was an economically sensible and an 
observable phenomenon for diversified portfolios to be held 
by investors. Since this starting point, others notably, 
Sharpe (1964,1971) and Mossin (1966) developed theories of 
portfolio selection, particularly for use in financial management. 
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Table 2.1 DEPLOYMENT OF OPECaCASH SURPLUSES (US$blns) 
Flows Levels end '79 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Bank Deposits 28.6 9.9 12.0 13.0 3.9 37.3 115 
1) Country of 
currency issue 7.0 2.0 0.5 2.3 
2) Eurocurrency 
2.8 6.3 
1.1 31.0 
26 
87 deposits 21.6 7.9 11.5 10.7 
Short term 
Gov't securities 
(b) 8.0 -0.4 -2.2 -1.1 
Long term 
Gov't securities 
-0.8 3.3 
(b) 1.1 2.4 4.4 4.5 -1.8 -0.7 
Other Capital 
7 
10 
Flows (C) 7.1 12.8 13.2 9.8 5.8 9.0 58 
IMF & IBRD (d) 3.5 4.0 2.0 0.3 0.1 -2.0 
46 
Flow of Funds to 
Developing 
Countries (e) 4.9 6.5 6.4 7.0 6.2 6.9 
Total identified 
surplus deployed 53.2 35.2 35.8 33.5 13.4 53.8 236 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1980. 
a) Includes member OPEC countries and Bahrain, Brunei, Oman and 
Trinidad & Tobago. 
b) Coverage confined to UK and USA. 
C) Other portfolio investment, direct investment. 
d) Investment in IMF oil facility, supplementary facility, 
and purchases of IBRD bonds. 
e) Bilateral loans and aid. 
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The theory of portfolio selection was developed by 
Markowitz as an alternative to existing theories of investment 
behaviour, which suggested in general, an investor would 
maximise the discounted expected returns on assets. Markowitz 
rejected this hypothesis on the grounds that it did not imply 
diversification of asset holdings, which is an observable 
phenomenon. The basic assumption underlying Markowitz's 
own theory was that in conditions of uncertainty , investors 
consider the expected return on an asset desirable, and the 
risk associated with that asset undesirable. In particular, 
he proposed that given the choice of two assets, A and B, each 
with the same expected return, but A having the greater risk 
of default, the investor would choose B. Alternatively, if 
assets A and B carried the same risk, but A had the greater 
expected return, the investor would choose to hold A. Markowitz 
called this choice, the expected return-variance rule (E-V rule). 
From this E-V rule, Markowitz developed a relatively 
sophisticated argument1 to show that it was economic for 
investors to hold a diversified portfolio of assets. This 
diversification would be based upon the mean and variance 
associated with assets, these characteristics being 
representative of the expected return and risk. For the total 
portfolio of assets, the investor chooses an efficient 
combination of total mean and risk, where 
1: The Markowitz principle has received widespread documentation 
elsewhere. See W. Sharpe'Portfolio Theory and Capital 
Markets'(1971 for a useful explanation and development of 
Cont 
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E Xiui 1) 
i=1 
and nn 
Vý XiXjQij 2) 
i=1 j=1 
Where E= expected return (mean) of the portfolio. 
ui= mean associated with individual asset i 
V= risk (variance) of the total portfolio 
Xi xi = proportion of total wealth held in assets i, j 
Qij = covariance of returns between i and j. 
Based on knowledge of ui and 4ij, the investor finds 
the efficient combination of E and V subject to his 
individual budget constraint. 
combination would be achieved 
assets for the 3 asset case. 
argument to show that for the 
combination of E and V is. fou 
the n assets. 
Markowitz showed this efficient 
by diversifying his wealth amongst 3 
Sharpe (1964) expanded this 
n-asset case, the efficient 
nd by diversification amongst 
Markowitz claimed that his rule not only implied 
diversification amongst assets, but the correct kind of 
diversification. For example, a portfolio with securities 
from different industries would be more diversified than one 
with securities from the same industry. This is due to the 
covariance of returns being lower across industries than within. 
Cont *: the Markowitz rule. H. Levy and M. Sarnat's 
'Financial Decision making under Uncertainty' (1977) 
is another good source. 
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This idea was developed upon by Sharpe (1971) with his 
index model, in which he proposed that investors should 
select representative assets from similar groups to choose 
their diversified portfolio, as consideration of all assets 
is not practical. 
Markowitz's original paper in 1952 concluded that in 
order for a diversified strategy to be reasonable, investors 
must be both able to follow the E-V rule, and to arrive at 
quantifiable values of ui and Qij. 
This paper stimulated much research in economics, 
particularly in the field of financial and monetary economics. 
This was concerned with the acceptability of the two assumptions, 
and empirical investigations using the theory of portfolio 
selection as their starting point. As well as giving a 
brief discussion of this research, we must decide on the 
relevance of the theory of portfolio selection as a basis 
for examining the disposal of the OPEC surplus, in the light 
of this research. 
2.21 The Choice of ui and Qiý 
In order to arrive at an efficient portfolio, Markowitz 
suggested some estimates of ui and Qij must be obtained. This 
proposal was based upon investors making a set of subjective 
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probabilities about the expected returns on assets. 
Shackle (1952) suggested that such a notion was contrary to 
the reality of decision making. He postulated, in the manner 
of Keynes (1936) that the subjective probability approach had 
little applicability in the formation of expectations. As 
an alternative he developed the idea of potential surprise, 
which allowed for all alternative returns to be considered, 
whether known or unknown in investor decisions. If a new 
asset were available with the E-V notion, a complete 
reformulation of investors expectations would be required. 
Despite the theoretical plausibility in Shackle's argument, 
his approach was not supported by the widely observed notion 
of asset diversification, whereas the E-V was quite consistent. 
The acceptance and application of the E-V rule gained 
further ground with the development of linear programming 
techniques, which allowed the cumbersome task of considering 
all possible returns more convenient. Further developments 
were made by the development of the Sharpe index which gave 
a practical technique for portfolio managers. To assist 
such management, Sharpe also introduced the idea of a Beta 
coefficient which represented an asset's volatility with 
respect to the market. 
Whilst clearly there was an element of 'surprise' for 
the OPEC countries in 1973 when the surplus first arose, the 
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evidence suggests the type of assets available, and in fact, 
held by the OPEC countries were well identified in financial 
circles. Furthermore, the diversified pattern indicated in 
Table 2.1 would give some support to the Markowitz principles. 
On the other hand, it seems that the disposal of the 
OPEC surplus has not been managed on grounds consistent with 
the Sharpe model. Although the level of aggregation in the 
data makes for some speculation, the lack of detailed knowledge 
on all assets available to OPEC investors abroad (including 
industrial, service industry, etc. as well as financial) 
probably restricted such an approach. Furthermore, dislike of 
foreign ownership by sovereign countries would not allow such 
an approach to be put into practise on any substantial scale. 
Thus, it would seem the Markowitz approach to be 
applicable, although not at its more sophisticated level, to 
the disposal of the OPEC surplus on these grounds. 
2.22 Investor Attitudes to Risk 
The work of Tobin and Markowitz also prompted much 
research on the underlying utility functions of investors who 
were averse to risk, under conditions of uncertainty. In 
particular, contributions were made by Arrow (1964), Borsch (1964), 
Cootner (1964), Feldstein (1969) , Samuelson (1967). (1970), 
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Pratt (1 964) and Tsiang (1972). 
Borsch (1964) criticised the E-V rule in that it 
implied a utility function that was polynomial in shape. 
Such a utility function is not consistent with a decreasing 
marginal utility of wealth as wealth increases, which is a 
characteristic of risk averse behaviour. Feldstein (1969) 
criticised the analysis because a linear combination of 
stochastic variables, i. e. the unknown asset returns, would 
not give a variable with a two parameter distribution. 
These comments forced Tobin (1969) to accept that the 
applicability of the E-V approach depended on the utility 
function of the investor being quadratic, or on the assumption 
that the uncertain outcomes could be regarded as normally 
distributed. 
However, even this reduced range of applicability was 
questionable. Cootner (1964) suggested that returns from 
investments are likely to be distributed with a positive skew, 
due to the progressive taxation system, hedging by companies, 
and their limited liability organisation. This implied the 
assumption of normally distributed returns to be unrealistic. 
In addition, the applicability of a quadratic utility 
was doubted. Arrow (1964) suggested that the utility function 
of a risk avert investor could be characterised by the 
following properties; 
- 42 - 
a) u' (y)-;, - 0 i. e. marginal utility of wealth is positive 
b) u" (y) «0i. e. marginal utility decreases with 
increases in wealth 
c) d -u"(y)/uy) /dy <0i. e. marginal absolute risk aversion 
should, if anything, decrease 
with an increase in wealth 
d) 
d 
yu"(y)/u'(y) /dy 0 i. e. marginal relative risk aversion 
should, if anything, increase 
with an increase in wealth 
The derivation of the second derivative of any 
quadratic utility function shows that characteristic b) would 
be violated, thus restricting the E-V rule further. 
However, in 1972, Tsiang showed that if the aggregate 
risk undertaken by an investor is small relative to the size 
of his wealth, then the E-V rule would have the range of 
applicability suggested by Tobin in 1969. Tsiang pointed out 
that no known utility function exhibited all the properties 
set out by Arrow, but if the negative exponential and constant 
1 
elasticity functions are expanded into Taylor's series, then 
the utility function could be characterised by the mean and 
variance of the expected returns, even if the underlying 
utility function was not quadratic, or the outcomes not 
normally distributed. 
1: These functions are the closest to fulfilling Arrow's 
properties. 
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Tsiang's paper implied that the E-V rule is more 
appropriate for investors where the total risk undertaken is 
small relative to the total wealth. A brief re-examination 
of Table 2.1 would suggest that the total risk taken by OPEC 
investors relative to total wealth from 1973 to 1979 was small. 
Most of the assets held by the OPEC countries in each year 
have been of a shorter term nature1. Little risk can be 
attached to short term government debt and bank deposits of 
the developed countries. In addition, the risk of default 
on the longer term assets is also limited, as most of these 
assets are also held in the developed world, or are direct 
aid2. This would suggest the Tobin-Markowitz principle to be 
an appropriate starting point for a model to examine the 
disposal of the OPEC surplus. 
2.23 Previous Empirical Work Based on the Theory of Portfolio 
Selection 
The work of Tobin and Markowitz, and the subsequent 
developments stimulated many empirical studies in different 
3 
fields, based on the theory of portfolio selection. Rather 
than presenting a discussion of all this past research, this 
section discusses the previous research that has some relevance 
1: although the proportion of shorter term assets has declined 
since 1979, it is still a high proportion of the total surplus 
invested. see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1979-81. 
2: in so far as aid is not an asset with a return, it has no risk. 
3: those discussed in sections 2.21 and 2.22. 
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to the subject matter of the thesis. 
The disposal of the OPEC surplus involves the transfer 
of wealth from the OPEC countries mainly to the developed 
nations of North America, Western Europe and Japan. 
Consequently, previous empirical research on international 
capital flows has particular relevance to the model developed 
in the next chapter. However, the model developed is a two 
stage portfolio model, the second stage of which considers 
asset diversification within a country. To this extent, 
previous research using the theory of portfolio selection 
to model the effects of financial institutions on the 
efficiency of domestic monetary policy is also relevant. 
Although empirical research on international capital 
flows has a long history, the introduction of theory of 
portfolio selection as a theoretical basis for developing 
models of international capital flows can be attributed to 
Branson (1968). Much of the resulting empirical research was 
encouraged by the work of Grubel (1968) who showed that 
international diversification of wealth was a suitable 
strategy for investors. According to the Markowitz E-V 
theorem, the gains from diversification depend on the degree 
of covariance between asset returns. Markowitz suggested 
that the smaller the covariance of returns, the greater will 
be the gains from diversification. Grubel showed that the 
correlation of returns on assets across countries was smaller 
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than the correlation of returns on assets within countries. 
Consequently, he concluded that international diversification 
of assets would be a sensible strategy for risk avert investors. 
Early empirical research into international capital 
flows had no strong theoretical basis. Good examples are 
provided by Bell (1962), Kenen (1963) and Stein (1965). 
These studies related capital flows to the level of interest 
rates or differentials, and used empirical results to suggest 
resulting policy implications. In his PhD thesis, Branson (1968) 
criticised this ad-hoc approach as it was inconsistent with 
the theory of portfolio selection. Branson suggested that 
the theory implied that the stock of assets should be related 
to the level of interest rates, and the flow of assets to the 
change in interest rates. Consequently, the early research 
had difficulties in giving a sensible interpretation. 
In contrast to this ad-hoc approach, Branson utilised 
the theory of portfolio selection to analyse the capital 
account of the US balance of payments. His thesis prompted 
a series of articles on capital flows to be published, 
including Branson and Hill (1971), and Branson and Willet (1972). 
His work and the research of Grubel prompted further research 
in the area. Lee (1969), Bryant and Hendershott (1970,1972), 
Miller and Whitman (1970), Willet and Forte (1969), Kouri and 
Porter (1974), Hodjera (1971), Black (1971), Makin (1972) and 
Kreicher (1981) are a good selection of similar research. 
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Useful surveys of most of these papers and others are 
provided by Hodjera (1973), Spitaller (1976), Learner and 
Stern (1972) and Bryant (1975). 
Most of this research was concerned with different 
aspects of capital flows. For example, Hodjera (1971) was 
primarily concerned with short term capital flows. In 
contrast, Kreicher (1981) examined long term flows. 
Hodjera (1971) was concerned with the capital account of the 
UK balance of payments. In contrast, Branson and Hill (1971) 
examined capital flows of most of the OECD countries. Despite 
such differences of attention, much of this research followed 
a similar path to that developed by Branson in 1968, and 1971. 
Consequently, we can focus our discussion of the general form 
of the models developed on the early work of Branson. 
In their work on capital flows of the OECD countries, 
Branson and Hill (1971) presented the 'new' view of 
international capital movements. From the theory of 
portfolio selection, the authors argue that the 'stock of 
assets held at home in any country, and abroad will depend on 
the level of interest rates given the degree of risk attached 
to domestic and foreign assets. They suggest an increase in 
foreign interest rates would induce both a 'stock-shift' 
effect and a 'continuing flow' effect of wealth towards foreign 
assets. This can be presented in the form of a system of 
equations, as follows; 
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f 
Kf(RR 
Eº W) 1) 
where Kf = holdings of foreign assets 
Rd Rf = domestic and foreign interest rate levels 
E= risk variable attached to Kf 
W= total wealth of investor 
Branson and Hill express holdings of foreign assets as a 
proportion of total wealth, thus allowing the ratio of foreign 
assets held to increase as portfolios grow. 
l 
From 1) multiplying by W, we obtain 
Kf =Wf (Rd, RF, E. W) 2) 
In order to examine the impact of interest rates on capital 
movements, an assumption of constant risk is taken, so that 2) 
becomes; 
Kf =Wf (Rd, Rf, W) 3) 
Now if interest rates remain constant, and portfolios grow 
over time then 
dKf - dW f (Rd, Rf , W) +W df dw ät d dw d 
dKf 
dt _ 
dW 
-d 
f (Rd, Rf, W) +W df 4) 
t dw 
If foreign interest rates change, two effects on capital 
movements can be identified. At the initial level of W, 
1: many studies assume asset distribution is homogenous with 
Cont * 
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there is a 'stock-shift' effect. From 3) 
Kf =W df fo Rf = stock effect 5) dR 
where represents change 
If wealth is growing over time, and foreign interest 
rates change, there is a 'continuing-flow' effect. From 4) 
0 dK _ 
dw f ORF - flow effect 6) dt dt 
[! 
d4 
Branson and Hill went on to show that the continuing 
flow effect would be small relative to the stock shift 
effect, and pointed out that due to continuing interest rate 
movements, the flow effect would be obscured in the data. For 
estimation purposes, Branson and Hill assumed a modified, 
linear version of equation 5) as the typical equation for 
capital flows for any one country. 
As the purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
surplus and its disposal, we are not particularly interested 
in the problem of isolating stock-effects from flow effects 
in our discussion of previous empirical research on capital 
movements. We are concerned more with the factors that may 
determine the portfolio distribution of wealth (i. e. level 
of asset holdings) of the OPEC countries. The other studies, 
mentioned above, suggested asset holdings across countries 
to be determined by similar factors as Branson and Hill in general. 
Cont respect to wealth, therefore removing W from the right 
hand side of the equation. see Brainard & Tobin 
(1968) for example. 
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Consequently, the same points are applicable in their 
discussion. 
One area where many of these studies were not clear 
in their arguments, was the incorporation of risk variables. 
Most of the studies recognised the possible importance of 
risk at the theoretical stage, but the absence of risk variables 
from most equations estimated was not clearly explained. An 
exception to this comment was the study by Miller and Whitman 
(1970), who suggested a suitable proxy for risk in their 
analysis of long term asset holding in the US, may be provided 
by deviations of GDP from its long term trend. They argued 
that riskiness is inversely correlated with fluctuations in 
economic activity. Although Miller and Whitman must be 
congratulated on their attempt to capture risk factors, it is 
difficult to accept such a proxy as totally suitable. At the 
peak of the economic cycle, risks associated with certain 
assets may be higher as the downturn in activity is soon to 
follow. 
Another area where these early studies were not explicit, 
was in the area of adjustment speeds and lags. Again, many of 
the studies made reference to the importance of lagged variables 
in affecting asset distribution, but the importance of such 
variables was somewhat diminished by the model testing stage. 
Bryant and Hendershott (1972) however, showed that the empirical 
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results obtained were greatly affected by alternative 
specifications of lagged variables. Many of these studies 
also seemed to pay little attention to the role of the 
stock adjustment model, which had been incorporated in many 
other areas of empirical research1. De Leeuw (1965) had 
suggested in an analysis of the financial markets of the USA, 
that desired asset holdings were a function of the relevant 
return and risk variables, but in practise the actual level 
of holdings would diverge from this desired level, due to 
various transactions costs. 
These studies can also be criticised for their lack 
of consideration of the role of expectations, particularly 
with reference to interest rate variables. Keynes (1936) 
suggested that investors are concerned about possible capital 
gains or losses, in deciding their holdings of government bonds. 
He suggested that as the price was inversely related to the 
rate of return, investors would hold views about the 'normal' 
rate of interest, and have expectations about the movement 
of the current rate of interest towards the normal rate. 
De Leeuw (1965) attempted to capture this expectations element 
using a weighted lag of previous interest rates to determine 
the normal rate. Parallel to this issue is the question of how 
1: Nerlove (1958) introduced the stock adjustment model in his 
analysis of agricultural markets. An excellent rationalization 
for the use of the stock adjustment model in models of financial 
behaviour is provided by Feige (1967). Early studies that made 
use of this approach in studies of domestic monetary policy were 
de Leeuw (1965), El Mokadem (1971), Norman (1968) and White(1975) 
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expectations variables should be incorporated into econometric 
models. The Almon1 technique was the method employed by 
White (1975). Other researchers rejected the concept of 
adaptive expectations, and suggested 'rational' expectations 
to be a more logical approach. Muth (1960,1961) suggested 
that expectations are made and revised rationally on the basis 
of all information available to the decision maker at any 
point in time. On a practical level, such rational expectations 
are constructed in a forecasting framework. Clearly, more 
attention should have been given to the role of expectations 
and the method of incorporation in the studies cited above. 
A more recently published study by Kreicher (1981) was 
modified to include many of the points mentioned. His analysis 
of longer term capital movements in OECD countries incorporated 
both the stock adjustment model, and a rationally determined 
expectations variable to construct rates of interest 
discounted for inflation. 
Many of the studies cited also incorporated the theory 
of portfolio selection without giving much attention to the 
degree of homogenity of transactors involved. Both Learner 
and Stern (1972) and Hodjera (1973) pointed out that both 
speculators and arbitrageurs participated in foreign exchange 
markets, implying differential portfolio behaviour. Rhomberg 
(1972) also pointed out that many of the studies did not 
1: see S. Almon (1965) 
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sufficiently account for the distribution of assets on a 
geographical basis, or for the distribution of the maturity 
structure of assets. He suggested a subportfolio approach 
may be a useful development to account for such problems. 
Parkin (1969) and Clayton et al (1975) pointed out that 
more attention should be given to the underlying utility 
function of investors, in the construction of models of 
financial markets. Parkin actually constructed a more 
rigorous model consistent with the theory of portfolio 
selection which allowed a more useful interpretation 
theoretically. (See Parkin (1969), Parkin, Gray and 
Barret (1969) for example). He criticised earlier research 
in that the ad-hoc specification of models meant interpretation 
was difficult. Brechling and Clayton (1965), De Leeuw (1965) 
and Norman (1968) were examples of such ad-hoc models. The 
approach of Parkin was not without its difficulties however. 
Courakis (1975) and Clayton et al (1975) pointed out the 
utility function used by Parkin did not take account of the 
Tsiang modification to utility functions of risk averse 
investors. Furthermore, the model developed for portfolio 
behaviour of Building Societies suggested a profit maximising 
approach to be applicable. However, this is inconsistent with 
the constitution of Building Societies, which are a non profit 
maximising institution. 
Another fault of many of the studies of international 
capital movements was the neglect of exchange rate expectations 
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as an explanatory variable in allocating wealth inter- 
nationally. The introduction of the floating exchange rate 
mechanism in 1971 meant the incorporation of exchange rate 
expectations was particularly important. It would seem that 
such considerations may be important in determining OPEC 
asset holdings, given the large movement of exchange rates 
over the latter part of the 1970's, as shown in Table 2.2. 
Black (1971), Hodjera (1971) and Makin (1972) have made 
contributions in this area. In his work on the Eurodollar 
market, Makin suggested that the forward exchange rate could 
capture expectations about the future spot rate, which would 
help determine assets held in the Eurodollar market. Hodjera 
suggested that a dummy variable could be used to capture 
periods of speculation, thus exchange rate expectations, in 
his analysis of short term capital movements of the UK under 
a fixed exchange rate system. Perhaps a variable based on 
previous levels of the exchange rate, similar to that 
suggested by De Leeuw (1965) for the normal rate of interest 
on bonds, would be a more appropriate proxy in a floating 
exchange rate system. 
Many comments have been made about the previous 
research of international capital movements, without any 
direct reference to the results obtained. This has been a 
deliberate objective as these results have few implications 
for an examination of the asset holdings of the OPEC countries. 
More importantly, the methods and variables incorporated in 
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such studies have had a greater influence on this thesis. 
In addition, the many econometric problems, typically 
associated with these studies, reduce the benefits of 
comparing the results obtained. For example, the presence 
of strong multicollinearity amongst interest rate variables 
makes the interpretation of any results obtained problematic1. 
All studies of financial markets have problems in this respect. 
Problems of estimation also arise, in the presence of lagged 
dependent variables, which is implied by the stock adjustment 
model. The use of OLS as the appropriate estimating procedure 
is restricted in such circumstances. Possible simultaneous 
equation bias is also a problem associated with studies of 
money markets. For example, in many cases the actual interest 
rate or exchange rate may be partly determined by the asset 
holdings of the investor being examined. Kouri and Porter 
(1974) have done some useful work in this area. For a 
technical disucssion of these econometric problems, Johnston 
(1972) is a useful source. Bryant (1975) discusses the 
importance of such problems in previous research on international 
capital movements. 
Despite the problems cited, elements of the empirical 
research discussed have contributed to the model developed in 
Chapter 3. Some attention has been given to the weaknesses of 
previous research, however. 
1: see Parkin (1969) for example. The presence of multicollinearity 
between variables causes standard errors to become large, thus 
leading to the rejection of possible statistically significant 
coefficients. see Johnston (1972) for further details. 
CHAPTER 3: 
A MODEL FOR THE OPEC SURPLUS 
AND ITS DISPOSAL. 
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CHAPTER 3: A MODEL OF THE OPEC SURPLUS AND ITS DISPOSAL 
This chapter describes the model of the OPEC surplus, 
and its disposal, which is to be empirically tested in 
Chapters44-S. The development of the model owes much to the 
research discussed in the previous chapter. Section 1 briefly 
outlines an ideal, theoretical model to examine the surplus 
and its disposal empirically. Section 2 goes on to consider 
a model which determines the OPEC surplus. The model draws 
heavily on the research of Ezatti (1976). In Section 3, a 
two stage portfolio model to examine the disposal of the 
surplus empirically is presented. This section includes a 
brief discussion of data availability which restricted the 
development of the model. 
3.1 A General Equilibrium Model 
We suggested in Chapter 2 that ideally a model of the 
OPEC surplus and its disposal should be examined in a general 
equilibrium type framework, i. e. factors which determine the 
amount of crude oil produced by the OPEC countries should be 
considered within the same model as factors which determine 
the level and distribution of foreign asset holdings. 
- 5-I- 
Such a model is depicted in Figure 3.1 on a simplified basis. 
Figure 3.1 The OPEC Surplus and Its Disposal in a General Equilibrium Framework 
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The diagram shows that crude oil production by the 
OPEC countries is determined by the OPEC countries' 
requirements for oil in addition to the world price of oil, 
and external influences such as wars between producing 
countries. The oil price is determined by the level of oil 
production (supply) and the world demand for OPEC oil. 
The oil produced is consumed both domestically and 
abroad, each being a component of Gross Domestic Product. 
The revenues from exports are used for development by 
increasing the level of imports of goods and services. In 
those countries with a limited absorptive capacity, the import 
demand is constrained. Consequently, the 'surplus' revenues 
are used to acquire foreign assets in the developed countries, 
and to increase aid to the developing countries. The 'recycling' 
process is completed by the transfer of these resources to 
the domestic sectors of the developed and developing 
countries, which in turn results in the world demand for OPEC oil. 
It was suggested in Chapter 1 that the speed of this 
'recycling' mechanism may be affected by the distribution of 
foreign assets held by the OPEC countries. The diagram shows 
that wealth of the OPEC countries can be invested in any of 
the developed countries' financial markets, thus possibly 
affecting the speed of the 'recycling' mechanism. 
The general equilibrium framework is completed by the 
interest payments to the OPEC countries on foreign assets held, 
- 59 - 
which helps to determine GDP. Actual OPEC countries' oil 
requirements are thus determined by GDP and the oil price. 
Consequently, a model which considers factors that both 
determine the surplus and its disposal would be theoretically 
superior to any alternative. However, we suggested in the 
previous chapter that the return on assets held abroad was 
often below the discounted return on a barrel of oil. In 
such circumstances, Figure 3.1 would suggest that oil 
production will be cut back in response to this differential 
return1. As a result, exports should fall reducing the size 
of the OPEC surplus, and removing the problem discussed in 
chapter 1. The evidence of Table 1.8 suggests that such a 
theoretical analysis is an inappropriate method of examining 
the surplus and its disposal, as the problem has persisted 
throughout the 1970's. 
3.2 A Model to Determine the OPEC Surplus 
Given the unlikely applicability of the above general 
equilibrium type model to examine the OPEC surplus and its 
disposal, this section attempts to outline a model which 
determines the OPEC surplus. The actual model specified is a 
1: The differential suggests the expected price on oil exceeds 
the rate of return on financial assets, therefore oil 
producers should cut back production and allow the asset in 
the ground to appreciate in value. See Ho telling (1931) 
and Levy and Sarnat (1975). 
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simple, highly aggregated model which is Keynesian in nature. 
The specification draws heavily on the research of Ezatti (1976) 
in that the model recognises the importance of the oil sector 
in the OPEC economies, and that the ability to develop 
economically is to a large extent dependent on oil revenues 
and the absorptive capacities in each country. The model is 
Keynesian in that no monetary sector is included, which is a 
reasonable assumption given the absence of financial institutions 
1 
in the OPEC countries. 
The model can be developed by a consideration of the 
National Income Identity2 for each OPEC country; 
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Xt - Mt - Vt 1) 
i. e. Gross Domestic Product (Y t) 
is equal to the total 
consumption (Ct), plus total investment (It), plus total 
government spending (Gt), plus export receipts (Xt), minus 
3 import spending (Mt), minus the net invisible trade balance (Vt). 
The individual components of Yt have been adjusted so 
that the important contribution of government in the OPEC 
economies can be recognised. For example, a large proportion 
of government expenditure is devoted to consumption goods in the 
form of expanded administrative, social and military sectors of 
1: see Chapter 1, pp13 for a discussion of financial institutions 
in the OPEC countries. 
2: see Levacic (1978) for a useful guide to a general 
macroeconomic model. 
3: for most of the OPEC countries, net invisible trade is 
generally negative due to the payment of expatriate workers. 
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the OPEC economies1. The need for such spending suggests 
that government consumption expenditure (GCt) is dependent 
on total government revenues(GRt) and the level of spending 
in the previous period. 
i. e. GCt =f (GRt, GCt 
-1) 
2) 
In contrast, private consumption spending (PCt) is 
a relatively small amount of total consumption expenditure, 
and therefore is a function of personal disposal income (YD). 
i. e. PCt = f(Yt) 3) where YD = (Yt - ORt) where 
ORt equals revenues from oil exports, most of which accrue to 
government. 
Similarly, a large proportion of investment is financed 
by government and the factors determining the level of 
government expenditure on investment (GIt) are likely to be 
different from those determining private investment spending 
(PIt). Most government investment is expenditure on development 
projects for the future, which is likely to be determined 
mainly by oil revenues (ORt) as it is oil revenues which 
provide the basis for planning development projects, i. e. 
GIt =f (ORt) 4) 
In contrast, private investment spending is more likely 
to be determined by similar decisions to those determining 
investment in the developed countries2, such as expected return, 
1: see data appendix for figures on government consumption spending. 
2: see P. Junanker (1977) for a discussion of theories of 
investment behaviour. 
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the level of capacity utilization in the economy, etc. 
However, the lack of development of a market economy in the 
OPEC countries suggests such variables are difficult to 
identify, therefore private investment spending (PIt) is 
assumed to depend on the level of national income in the 
previous year (Yt _1) 
as this can be a proxy for the other 
variables. i. e. 
Pit =f (Yt -1) 
5) 
Exports (Xt) are determined exogenously to the OPEC countries 
in general, being determined in the major consuming areas. 
However, we shall have to return to the export equation, in 
order to obtain an estimate of the OPEC surplus. 
The level of imports (Mt) have increased dramatically 
since 1973 due to the vast increase in oil revenues and the 
development projects undertaken. Clearly, the level of imports 
is restricted by the absorptive capacities in each of the OPEC 
economies, and is a major determinant of the surplus. Ideally, 
such importance would warrant a disaggregated analysis of 
imported commodities, but detailed analysis is restricted by 
lack of data availability. Imports are assumed to depend on 
total income as a simplified proxy therefore, i. e. 
Mt =f (Yt) 6) 
Net invisible trade consists mainly of payments for 
expatriate workers, and the receipt of earnings on foreign 
assets held. However, data is unavailable for either of these 
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two components in an observational useful time series. 
Consequently, the net invisible balance (Vt) is considered 
a function of total income, as the large payments to foreign 
labour results in a negative balance generally. The demand 
for expatriate workers is a function of total income, 
therefore 
Vt =f (Yt) 7) 
Total government revenues (GRt) consist of revenues 
from oil (ORt) plus direct taxes obtained by the taxation 
of land values (DTt) plus indirect taxes levied on imported 
goods (ITt) plus interest earnQ4on foreign asset holdings (RTt) , 
i. e. 
GRt = ORt + DTt + ITt + RTt 8) 
A large proportion of government revenues are provided 
by oil revenues, which are clearly a function of petroleum 
exports, i. e. 
ORt =f(PXt) 9) where Xt = PXt + NPXt 
and both petroleum exports (PXt) and non-petroleum exports (NPXt) 
are determined exogenously, the latter being a small proportion 
of total export earnings in general. 
The other sources of government revenue should ideally 
be examined in an individual manner, but the relative small 
size of indirect and direct taxes, and the lack of data 
availability on all these components of government revenue, 
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suggest that non-oil government revenues (NORt) should be 
estimated as a function of total income, i. e. 
NORt =f (Yt) where NORt = DRt + ITt + RTt 
Total oil production (OPt) in each OPEC'country is 
equal to petroleum exports plus domestic consumption of 
petroleum (DOt) i. e. 
Opt = PXt + DOt 10) 
Domestic oil consumption is a small, but growing 
proportion of the total amount of oil produced in each 
9) 
country. However, the price charged to domestic consumers 
1 
differs widely from the price charged to developed countries. 
Consequently, domestic oil consumption is assumed to depend 
on National Income, i. e. 
DOt =f (Yt) 11) 
Those relationships and equations provide the underlying 
framework of the economies of the OPEC countries. As suggested 
earlier, the equations are to a large extent derived from 
Ezatti's work which recognises the importance of absorptive 
capacities and oil revenues in the OPEC economies. However, 
there is a marked deviation between the use of these equations 
between Ezatti and this thesis. Ezatti suggested that each of 
the equations should be estimated, and the resulting coefficients 
used as constraints in M OpFjp j5i(%9 function in which the 
1: the price paid by domestic users is difficult to obtain, 
but generally thought to be much lower than charged on exports. 
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future value of consumption is maximised to the benefit of 
the individual OPEC countries. We suggested in Chapter 2, 
and in section 3.1, that such formal models do not appear to 
be consistent with the actual behaviour of the OPEC countries 
during the 1970's. Consequently, the equations of the model 
were estimated and the resulting coefficients used as the 
basis for future projections of the components of the economy 
without the formal underlying utility function constraining 
their path. 
As well as the specification of a model of the OPEC 
economies, to predict the surplus, we require an equation to 
determine export receipts to the OPEC countries. In Chapter 2 
we suggested that many studies had difficulties in estimating 
the demand for OPEC oi11. Consequently, the equation is much 
simplified, and OPEC exports of oil (PXt) are assumed to be 
a function of the price of oil (OIL p) and world 
income (WESTYt), 
i. e. 
PXt =f (WESTYt, OILp) 12) 
This equation does not include the price of any 
substitute energy product as it is assumed the demand for 
petroleum is fairly inelastic2 with respect to price. In a 
more detailed analysis of demand for OPEC oil, the price of 
1: see the study by Deagle, Rahmani and Huff (1981) for example. 
2: The figures in Table 1.3 show that despite higher oil prices, 
world oil consumption was higher in 1979 than in 1973. 
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substitute products, and indeed, the price of oil from 
non-OPEC countries would have to be considered. 
1 
All the equations presented in this section were 
estimated by the appropriate methods2 and their results, 
along with the implications for the surplus are discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
3.3 A Model of the Disposal of the Surplus 
We suggested in Chapter 2 that portfolio diversification 
appears a sensible strategy for OPEC investors to follow, this 
section outlines a model which empirically tests such 
a strategy. The model developed is formally ad-hoc, in the 
tradition of De Leeuw (1965), Branson (1968), Branson and Hill 
(1971), Bryant and Hendershott (1972) and Norman (1968). More 
rigorous models based on the theory of portfolio selection 
can be found in Parkin (1969), Courakis(1975) and White (1975). 
3.31 Theoretical Background to the Model 
The theory of portfolio selection, briefly outlined in 
Chapter 2, suggests the desired holdings of an asset by an 
1: However, the price of oil in non-OPEC countries tend to be 
approximately equal the price of similar grades of oil in 
OPEC countries. 
2: see Chapter 4 for the estimation methods employed. 
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investor will depend on the expected return and risk associated 
with that asset, and the expected return and associated risk 
on all competing assets, i. e. 
DA =f (rA, rB, ... rz, QA' QB' ... QZ) 13) 
where DA = desired holdings of asset A 
rA, rB, ... rz = expected return on assets A, B, .. to z 
QA' 0B' " "Qz = risk associated with assets A, B, ... to z 
Chapter 2 also informed us that Grubel (1968) has shown 
that international diversification is a sensible strategy for 
investors to adopt. This suggests that since the floating 
exchange rate regime introduced in 1971, exchange rate 
expectations should be considered by the international investor. 
Consequently, equation 13) becomes: 
e DA =f (rA, rB, ... rz, QA, QB' ... QZ, X ) 14) 
where X= expected exchange rate of currency in which A is e 
denominated. 
An equation such as 14) would be suitable as the basis 
for the investment strategy of OPEC investors, with an under- 
lying utility function that can be characterised by the first 
two moments of the probability distribution of the returns on 
the asset , as risk is small relative to total wealth. 
Previous studies of financial behaviour have emphasised 
the importance of wealth as a constraint on desired asset holdings. 
1: see Borsch (1972) 
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Good examples are provided by De Leeuw (1965), Branson 
and Hill (1971), Bryant (1975) and Brainard and Tobin (1968). 
De Leeuw suggested that desired holdings of a particular 
asset are constrained by the total size of portfolio wealth, 
which ideally is equal hkrý sum of assets held in the 
portfolio. In the same manner, we can postulate the desired 
holdings of an asset by OPEC investors are subject to 
a similar constraint. Consequently, equation 14) is itself 
modified to; 
DA =f (r A, rB 
e W) , ... r2, QA. QB, ... QZ, X, 15) 
where W= portfolio wealth 
Equation 15) thus represents the theoretical basis equation 
for an OPEC investor. However, given the large number of 
assets available and held1 by the OPEC countries, and the 
different currencies in which these assets are denominated, 
the number of variables entering equation 15) would be too 
numerous for the investor to contemplate adjusting his asset 
holdings in response to interest rate and risk changes. For 
ten different asset categories denominated in the same 
currency, at least 22 variables would be required. In such 
circumstances, the transactions costs involved would restrict 
portfolio adjustments. In addition, such an equation would 
present major difficulties for the researcher, as many 
statistical problems would develop from the estimation of 
such an equation. 
One way of determining a more practical strategy than 
1: see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, pp 35 
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that proposed in equation 15) would be to eliminate the 
risk variables. As suggested in Chapter 2, this has been 
frequently adopted by less rigorous applications, although 
in many cases without any discussion behind this approach. 
Table 2.1 indicated that OPEC investors had a preference for 
assets of financial institutions in the developed world. The 
possibility of default on the repayment of those assets is 
very small, and generally constant between the different types 
of asset1. Any slight difference in risk associated with 
these assets will be accounted for in the rate of return 
offered on the assets, therefore such an approach seems quite 
reasonable. Any risk arising from the international nature 
of the strategy adopted will be captured in the expected 
exchange rate variable, thus equation 15) can be modified to; 
" 
DA =f (rA, rB, ... r2, Xe, W) 
16) 
However, such an equation may still not be a realistic or 
practical proxy to model the foreign investment behaviour of 
OPEC countries. 
3.32 A Two-Stage Portfolio Model 
An equation such as 16) would still describe a strategy 
in which the. holdings of one asset would be affected by both, 
the returns on all other assets available, and the expected 
exchange rate of that asset's currency vis a vis other currencies. 
1: the freezing of Iranian assets held in US banks in 1979 would 
appear to contradict this statement. However, it is assumed 
that such occurences are random and can thus be dealt within 
the normal assumptions of an econometric model. 
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Presumably a more practical strategy may still be obtained. 
Some assistance for a more realistic approach is provided by 
the work of Strotz (1957,1959) on the concept of additive, 
separable utility functions. Strotz suggested that an 
individual economic agent could allocate his expenditures 
amongst various branches, and then make independent decisions 
as to how best to spend each branch allocation amongst the 
various commodities in that branch. In such a 'utility tree' 
approach, the individual's utility is maximised subject to his 
usual budget constraint, by the maximising of the individual 
branch utility functions. If this concept is true, then 
there is no reason why such assumptions cannot be applied to 
asset holdings of the OPEC countries, as OPEC investors are 
faced with the choice of the complete range of financial 
instruments, and all currencies in which any such instruments 
may be denominated. The utility tree of OPEC investors would 
resemble a situation similar to that depicted in Figure 3.2 
in such circumstances. 
As the international economic system has been subject 
to a floating exchange rate regime since 1971, currency 
fluctuations have been quite marked. Consequently, OPEC 
investors will allocate funds between currencies at the second 
'branch' of the tree, given the first branch allocation between 
consumption and savings. The third branch of the tree would 
allocate funds between various categories of assets given the 
second branch decisions, and further decisions for diversification 
would be taken down the tree until all possible allocations have 
been decided. 
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Figure 3.2 A Utility Tree for OPEC Investors 
Income 
Savings (Asset Holdings) Consumption 
Gov't consumption 
Private Consumption 
Assets in US Assets in UK 
Gov't Bills Bank Deposits 
Gov't Bonds 
Assets in other countries 
Equities, Investments, etc. 
Therefore, we can postulate a two stage portfolio model 
to examine the disposal of the OPEC surplus, the first stage 
allocating wealth amongst different currencies, the second 
determining which assets would be held in a given currency. 
The typical equations of such a model would be as follows; 
D=f (r $, r£, rDM, ... X$, W) 
17) 
where D$ = desired holdings of dollars 
r$ = representative interest rate on dollar denominated assets 
sterling 
rDM= II . if " deutschmark " 
X$ = expected dollar exchange rate 
W= wealth constraint 
and similarly for the desired holdings of other currencies at 
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the stage one branch, and; 
DTB (rTB, rBD, rGBI rCB, re' W) 18) 
where DTB = desired holdings of Treasury Bills 
rTB = interest rate on Treasury Bills 
rBD, rýB, rCB, re = interest rates on bank deposits, 
government bonds, corporate bonds and 
equity respectively 
W= wealth constraint 
and similarly for the desired holdings of other assets at the 
stage two branch given the stage one decisions. 
Clearly such a model would have advantages for the 
investor, and indeed, for the practical researcher, as the 
decisions determining asset holdings are determined in this 
tree-like approach, allowing a practical analysis of the 
financial markets. Furthermore, this approach provides the 
basis to the model empirically tested. However, further 
refinement of the model is still required. 
The Choice of Suitable Interest Rate Variables: 
Although we have refined the model to a. more practical 
level, problems still exist as to the choice of relevant 
interest rates at both the stage one and stage two branches. 
The problems involved in choosing representative interest rates 
have been a common headache for researchers historically, as 
to some extent all asset categories involve a degree of 
aggregation concerning the maturity and liquidity levels of 
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assets in a particular category. For example, difficulties 
are encountered when trying to obtain a representative rate 
for Eurodollar assets. Published data on OPEC holdings of 
Eurodollars is only provided on a highly aggregated basis 
therefore leaving the researcher susceptable to problems of 
guesswork on their likely maturity date. 
Another issue is the role played by real interest 
rates, i. e. rates of interest discounted for inflation. 
Theoretically, we may suspect real interest rates may be 
important at the first stage branch of the model. 
Furthermore, what importance should be attached to the 
role of expectations concerning interest rate movements. 
Keynes (1936) suggested that investors held a notion about the 
'normal' rate of interest on bonds, and that expectations about 
the likely movement of the actual rate on bonds would effect 
their investment decisions insofar as they could anticipate 
capital gains or avoid capital losses. De Leeuw (1965) 
attempted to capture expectations in his research by trying 
to calculate the 'normal' rate on bonds using a weighted lag 
distribution of past rates. By comparing this 'normal' rate 
with the current actual rate, investors could make decisions 
as to whether they expected the current rate to rise or fall. 
Keynes had proposed that if current rates exceeded the normal 
rate, investors would expect the current rate to fall. In 
contrast, Duesenberry (1958) suggested that if current rate 
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exceeded the normal rate, there was no reason why investors 
should not expect a further rise in the current rate. De Leeuw 
attempted to test the alternative ideas empirically. Clearly 
such expectations may affect the decision plans of OPEC 
investors. 
Against the background of those considerations, we 
must anticipate the usual problem of incorporating too many 
interest rates to allow sensible incorporation 
1 in our 
specification. 
The relevance of some of the questions raised can perhaps 
be decided on theoretical grounds. Where this is not possible, 
empirical tests must provide us with the answers. Let us 
first consider the stage one branch. The choice of suitable 
representative rates can perhaps be best made by a consideration 
of the liquidity structure of the assets held in a given 
currency. Unfortunately, detailed data on asset holdings by 
the OPEC countries is only available in the UK, and the USA2. 
However, the data indicates the predominance of short term 
assets, particularly bank deposits, held in the OPEC portfolio. 
Consequently, short term representative interest rates are 
preferred. Due to the varying portfolio mix of bank deposits 
and short term government debt held over time, an empirical 
test of the most suitable variable is provided. 
1: multicollinearity is usually a severe problem between interest 
rate variables. see J. Johnston (1972). 
2: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletins, and the US Treasury 
Bulletins provide data for OPEC asset holdings; see data appendix 
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The choice of the relevant representative interest 
rates has implications for the importance of expectations at 
the stage one branch. The suggestion that short term rates 
are appropriate, the implication is that investors are not 
particularly concerned about capital gains or losses, as 
the interest rate on short term assets is usually fixed at the 
time of purchase. Consequently, expectations are given little 
significance at this stage. 
The role of real interest rates is more interesting. 
We have suggested above that theoretically we may suspect that 
real interest rates are important. However, unless OPEC 
countries are purchasing goods with matured funds in that 
same currency on a frequent basis, nominal rates may be more 
applicable. This would explain why OPEC countries had invested 
in UK assets, when the rate of return adjusted for inflation 
was negative, over much of the period under consideration. 
Only the more recent studies concerned with international 
capital movements have recognised the possible importance of 
real interest rates, mainly due to the fact that inflation has 
been a problem of recent times historically in terms of research 
in economics. Kreicher (1981) is a good example. The question 
of their importance is empirically tested in this thesis, as 
theoretically the evidence is not conclusive. 
The anticipated problem of multicollinearity and too 
few degrees of freedom suggested that only the interest rates 
on the most likely substitutes should be used. For this purpose 
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the use of differential rates is also helpful. 
Some theoretical considerations may assist our choice 
of relevant interest rates and the stage two branch also. 
As the assets held are more clearly defined, the choice of 
representative rates is not as difficult as stage one, although 
some choices had to be made for bank deposits, and government 
bonds maturity dates. 
Real interest rates are given no importance at this 
level, as all assets within a particular currency are subject 
to the same inflation rate. 
The role of expectations is given more significance in 
stage two of the model. Given the stage one currency holdings 
decision, the OPEC investors then have to decide upon the 
composition of their country portfolio. Whilst the holdings 
of short term assets will be determined by their actual rate, 
it is hypothesised that investors consider the expected rate 
of return on bonds in order to anticipate possible capital 
gains or losses. Consequently a variable to test such 
expectations is tested for all asset holdings. Even though 
capital gains or losses cannot be made on shorter term assets, 
the deviation between the actual and normal rate on bonds, may 
affect the short term asset holdings in so much as the deviation 
makes bonds more/less attractive than short term assets. For 
example, if the current rate on bonds exceeds the normal rate, 
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then investors expect the current rate to fall, according 
to Keynes, thus allowing a capital gain to be made if the 
investor makes a purchase. Consequently, at such times, 
bank deposits may become less attractive. 
Once again, problems concerning multicollinearity 
and degrees of freedom suggested that the number of actual 
interest rates used in the model ought to be restricted. 
Wealth Constraints and Portfolio Adjustment 
The typical equations 17) and 18) suggested that 
desired asset holdings at both stages of the model are 
constrained by portfolio wealth. We must now determine 
specific variables to. represent these wealth constraints. 
Furthermore, we have only discussed desired asset holdings 
to date. In practise, actual asset holdings may be 
constrained from reaching these desired levels by total 
portfolio wealth. The problems of choosing suitable wealth 
variables have received much attention in the literature. 
Good examples are provided by De Leeuw (1965), Brainard and 
Tobin (1968), Whiteo(1975). and Bryant (1975). Bryant gives 
a good discussion of the appropriate wealth variable. He 
suggests 'in principle, with the entire portfolio correctly 
specified, a balance sheet constraint will hold such that 
S will be equal to the sum of the Fi*', where S represents 
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the wealth constraint and Fi* the individual actual asset 
holdings. Bryant indicates that for households, current 
income is taken to be a proxy for wealth, and for firms, 
profits are a good proxy. For the purposes of our model, 
suitable proxies, consistent with Bryant's suggestion, can 
be obtained. 
In the stage one branch of the model, the wealth 
variable can be obtained by deriving the sum of the individual 
currency holdings of the OPEC countries. This is equal to the 
total surplus less the money given to aid, and to international 
institutions such as the IMF, i. e. equation 17) becomes; 
D=f (r$, r£, rDMI ... X$, WESTOT) 17a) 
where WESTOT = sum of individual currency holdings. 
Similarly, the wealth variable at the stage two branch 
can be obtained by deriving the sum of the individual asset 
holdings in a particular currency, i. e. equation 18) becomes; 
DTB= f (rTB, rBD, rGB, rCB, rE, TOT) 18a) 
where TOT = sum of individual asset holdings. 
We have suggested above also that the actual holdings 
of assets may be constrained from reaching desired holdings 
by a wealth constraint. In reality, the actual level of assets 
held by OPEC countries may diverge from desired levels, due 
to both transactions costs and a wealth constraint. 
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A rationalisation for the divergence between actual 
and desired asset holdings due to transactions costs is 
provided by Feige (1967), who proposes the use of the stock 
adjustment model, developed by Nerlove (1958) to incorporate 
the adjustment between actual and desired levels. Many 
previous financial models have incorporated the stock adjustment 
in their framework. Good examples can be found in De Leeuw 
(1965), Norton (1968) Bryant and Hendershott (1970) and 
Kreicher (1981). The essence of the model is the premise 
that investors attempt to reach their desired asset holdings 
over time, but they are constrained by the transaction costs 
involved in reaching such a position. If we assume desired 
holdings of asset A to be a linear function of the relevant 
explanatory variables, we can incorporate the typical use of 
the stock adjustment model as follows; 
DA = a1 + b1 r1 = b2r2 + ... bnrn + c1 Xe + d1 W a) 
where r1, r2, to rn represent interest rates 
X= expected exchange rate e 
W= wealth 
a`bl , b2' ... bncl , dl = unknown coefficients 
The stock adjustment model proposes that; 
DA, t - DA, t-1 = (DA 
,t 
DA't-1) b) 
i. e. the adjustment of asset holdings between periods t and t-1 
is equal to a constant proportion of the discrepancy between 
desired asset holdings at time t, and actual holdings at t-1. 
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By substitution of b) into a) and re-arranging, we 
obtain; 
DA, t =X (a' b1 r1 ,+ b2 r2 + ... bnrn + c1Xe + d1 W)+(1-A)DA, t-1 C) 
Hovever, De Leeuw suggested that the adjustment of asset 
holdings would also be constrained by the portfolio wealth 
size of the investor, as the total funds available at any one 
time may constrain him from adjusting his asset holdings to 
reach desired levels. De Leeuw proposed that the previous 
period's total wealth would act as a suitable proxy as the 
constraint on adjustment of actual to desired asset holdings. 
In our model, this suggests that the size of the OPEC surplus 
in the previous quarter may act as a constraint on this 
adjustment path. Consequently equation b) becomes; 
DAft - DAt-1 = X(DA, t-DAºt_1) + eSt_1 d) 
where St_1 = total surplus in the previous period 
and e= unknown coefficient 
substitute d) into a), 
DA't =%(at bý rI +b2r2+ ... barn+C1xe+d1 W) + (1-X)DA't-1+eSt-1 19) 
which represents the general form of the equations of the model. 
Exchange Rate Expectations 
We have suggested that exchange rate expectations will 
be an important determinant of asset holdings at the stage one 
branch of the model. To complete the specification of the 
model, we must consider how such expectations may be formed. 
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As suggested in the previous chapter, little research 
has incorporated exchange rate expectations in determining 
capital flows, mainly due to the fact that the system of 
floating exchange rates has existed only since 1971. However, 
Hodjera (1971) and Makin (1972) are examples of more recent 
work that have incorporated attempted proxy variables for 
exchange rate expectations, although their proxies were 
1 
unconvincing 
Perhaps studies in other areas can suggest some advice 
for constructing a proxy for exchange rate expectations. We 
have already discussed De Leeuw's method of calculating interest 
rate expectations. Friedman (1957) also proposed a weighted 
lag mechanism to capture expectations concerning permanent 
income. Muth (1960,1961) introduced the notion of rational 
expectations. Mayes (1981) provides a useful discussion of 
how people form expectations of the values of economic 
variables, particularly with reference to rational expectations. 
Rational expectations, where the decision maker's 
expectations are continually revised upon the availability of 
more information, are rejected as the basis for deriving a 
suitable proxy for exchange rate expectations. The necessary 
assumption of a complete understanding of the economic forces 
at work for rational expectations concepts to hold, may not be 
1: see pp 54 in Chapter 2. 
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valid in the context of OPEC surpluses and their disposal1. 
In addition, the regular intervention by central banks in 
foreign exchange markets suggests rational expectations to 
be inappropriate. 
In preference, an adaptive expectations hypothesis is 
assumed. Although this assumption accepts the possibility of 
under/over predictions of the exchange rate implicity, it 
appears that markets expect the exchange rate to show some 
relationship to its previous rates. On a more practical note, 
the calculation of adaptive expectations type variables does 
not require as much information, and therefore the extra time 
dimension needed to calculate rational expectations variables 
does not seem justified unless the evidence is particularly 
strong. 
The specific form of adaptive expectations variable 
calculated is similar to that proposed by De Leeuw, for 
calculating the 'normal' interest rate on bonds. However, 
more weight was given to the present and most recent values 
in the derivation of the expected exchange rate variable, as 
this seemed theoretically plausible. The general mechanism 
generating the variable was; 
1: For example, if a complete understanding of economic forces 
existed, OPEC investors would be expected to hold more direct 
investments, as they are the only asset whose value has kept 
ahead of inflation during the 1970's. 
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Xe = 
1-X i-1 
1-> i=1 
XA-i 
where X takes values between 0 and 1 
F= number of previous periods considered 
XA= actual exchange rate at time t 
e X= expected rate 
Such a variable was constructed for the countries considered 
at stage one of the model. 
3.321 Further Considerations for the Model 
Before presenting the completed form of the model 
estimated, some further considerations have to be taken into 
account, particularly with reference to data availability. 
OPEC -A Homogenous Unit? 
We suggested in Chapter 1 that the surplus is mainly 
a matter of concern for the 'low' absorbing countries of 
Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Quatar and the United Arab Emirates. 
Ideally, any model which examines the disposal of the surplus 
would consider each country separately as heterogenities 
amongst the investment behaviour is likely. However, the 
unavailability of data does not allow such disaggregated 
analysis. Some data for foreign asset holdings by the Latin 
American and African members of OPEC countries is available 1 
1: the main data sources are, the Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, and the US Treasury Bulletin, both of which include 
data on individual country asset holdings for the Latin Cont 
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but this is not provided over a long enough time horizon 
historically to be useful. In any case, these countries, 
with the exception of Libya, are of less anal tical interest 
with respect to the disposal of the surplus. Furthermore, 
data on the asset holdings of the 'low absorbers' as a unit 
is scarce. Some data is available on bank deposits held by 
'low absorbers' but this is too aggregared by asset category 
to be of any interest to this thesis1. In addition, this 
data is only available from the last quarter of 1975 which 
places constraints on degrees of freedom in empirical research. 
Most published data in fact reports asset holdings for 
the OPEC countries as a total unit2, consequently the empirical 
investigation imagines the OPEC countries to be a homogenous 
unit with respect to their financial investment policy. It 
appears that some degree of statistical bias may arise from 
this level of aggregation. In addition, it is rumoured that 
even the 'low absorbers' have a different investment strategy3. 
Kuwait's foreign portfolio is thought to be quite sophisticated 
whereas that of Iraq is considered to be highly short term in 
its maturity content. 
Cont American and African OPEC member countries. 
1: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Annual Reports 
include a table reporting OPEC countries' holdings of bank 
deposits in the reporting area. 
2: in fact, the available data is for OPEC plus Bahrain, Brunei, 
Oman and Trinidad & Tobago. 
3: see S. Bluff (1980) 
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On the other hand, the use of experienced money market 
dealers by the 'surplus' countries will offset the bias to a 
large extent, as dealers are likely to choose similar options 
for investment for customers. 
OPEC Aid, and Funds Flowing to International Institutions 
As shown in Table 3.2, the value of funds given in 
direct aid to less developed countries (LDC's) and in loans 
to institutions such as the IMF and IBRD is approximately 
one-third of the total surplus. By the end of 1980 the 
accumulated figure for these funds since 1974 was in the 
region of $100 US billions. Clearly, this forms an important 
and direct part of the recycling process. However to include 
such flows in a portfolio selection type framework appears 
to be a questionable decision. Any expected return on aid 
is not monetary and more altruistic in general. Therefore, 
to include such flows in the frwmwork proposed above is 
dubious. To the extent that OPEC aid, at least in monetary 
terms1, has been an important route of recycling, we must 
recognise the limitations of the analysis. 
Non-Dollar, Non-Sterling Assets 
We suggested that in the stage one branch of the model, 
OPEC investors will diversify their wealth amongst different 
1: see Table 2.1 on pp35. 
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currencies. Unfortunately detailed data is only provided 
for assets denominated in dollars and sterling. Consequently, 
non-dollar and non-sterling assets are derived as an aggregate 
by finding the residual of the total surplus from all known 
components. No details of the particular currencies or 
liquidity structure of the assets are published and therefore 
the empirical analysis is restricted at both branches of 
the portfolio model. At the stage one branch, analysis can 
only be performed by considering non-sterling, non-dollar 
currencies as a total unit. At the second stage, data 
availability does not allow any analysis of assets held in 
non-dollar, non-sterling currencies. 
To the extent that the available data does indicate 
possible growth of non-dollar, non-sterling assets in the OPEC 
portfolio proportionately, the empirical analysis is further 
limited in its scope1. 
Equity, Property and Other Investments 
Table 2.1 also indicated a breakdown of assets held in 
the USA and UK. These figures include estimates of equity, 
property and other portfolio investments in both countries. 
However, data on such assets is not provided on a regular basis, 
which restricts empirical analysis of these forms of investment 
1: see Table 3.1 
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as a means of recycling. These assets are thought to be a 
small percentage of the total surplus, thus the importance 
of data unavailability for these types of investment is not 
crucial. 
Political Factors 
It has been suggested that political factors may have 
affected OPEC countries' asset holdings1. For example, it 
has been suggested that the freezing of Iranian assets by US 
banks following the 'hostage' crisis has resulted in a 
movement against dollar assets. 
Some testing of the importance of such political factors 
was undertaken with 
appears to indicate 
The last quarter of 
of OPEC rose by 500 
freezing. 
the use of dummy variables, but the data 
little movement against US bank deposits. 
1979 indicated US bank deposit holdings 
million dollars2, the quarter after the 
1: see Mr Atiqui, the ex-Finance Minister of Kuwait in 
Mees(March, 1980). Also various comments have been along 
similar lines in various issues of International Currency Review. 
2: see US Treasury Bulletin, March 1980. 
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Table 3 OPEC HOLDINGS OF NON-STERLING 
NON-DOLLAR ASSETS IN OECD COUNTRIES 
(US $ billions) 1974-1980 
1973 
1974 
1975 3.8 
1976 7.9 
1977 10.9 
1978 13.7 
1979 17.9 
1980 22.9 
Source: Own estimates, in addition to BOEQB 1974-80, 
BIS Annual Report 1974-80, US Treasury Bulletin 1974-80. 
Table 3 OPEC AID AND FINANCE TO INTER- 
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (US $ billions) 
I07A-1(1 on 
Total % of Surplus 
1973 - - 
1974 15.2 20.8 
1975 31.6 29.0 
1976 43.4 30.2 
1977 55.3 31.3 
1978 64.0 33.9 
1979 75.7 31.1 
1980 101.2 31.1 
Source: Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1974-1981 
1: IMF and IBRD 
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3.33 The Model Estimated 
The two stage model estimated can be summarised as 
follows; 
Stage 1 branch: 
, Wt) 20) D£ =f (r£, r$, X£e 
where D£ = desired holdings of sterling 
r£ = representative interest rate on sterling 
r$ = representative interest rate on dollars 
X£ = expected exchange rate between sterling and dollars 
Wt = stage one wealth constraint 
By incorporating the stock adjustment model, actual holdings 
are estimated as a linear function of the relevant explanatory 
variables, the previous quarter's total surplus and the previous 
quarter's holdings of the asset, i. e. 
D£ t= (aj +bIr£+b2r$+c,, 
e+d1Wt) - (1-)%) D£, t_1+eSt_1 21) 
Similar equations are estimated for dollar, and non-dollar, 
non-sterling asset holdings of OPEC countries. 
Staqe 2 branch: 
22 DTB =f (rTB. rGB, r 
e 
GB, Tt) ) 
* 
where DTB = desired holdings of Treasury Bills. 
rTB = interest rate on Treasury Bills 
rGB = interest rate on Government Bonds 
re = expected rate on bonds 
Tt = wealth constraint at stage two branch 
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By incorporation of the stock adjustment model we have; 
DTB. t =X (a1+b1rTB + 
b2rGB + b3rGB+c1Tt) + (JA) DTB't-1+eSt-1 23) 
Similar equations are estimated for all assets held at the 
stage two branch of the model. 
CHAPTER 4: 
A MODEL FOR THE OPEC SURPLUS RESULTS. 
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CHAPTER 4: A MODEL FOR THE OPEC SURPLUS RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical results estimated 
for the model of the OPEC economies from which the OPEC 
surplus can be predicted. The next section re-introduces 
the model specified in Chapter 3 in an econometric framework 
and suggests a modified version of the model suitable for 
estimation with the data available. 
This section presents results estimated using series 
of data over time, and suggests some limitations with this 
approach. Section 3 advocates an alternative estimation 
procedure to derive the parameters of the OPEC economies. 
Section 4 discusses the applicability of this approach in the 
provision of forecasts, and considers other forecasts of the 
OPEC surplus in the future. 
4.2 The Model Refined 
The already aggregated and simplified model of the OPEC 
economies specified in Chapter 3 has been further modified for 
estimation purposes. The following adjustments to the model 
were necessary due to the unavailability of data; 
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1) We suggested in Chapter 3 that factors determining 
private investment were different to those affecting 
government investment decisions. However, due to the lack 
of adequate data on private and government investment, a 
total investment equation was estimated. Insofar that oil 
revenues may act as an indirect stimulus to private invest- 
ment, total investment was estimated as a function of oil 
revenues. 
2) As indicated in the last chapter, net invisible trade 
was assumed to be a function of total income, although the 
relative importance of invisible exports and imports may 
change over time thus suggesting a more disaggregated approach 
to be suitable. This would be particularly true with respect 
to increased receipts from assets held abroad, and reduced 
demands for foreign labour. However, the unavailability of 
data restricted such an exercise. 
3) In many cases, data on non-oil revenues was difficult 
to obtain, and where available unreliable. Consequently, 
non-oil revenues have been obtained as the residual between 
total government revenues and oil revenues. 
4) In estimating domestic oil consumption we required an 
estimate of the oil price for domestic consumers, as ideally 
oil consumption would be estimated in value terms. However, 
as such data is not available, oil consumption was estimated 
in volume terms. Exports of oil were estimated in both terms 
of volume and value. 
The final form of the model estimated was as follows: 
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Yt = Ct+It+Gt+Xt-Mt-Vt 1) 
Ct = a1+b1YD+u1 2) 
Gt = a2+b2GRt+c3Gt_1+u2 3) 
It = a3+b3ORt+u3 4) 
Xt = PXt+NPXt 5) 
Mt = a4+b4Yt+u4 6) 
Vt = a5+b5Yt+u5 7) 
GRt = ORt+NORt 8) 
ORt = a6+b6PXt+u6 9) 
NORt = a7+b7Yt+u7 10) 
DOt = a8+b8Yt+u8 11) 
opt = DOt+PXt 12) 
PXt = a9+b9OILPt+c9WESTYP+u9 13) 
where the system contains nine behavioural equations 
and four identities. All variables are defined in Table 4.1. 
For purposes of comparison between countries, and consistency 
amongst the data, all variables are expressed in millions of 
US dollars at 1975 exchange rates unless volume units are 
appropriate. 
4.21 Data Sources and Improvement 
The large amount of data was collected from a variety 
of sources , the IMF International Financial Statistics 
1: see data appendix 
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Yearbook 1980 being the major source for the macro-components 
of demand. In some cases, this was supplemented with data 
from United Nations publications, and domestic National 
Accounts statistics. For data on oil production, consumption, 
etc., the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, and the UN World 
Energy Statistics Series J were the most useful. 
For purposes of comparison, data was converted to 
millions of US dollars at 1975 exchange rates1 when presented 
in local currency or US dollars at current prices and exchange 
rates. 
4.22 Results: Time Series Analysis 
For most variables, data was only available on an 
annual basis which limited the scope of the empirical analysis 
to using annual time series data. In addition, most recent 
data was unavailable for some variables for certain countries. 
The variability of data is shown in Table 4.2. The lack of 
data was problematic therefore on both its recent availability 
and its regularity. This was particularly important given the 
recent existence of the surplus historically2. Nevertheless, 
the equations of the model were estimated over the sample 
periods indicated in Table 4.2. 
1: Conversion made using exchange rate series rf in the IMF 
'IFS Supplement on Exchange Rates' 1981. 
2: see Chapter 1. 
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Table 4.1 Definitions of Variables 
(All in US dollars millions at 
1975 exchange rates)* 
Yt = Gross Domestic Product 
Ct = Private Consumption 
Gt = Government Consumption 
It = Total Investment 
Xt = Total Exports 
PXt = Petroleum Exports 
NPX = Non Petroleum Exports 
Mt = Imports 
Vt = Net Invisible Trade 
d 
y= Disposable Income 
GRt = Government Revenues 
ORt = Oil Revenues 
NORt = Non-Oil Revenues 
DOt = Domestic Oil Consumption (millions of barrels per year) 
opt = Oil Production 
OILPt = Oil Price (US dollars per barrel) 
WESTYp = Non Communist World Income (in billions of US dollars) 
u1.. u9 = Random Disturbance Term 
* except where variables expressed in volume terms. 
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Table 4.2 Period Of Estimation For 
Different OPEC Countries 
Algeria 1960 - 1977 
Ecuador 1960 - 1978 
Gabon 1960 - 1978 
Indonesia 1964 - 1978 
Iran 1960 - 1977 
Iraq 2 1960 - 1971 
Kuwait 1962 - 1977 
Libya 1962 - 1978 
Nigeria 1960 - 1978 
Saudi Arabia 1963 - 1978 
Venezuela 1960 - 1978 
1: no data is available for either Quatar or the U. A. E. 
in such detail. 
2: some data has recently become more available for Iraq 
in the ENI Survey (1981) but this is unofficial data. 
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The equations were estimated by ordinary least 
squares, and two stage least squares, the latter being used 
to take account of the simultaneity present in the modelt. 
Only a sample of the results are presented here, as it was 
realised that the coefficients of the equations would be 
unstable over the time period considered, and hence not 
allowing a sensible interpretation of the coefficients 
estimated both as a basis for testing our hypotheses and a 
basis for forecasting future aggregates. These results are 
presented in Tables 4.3 - 4.5. 
Results are presented for Kuwait, Libya and Saudi 
Arabia, three of the 'low-absorbing' member countries, and 
by way of comparison, Venezuela, a 'high absorbing' country. 
Results are presented for equations 2), 3) and 6) as the 
latter two variables, government spending and imports have 
been greatly affected by the increase in oil revenues, whereas 
private consumption may not have been so greatly affected. 
in addition, these three equations allow direct comparison 
with other research, notably that of Ezatti (1975), which 
estimated the same equations over different sample periods. 
Table 4.3 reports the results obtained for government 
consumption, both from OLS and 2SLS estimates. The most 
striking feature of the results is the similarity between the 
results from the alternative procedures adopted. This may be 
1: see J. Johnston (1972) for a discussion of the use of two 
stage least squares and simultaneous equations. 
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due to the limited sample size used for estimation. One 
of the necessary pre-requisites for 2SLS to be a superior 
estimating technique to OLS is a large sample, as its 
properties are asymptotic1. Alternatively, the similar 
results may be due to the large time trend element present 
in all variables, which results in the instrumental variables 
used in the second stage of estimation being very close to 
the actual values of the true variables 
1. Consequently, 
the discussion of the results is restricted to the OLS 
estimates. 
For all of the countries, the coefficient of the 
government revenue variable is significant at the 1% level 
(t = 2.131). With the exception of Libya, all the equations 
also report a significant lagged spending variable. 
A cross country comparison shows little difference 
between Venezuela, and the three low-absorbing countries. 
As suggested above, the results are difficult to 
interpret due to the instability of the coefficients over 
time. Clearly the structural relationship between government 
consumption expenditure and its determinants, for example, 
will have been greatly changed by the oil price rises in 
1973-74. From 1963 to 1973, spending on government consumption 
rose fairly steadily in Saudi Arabia. However the 1973 total 
1: see J. Johnston (1972) for a discussion of the properties 
of the 2SLS estimates. 
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of 5.3 billion Riyals was trebled to nearly 16 billion 
1 in 1975. Similarly, government revenues, one of the 
determinants rose steadily from 1963 to 1973. The 1973 
total of nearly 23 billion Riyals was more than quadrupled 
by 1975 to approximately 96 billion Riyals, due to the large 
rise in oil receipts. Therefore, the relationship between 
these two variables has changed over time. 
The apparent instability of the coefficients can be 
further confirmed by a comparison of the results in Table 4.3 
with those estimated by Ezatti (1975) for the same equation 
over different sample sizes. His results are shown in 
Table 4.6. 
Ezatti's results have coefficients which contrast 
greatly with our own estimates in Table 4.3, highlighting 
the problem of instability over time. Consequently, to use 
such coefficients as the basis for forecasts about the future 
level of government spending in Saudi Arabia seems a doubtful 
tool, as it would for the other OPEC countries. 
Similar conclusions may be reached concerning the 
results of Tables 4.4 and 4.5. In both cases, reasonable 
results are obtained statistically. However, an economic 
interpretation does not provide as much satisfaction. For 
example, consider the equation estimated for Saudi Arabia, 
the major surplus country. Our results suggest that for an 
1: see data appendix, and IMF: IFS Yearbook 1980. 
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increase of disposable income by 1 billion dollars, there 
would be an increase in private consumption of approximately 
500 million dollars (at 1975 exchange rates). In contrast, 
the results estimated by Ezatti suggested that for every 
billion dollar increase in disposable income, private 
consumption expenditure would rise by approximately 800 million 
dollars, nearly twice the response implied by our estimates. 
Table 4.6 Government Consumption 
(millions of local currenc y) 
1 
Country Constant GRt GC t-1 R2 D-W 
Kuwait -0.001 0.246 0.510 0.91 2.12 
(-0.1) (3.1) (2.2) 
Libya 0.008 0.040 1.077 0.96 3.30 
(0.4) (0.6) (8.3) 
Saudi Arabia 0.277 0.073 0.868 0.96 2.64 
(1.3) (1.4) (6.4) 
Venezuela -0.439 0.391 0.566 0.95 2.10 
(-0.9) (2.2) (1.9) 
1: Only difference in comparison is the constant term. 
In the presence of such discrepencies, to use 
coefficients from our own equations as the basis for forecasts 
of the components of aggregate demand in the OPEC countries, 
does not seem reasonable. An alternative approach has to be 
sought. 
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4.3 The Use of Pooled Data 
Given the lack of quarterly data, the use of time 
series analysis to provide estimates of the parameters of the 
above model has definite limitations. On the one hand, pre 
1973 economic conditions seem to bear little relationship to 
post 1973 conditions. On the other hand, post 1973 data does 
not allow an acceptable number of degrees of freedom for 
estimation. 
A possible alternative may be found by the combining 
of cross section data for each of the OPEC economies over 
time from 1973 onwards. The advantage of such a technique 
is that it increases our sample size to the total number of 
years, times the total number of cross sectional units, thus 
increasing the number of degrees of freedom for estimation. 
The common assumption of this pooling technique is 
that a certain degree of homogenity exists amongst the 
different cross-sections. Although we have suggested that 
there may be two distinct groups amongst the OPEC countries 
in terms of their absorptive capacities, the dependence of 
all the OPEC countries on oil revenues, provides a homogenous 
element. The question of the validity of this central 
assumption will be returned to later. 
Despite this assumption, the technique expects some 
heterogenities, as we are using different countries as our 
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cross-sectional units. Consequently any model should be 
contructed so as to 'catch' the effects of these differences. 
4.31 An Econometric Description of the Model 
We can say in general that a pooled model using 
cross-section and time series data is specified as follows; 
Yit = a+b1Xlit+b2X2it+ " . bkXkit+Uit 14) 
where i=1,2,3, ... N = number of time series 
t=1,2,3, ... T = number of cross section units 
Yit = dependent variable 
X1, X2.. Xk = explanatory variables 
and Uit = the error term 
The main assumption of this model is that the error 
term has three components, one due to the cross-section units, 
another attributed to the time-element, and the third a 
combinational element. 
Various different pooled model models have been used 
in practise 
1. One of particular interest to us is the 'covariance 
model' which is the traditional approach to pooling. A 
description of this approach can be found in Johnston (1972). 
The main theme of the 'covariance' model is to identify 
the error components attributed to time and the cross section 
1: see Kouris (1976) for a discussion of various pooled models. 
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as fixed effects, and to try and capture them with an 
appropriate set of dummy variables. This leaves the model 
with a purely random term to deal with in the usual manner. 
4.32 Previous Studies 
Previous applications of the covariance model can be 
found in Hock (1962) Mundlack (1961) andKouris (1976). The 
latter study is concerned with the demand for energy in the 
EEC countries. As well as the benefits obtained by increasing 
the degrees of freedom available for estimation, Kouris proposed 
the use of the pooling technique would reduce problems of 
multicollinearity encountered in his research. He assumed 
a degree of homogenity of the elasticities of price and income, 
amongst the EEC countries, which allowed him to combine data 
from the different cross sectional units which were the 
individual countries. Kouris tested his model for both 
differences in the time and cross section effect, and concluded 
that only the latter was significant, which supported his 
theoretical basis of assuming common elasticities but 
differing intercepts amongst the EEC countries. 
4.33 A Pooled Model for the OPEC Economies 
By restating equation 14) as, 
Y= BX+U 15) 
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where Y= (nxl) vector, consisting of p sub-vectors, which 
are the sample observations on Y for the 
p classes. 
X= (kxn) matrix of explanatory variables. 
B= (1xk) vector of coefficients. 
U= (nxl) vector of random elements. 
Unlike Kouris, we are only interested in testing for the 
different cross section units. The assumption of homogenity 
amongst the OPEC countries implies. common elasticities of the 
explanatory variables to be applicable across the equations. 
In order to test the assumption of a common intercept, i. e. 
to test for heterogenities amongst the countries, equation 15) 
must be modified to; 
Y =A D+BX+U 16) 
where Y, B, X, M, are as before 
and Ais (p-1) column vector 
and D is a (p-1)X in p vector of dummy variables 
which takes into account varying intercepts from 
class to class. 
1 
If there is no differential class effect, then we can assume 
A= 0. This hypothesis is statistically tested. 
Consequently, the equations of the model of the OPEC 
economies are re-estimated in the general form of equation 16) 
over the periods 1974-77 for 12 countries, and 1974-78 for 10 
countries, depending on the availability of data. The results 
there is no dummy attached to the first class, as we should 
fall into the dummy variable trap. see J. Johnston (1972 
pp176-207) 
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are shown in Tables 4.7 - 4.16. No equations were estimated 
for Quatar due to the unavailability of data on their national 
income accounts. 
4.34 A Statistical Interpretation of the Results 
The significance of the explanatory variables of the 
equations are statistically tested with the use of the students 
t distribution as usual. A test 
1 for the assumption of common 
intercepts amongst the countries, i. e. A= 0 can be provided by; 
F= S1/(p-1) 
S2/(mp-p-k+1) 
where F= calculated F statistic 
S1 = the incremental sum of squares with the use of dummies 
S2 = the actual sum of squares with dummies 
p= the number of classes 
m= the length of time series 
k= the number of explanatory variables 
As usual, R2 measures the degree of total explanatory 
power of all the exogenous variables. However, no Durbin-Watson 
statistic is calculated as autocorrelation has little meaning 
in cross section analysis and therefore no significance. in pooled 
2 
models either. 
1: see J. Johnston (1972) 
2: see Koutsoyiannis (1977) for a discussion of autocorrelation 
in cross section analysis. 
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Although the results are presented for both estimation 
periods, the discussion focusses on the results obtained from 
the 1974-78 estimates as a greater time element is embodied 
in the data, and only Iran and Algeria are lost from the pool, 
neither of which have been a major contributor to the OPEC 
surplus. 
Table 4.7 reports the estimated results for government 
consumption. The overall regression equation reports similar 
results for both periods of estimation, with the lagged 
dependent variable being significant at the 1% level, and the 
government revenue variable being statistically insignificant. 
The latter result may have arisen due to the degree of 
multicollinearity between the two explanatory variables 
(rGR, Gt-1 = 0.734 for 1974-77, and rGR, Gt-1 = 0.738 for 1974-78. ) 
Both periods report a high value of R2. 
The test statistic for heterogenity was calculated from 
the following table. 
Table 4.17 Analysis of Covariance for Differential 
Intercepts (1974-1978) 
Source Sum of Squares (SS) df Mean SS F 
Residual 
model with 
no dummies 
Residual 
model with 
dummies 
11878747.501 
6217823.311 
Incremental 5660924.19 
37 321047.21 
28 222065.11 
9 514629.47 2.832 
Table 4.18 reports the F statistic for all the equations estimated. 
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At the 1% level of significance, the critical value 
of F=2.21 (where V1 = 9, V2 = 28). Consequently as 
2.832> 2.21 we reject the nulihypothesis that A= 0, and 
conclude the constant terms are heterogenerous from the 1974- 
1978 model, for government consumption. 
In the 1973-1977 model, the calculated test value of 
F=1.564, whereas the critical value = 2.30. Therefore we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that heterogenities between 
countries exist in this model. 
Similar statistical results were obtained for all the 
equations estimated over both time periods. In most cases, 
the correct apriori signs were found on explanatory variables, 
and they were statistically significant at the 1% level In 
general, a high value of R2 was obtained for all the equations 
estimated. 
The F test for heterogenity was also statistically 
significant in nearly all cases2. 
The results obtained for petroleum exports, and domestic 
oil consumption, are perhaps worthy of a special mention. The 
results for domestic oil consumption are presented in Table 4.14 
1: This was true for all results with the exception of the 
equations for domestic oil consumption and petroleum exports. 
2: Significant statistics marked with an * in Table 4.18. 
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in millions of barrels per year. It was not possible to estimate 
this equation in terms of the value of oil consumed, as 
domestic oil price data is unavailable. The price paid by 
domestic oil consumers is generally different from the price 
paid by foreign consumers, and no data is published on these 
prices. 
The equations estimated for domestic oil consumption 
over both periods report a high R2 although the income variable 
was not found to be significant. The heterogenity test proved 
to be significant for 1974-77, but not for 1974-78. 
Tables 14.15 and 14.6 report the results obtained for 
petroleum exports in value and volume terms respectively. 
Both equations estimated the dependent variable as a function 
of the oil price , and developed countries GDP2, both variables 
being assumed exogenous to the individual OPEC countries. 
Table 14.15 gives the results in millions of US dollars. 
The expected sign on the oil price variable was not found in 
either period, and only for the 1974-77 period did the income 
variable appear statistically significant. 
1: Oil prices were the contract prices at the main ports for 
each country. see the 'Petroleum Economist'. 
2: the GDP of the main consuming nation for each country was 
used as the relevant proxy variable. 
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Table 4.16 reporting the results in volume terms, 
shows the correct sign on all variables, but in no cases were 
those variables found to be significant. In all cases, both 
for value and volume terms, the heterogenity assumption was 
supported at the 1% level of significance. Clearly for a 
complete explanation of OPEC oil exports, a more sophisticated 
1 
equation would be necessary. However, even in such an 
equation, the expected significance of the income and price 
variables may be difficult to detect, due to the high degree 
of multicollinearity between them. 
4.4 An Economic Interpretation of the Results : Use of 
Pooled Model for Forecasting the Surplus 
Although most of the equations estimated gave suitable 
results statistically, an economic interpretation of the 
results is somewhat difficult. The essence of pooled models 
is to combine cross-section data and time series data. As 
suggested by Koutsoyiannis (1977), the interpretation of such 
functions is difficult as the cross section element provides 
an estimate of the long run elasticity, whereas the time series 
element provides an estimate of the short run elasticity. 
1: Perhaps a variable to capture industrial conservation by 
consumers would add to the explanatory power. In addition, 
the price of substitute energy may improve the performance 
of such an equation. 
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Consequently, our equation is a combination of both short 
and long run elasticities, thus making interpretation 
difficult, and the use of the estimated coefficient 
difficult for forecasting purposes. 
Apart from the problems of interpretation, some of 
the results are unsatisfactory. At its simplest level , the 
current account surplus for the OPEC countries at any time 
period is; 
B= X-M±V 17) 
where B= current account balance 
and X, M, V, are defined as before. 
This suggests that in order to constitute a satisfactory 
basis for prediction of the surplus, each of the right-hand 
side elements of equation 17) should be well explained. 
Although Table 4.10 suggests the import function to be well 
determined at the level of aggregation employed, Tables 4.11, 
4.15 and 4.16 do not suggest a good relationship has been 
obtained for invisible trade and petroleum exports. 
Table 4.11 shows the results obtained for net invisible 
trade. The results show an R2 of 0.58 for the 1974-78 
estimate which implies that nearly half of the variation in 
net invisible trade is unexplained by the equation. This does 
not seem a satisfactory basis to provide forecasts about future 
1: Given the nature and degree of simultaneity in the economy, 
a reduced form approach would be more theoretically correct. 
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invisible trade. It would seem likely that a better 
explanation would be achieved if invisible trade were 
examined in a dissaggregated framework of inward and outward 
flows, particularly as the latter may be determined largely 
by income, but the former mainly consisting of interest 
payments on foreign assets is likely to be determined by 
the previous period's surplus level. However, at the time 
of writing, data availability does not allow such an exercise. 
We have already discussed in the previous section the 
inability of the petroleum export equation to provide 
acceptable results statistically. Given the predominance of 
earnings from oil exports in total earnings from abroad on 
trade , such results seem a dubious basis for the provision 
of forecasts of export earnings for the OPEC countries. 
The model has been estimated for periods up to 1978, 
given the availability of national accounts data. In Chapter 1 
we suggested that there had been further substantial oil price 
increases in 1979, implying that there has been another 
structural change in the OPEC economies since our period of 
estimation. Consequently, to use any parameters from a model 
estimated pre-1979 as the basis for predictions of post-1980 
aggregates is a questionable approach, in the same manner as 
combining pre-1973 data with post-1974 data to provide time 
series parameter estimates. 
1: see Chapter 1 
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It would seem therefore on the basis of the above 
discussion, econometric models have a limited role in 
assisting our analysis of the macroeconomies of the OPEC 
countries since 1973, and in providing the basis for forecasts 
about the OPEC surplus. 
4.5 Forecasting the OPEC Surplus: Other Methods 
We suggested in the previous section that any 
econometric model may not provide a suitable framework for 
forecasting aggregates for the OPEC economies, and the OPEC 
surplus, since 1974, due to the instability that has been 
periodically apparent. 
One of the main problems involved in any forecasting 
exercise, either based on an econometric framework or 
alternative approaches, concerns a correct analysis of the 
path of movements in exogenous variables. In our model, the 
oil price, the all important determining variable, has. been 
assumed to be exogenous. Past recent attempts to predict the 
future price of oil have been shown to be a particularly 
ambitious task. Many examples of misplaced forecasts exist 
in the literature. Adelman (1972) writing before the price 
explosion in 1973-74 suggested that-future world oil prices 
would fall from their 1972 level of $1.90 per barrel unless 
there was agreement between producing and consuming countries 
to maintain relatively high prices. Robinson and Morgan (1978) 
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provide various scenarios of world oil prices in their study 
on the future of North Sea Oil. For 1980, the forecasts for 
the Saudi light reference price range from a lower price of 
$16.8 per barrel to a high of $22 per barrel. In 1980, the 
actual reference price was $28.67 per barrel. More recently, 
MEES (July 71981) reports a scenario from the Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York. In January 1981, Morgan were 
forecasting an oil price of $40 per barrel as an average for 
the year, in anticipation of the market response to the war 
between Iran and Iraq. However, this price has not yet been 
reached. The Saudi market price presently stands at $34 per 
1 barrel. 
Clearly, all of these forecasts have either under or 
over predicted the price of crude oil by a significant margin. 
In their defense, it must be said that it was impossible to 
predict the various non-economic shocks to the oil market 
which helped cause the significant rises in the price of oil 
during the 1970's2. However, this example indicates the 
problems of providing forecasts of a dependant variable, when 
the prediction of the exogenous variable is so difficult to 
predict. Consequently, to provide such forecasts from the 
framework of an econometric model where constant parameters 
over time are explicitly assumed, does not seem to be a useful 
exercise even with a broad range of scenarios of exogenous 
variables such as the oil price. 
1: as on December 1st 1981 
2: see Seymour (1981) for a discussion of these events. 
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However, forecasts of such variables are still 
required by policy makers, as the oil price, and indeed the 
OPEC 'surplus' are important determinants of world activity1. 
Perhaps a more fruitful approach would be to give analytical 
forecasts, based on a less rigorous approach, which would 
allow greater flexibility than possibly allowed by the 
parameters of an econometric model. Such an approach appears 
to have been adopted by the world's leading official 
institutions and banks. A summary of their recent forecasts 
of the OPEC surplus are given in Table 4.19. 
Table 4.19 Current Account Surpluses of the OPEC 
Countries. (billions of US $'s at 
current prices). 
1981 1982 
OECD 109 67 
IMF 96 80 
Bank of England (1st six months) 55 NA 
Morgan Guaranty 77 54 
Marine Midland 74-81 35-50 
Chase Manhattan 75-80 60-65 
Wharton 72 60 
First National Chicago 67.6 49.2 
Average 81.3 57.8 
Source: MEES 7th July 1981 
The forecasts vary amongst the banks and institutions, 
with the official forecasts tending to be higher than those 
provided by the banks. All the forecasts suggest that the 
1: see discussion in Chapter 1 
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surplus in 1982 will be smaller than in 1981. Generally, 
the forecasts have assumed an increasing level of imports by 
the OPEC countries, and a constant oil price. 
The importance of the oil price, and the intrinsic 
value of the less rigorous approach can be seen if we consider 
recent Morgan projections for the surplus. The forecasts 
presented in the table are based on an assumed price of $34 
per barrel for OPEC oil, which corresponds to the present 
Saudi market price. However in 1980, different oil market 
conditions led the bank to predict a 1981 surplus Of $110 
billions1 based on an assumed oil price of $40 per barrel. 
Clearly the forecasts of the surplus are quite flexible, which 
would not necessarily be the case in an econometrically based 
forecast. 
It appears that the more flexible approach is probably 
more useful in providing forecasts of the OPEC surplus, given 
the nature and degree of instability experienced in oil markets 
in the 1970's. Table 4.18 suggests that the surplus is unlikely 
to disappear in the near future on the evidence of the reported 
studies. The average forecast for the 1981 surplus was 
$81 billions, and for 1982 it was $58 billions. 
1: no details of specific assumptions of imports, invisible 
trade, etc. are available but they are not generally 
limited by an econometric model. 
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This conclusion is supported by a recent study by 
the ENI (1981) which gives forecasts of the current accounts 
of the major trading sectors of the world's economy, against 
the OAPEC countries1. This study suggests that unless there 
is co-operation between the major oil producing and consuming 
nations, the surplus of the OAPEC countries will grow. 
Without co-operation, ENI provided a 1985 forecast of $116 
billions for the surplus, and a 1990 forecast of $117 billions. 
In contrast, the survey suggests a surplus of $92 billions in 
1985, and $110 billions in 1990 if the developed countries 
encourage expansion of employment in their own economies 
(i. e. with co-operation). Clearly, such forecasts are open 
to doubt on the grounds of their time horizon, and their 
precision, particularly in the light of the above discussion. 
In addition, the alternative 'levels' of co-operation depicted 
by the study do not lead to great disparaties in the level of 
the surplus. However, the study does not lend support to the 
notion that the current account surplus of the OPEC countries 
is not likely to diminish in the near future. 
1: These forecasts are provided by an econometric model, and 
therefore the results are subject to the same comments as 
our own model. see Chapter 2 for a further discussion. In 
addition the model used unofficial data allowing more degrees 
of freedom in the time series analysis. 
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Table 4.3 Government Consumption Equations 
(All in US $ millions 1975 exchange rates) 
Country Constant GRt GC t-1 R2 D-W 
1. OLS 
Kuwait 164.55 . 076 . 614 . 973 1.550 
(2.85) (4.14) (4.96) 
Libya -19.81 . 701 -. 076 . 986 1.682 
(. 20) (3.20) (. 20) 
Saudi Arabia 146.17 . 110 . 836 . 977 2.391 
(. 64) (3.13) (5.60) 
Venezuela -33.49 . 092 . 955 . 997 1.720 
(. 86) (7.04) (26.56) 
2.2SLS 
Kuwait 168.10 . 078 . 598 . 973 1.520 
(2.91) (4.25) (4.81) 
Libya -64.84 . 920 -. 459 . 985 1.654 
(. 58) (2.87) (. 82) 
Saudi Arabia 147.98 . 107 . 847 . 977 2.357 
(. 65) (3.02) (5.62) 
Venezuela -93.64 -. 069 1.241 . 988 . 950 
All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.4 Private Consumption 
(All in US $ millions 1975 exchange rates) 
Country Constant YD(l) R2 D-W 
1. OLS 
Kuwait -97.30 . 414 . 669 0.894 
(. 35) (5.35) 
Libya -56.09 . 485 . 989 1.496 
(. 69) (37.42) 
Saudi Arabia -353.68 . 498 . 960 1.568 
(1.24) (18.36) 
Venezuela -11.8.82 . 613 . 981 0.818 
(. 36) (29.51) 
2.2SLS 
Kuwait -313.45 . 478 . 643 1.024 
(. 97) (5.34) 
Libya -110.45 . 492 . 990 1.756 
(1.32) (37.88) 
Saudi Arabia -436.94 . 506 . 959 1.592 
(1.41) (17.61) 
Venezuela -149.71 . 615 . 980 0.821 
(. 39) (28.75) 
All t statistics are in brackets. 
(1) YD is calculated as total GDP less total government 
revenues. 
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Table 4.5 Imports (All in US $ millions at 
1975 exchange rates) 
Country Constant Yt R2 D-W 
1. OLS 
Kuwait -273.72 
(-1.06) 
Libya -199.94 
(-1.23) 
Saudi Arabia -1286.70 
(-1.31) 
Venezuela -1487.62 
(-3.15) 
. 265 . 787 0.791 
(7.20) 
. 269 . 955 1.887 
(17.83) 
. 282 . 925 0.702 
(8.41) 
. 301 . 890 0.836 
(12.36) 
2.2SLS 
Kuwait -306.31 
(-1.08) 
Libya -241.61 
(-1.36) 
Saudi Arabia -1169.70 
(-1.22) 
Venezuela -1576.06 
(-3.11) 
. 270 . 779 0.799 
(6.85) 
. 271 . 954 1.965 
(17.04) 
. 324 . 863 0.698 
(9.41) 
. 304 . 899 0.857 
(11.92) 
All t statistics are reported in brackets. 
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Table 4.7 Government Consumption (All in US $ 
millions at 1975 exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
Gt = 615.297 + . 008(GRt) + "897(Gt-1) 
(1.13) (. 08) (6.90) 
R= . 980 
2 
1974-1978 estimates: 
Gt = 228.028 + . 047(GRt) + . 837(Gt-1) 
(. 95) (. 79) (10.10) 
R2= . 973 
Country Hetero genities(1)'(2)'(4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria 615.297(1.13) - 
Ecuador 198.94 ( . 67) 228.03( . 95) 
Gabon 160.87 ( . 77) 97.33( . 39) 
Indonesia 1194.41 (1.29) 1083.72(1.87) 
Iran 3219.68 (1.86) - 
Iraq3 1170.96 ( . 76) 806.55( . 74) 
Kuwait 304.67 ( . 53) 15.08( . 35) 
Libya 992.89 ( . 78) 1020.69(1.83) 
Nigeria 1644.66 (2.17) 1286.09(2.20) 
Saudi Arabia 3255.17 (1.33) 2322.89(1.41) 
U. A. E. 349.12 ( . 97) 111.61 (1 . 35) 
Venezuela 1102.27 ( . 53) 931.50( . 23) 
1: Data unavailability prevented the inclusion of Quatar. 
2: Data was only available for Iran, Algeria until end 1977. 
3: Using non-official data 1975 onwards. 
4: Different intercepts obtained by adding/subtracting the 
co-efficient on the dummy variables from the base constant. 
From 1974-77 Algeria provided the base, 1974-78 it was 
provided by Ecuador. 
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Table 4.8 Investment (in US$Millions at 1975 
exchange rate) 
Results from Pooled model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
It = 4014.25 +. 824 (ORt) 
(2.26) (3.52) R2 = . 686 
1974-1978 
I = 870.02 + . 883(OR ) t 
(. 80) 
t 
(5.67) R2 = . 714 
Country Heterogenities 
1Q7A-1077 
Algeria 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Irag3 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Nigeria 
Saudi Arabia 
U. A. E. 
Venezuela 
4014.25 
776.98 
3216.80 
3325.28 
822.93 
-2797.34 
-4308.54 
-1950.84 
2400.74 
-15913.31 
-2967.91 
2975.15 
(2.26) 
(1 . 40) 
. 35) 
. 32) 
. 69) 
(2.87) 
(3.59) 
(2.53) 
( . 67) 
(3.18) 
. 45) 
(3.05) 
(1) , (2) , (4) 
1974-1978 
870.02 ( . 80) 
2590.56 (1 . 12) 
3316.69 (1.45) 
-3345.42 
-4580.34 
-2489.80 
2840.71 
-1.6960.28 
-3186.67 
4178.29 
(2.14) 
(2.91) 
(1 . 73) 
( . 99) 
(3.60) 
(2.19) 
(1 . 79) 
1: Data unavailability prevented the inclusion of Quatar. 
2: Data was only available for Algeria, Iran till end 1977. 
3: Using non-official data. 
4: Differential intercepts obtained by subtracting/adding 
the coefficients on the dummy variables from the base 
constant. In 1974-77 estimates Algeria provided the 
base, 1974-78 Ecuador. 
* All t statistics are in brackets. 
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Table 4.9 Private Consumption (in US$Millions at 
1975 exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
Ct = 531.73 + . 555 (YD) 
(. 74) (15.98) R2 = . 983 
1974-1978 
Ct = -447.22 + . 736 (YD) 
(. 64) (14.41) R2 = . 976 
Country Heterog enities 
(1)'(2)'(4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria 531.73 ( . 74) - 
Ecuador 420.06 ( . 13) -447.22 ( . 
64) 
Gabon -587.62 (1.25) -814.14 ( . 39) 
Indonesia 6490.09 (5.78) 1118.15 ( . 91) 
Iran 191.90 ( . 27) - 
Iraq3 52.85 ( . 57) -1310.72 ( . 92) 
Kuwait -477.53 (1.18) -1134.78 ( . 74) 
Libya -665.35 (1.45) -2581.52 (2.22) 
Nigeria 6000.09 (5.54) 1096.06 ( . 98) 
Saudi Arabia -1854.71 (2.90) -2785.82 (2.25) 
U. A. E. -530.76 ( . 23) -3517.66 (2.16) 
Venezuela 742.52 (1.21) -1140.56 ( . 75) 
1: As earlier 
4: " 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.10 Imports (all in US$Millions at 1975 
exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
Mt = 186.73 + . 346 (Yt) 
(. 17) (8.38) R2 = . 835 
1974-1978 
Mt = -1279.97 + . 443 (Y t) 
(1.11) (7.03) ý2 = . 757 
Country Heterogenities 
(1), (2), (4) 
1n"A-1 n77 1Q7d-1079 
Algeria 186.73 ( . 17) 
Ecuador -687.30 ( . 67) 
Gabon -431.74 ( . 46) 
Indonesia -8138.94 (5.81) 
Iran -9391.92 (4.28) 
Iraq 3 -1893.41 (1.71) 
Kuwait -1240.72 (1.17) 
Libya -1502.36 (1.39) 
Nigeria -4466.33 (3.15) 
Saudi Arabia -5251.72 (3.30) 
U. A. E. 33.41 ( . 12) 
Venezuela -3568.35 (2.75) 
1: As before 
2: it 
3: 
4: 
-1279.97 (1.11) 
-683.65 ( . 38) 
-12412.13 (4.31 ) 
-3813.30 (1.49) 
-2481.12 ( . 74) 
-3274.61 (1.14) 
-7567.42 (2.42) 
-6940.13 (1.93) 
-839.04 ( . 28) 
-6330.77 (2.16) 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.11 Invisible Trade (net) 
(all in US$Millions at 1975 exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
Vt = 830.324 - . 138 (Yt) 
(1.18) (-5.17) = . 823 
2 
Vt = 593.404 - . 171 (Y t) 
(. 63) (-3.30) I. = 577 
2 
Country Heterog enities 
(1)'(2)' (4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria 830.32 (1.18) - 
Ecuador 389.54 ( . 52) 593: 40 ( . 63) 
Gabon -227.57 (1.22) -150.90 ( . 58) 
Indonesia 2126.85 (1.40) 3534.67 (1.38) 
Iran 5344.78 (3.12) - 
Iraq3 -2240.06 (3.91) -1366.03 (1.40) 
Kuwait 1448.52 ( . 78) 1978.67 (1.04) 
Libya 685.73 ( . 18) 1157.03 ( . 39) 
Nigeria 2007.87 (1.23) 1927.37 ( . 62) 
Saudi Arabia -2745.88 (3.35) -101.21 ( . 29) 
U. A. E. 992.61 (2.02) 1423.58 ( . 63) 
Venezuela 2618.17 ( . 20) 3543.17 (1.54) 
1: As before 
2: It 
3: If 
4: " 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.12 Oil Revenues (millions of US$ at 1975 
exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
ORt = 664.316 + . 663 (PXt) 
(. 68) (5.70) R2 = . 962 
OR = 254.587 + . 348 (PXt) t 
(. 26) (3. 49) R2 = . 932 
Country Heterog enities 
(1), (2), (4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria 664.32 ( . 68) - 
Ecuador 61.63 ( . 49) 254.59 ( . 26) 
Gabon -57.98 ( . 59) 356.93 ( . 07) 
Indonesia 571.84 ( . 08) 2765.35 (1.69) 
Iran 7166.58 (2.93) - 
Iraq3 2291.85 (1.35) 5209.88 (3.08) 
Kuwait 5460.31 (4.14) 6021.40 (4.07) 
Libya 1893.73 (1.00) 4847.71 (2.83) 
Nigeria 2060.60 (1.11) 5167.61 (2.98) 
Saudi Arabia 7824.26 (2.13) 19440.92 (5.55) 
U. A. E. 1778.52 ( . 94) 4353.98 (2.63) 
Venezuela -8630.39 (3.68) -55.18 ( . 13) 
1: As before 
2: 
3: 
4: 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.13 Non-Oil Revenues (millions of US$ at 
1975 exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
NORt = -944.991 + . 170 (Yt) 
(. 62) (2.96) R2 = . 526 
NORt = -799.019 + . 172 (Yt) 
(. 71) (2.79) R2 = . 529 
Country Heterogenities (1), (2), (4) 
I01A_IQ71 1n7A_1n70 
Algeria -994.99 ( . 62) 
Ecuador -734.02 ( . 12) 
Gabon -312.67 ( . 34) 
Indonesia -3716.22 (1.39) 
Iran -5797.78 (1.56) 
Iraq 3 522.89 ( . 87) 
Kuwait 447.41 ( . 82) 
Libya -4484.70 (2.10) 
Nigeria -6116.16 (2.52) 
Saudi Arabia -12999.02 (5.25) 
U. A. E. -1748.65 ( . 47) 
Venezuela -2683.42 ( . 91) 
1: As before 
2: " 
3: to 
4: it 
-799.02 ( . 71) 
-375.98 ( . 28) 
-4178.22 (1.33) 
688.29 (1.49) 
481.68 ( . 80) 
-4385.07 (2.08) 
-6557.81 (2.26) 
-12972.01 (4.23) 
-1876.77 ( . 69) 
-2679.12 ( . 82) 
* All t statistics are shown in brackets 
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Table 4.14 Domestic Oil Consumption (M. of barrel-, per year) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
DOt= 31.490 + . 0007 (Yt) 
(2.10) (1.21) R2 = . 960 
DO = 59.303 + . 001 (Y ) t 
(. 85) (. 29) 
t 
R2 = . 965 
Country Heterogenities (1), (2), (4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria 31.490 ( 2.10) - 
Ecuador 10.790 ( 1.16) 59.303 ( . 85) 
Gabon 2.293 ( 1.59) 68.692 ( . 10) 
Indonesia 93.462 ( 3.14) 479.562 ( 2.68) 
Iran 212.663 ( 5.88) - 
Iraq3 52.028 ( 1.23) 826.246 ( 7.42) 
Kuwait 112.238 ( 4.79) 753.378 ( 7.04) 
Libya 14.121 ( 1.04) 626.498 ( 5.32) 
Nigeria -1.982 ( 1.65) 689.431 ( 3.99) 
Saudi Arabia 170.373 ( 6.11) 2949.972 (16.19) 
U. A. E. -5.764 (17.79) 657.311 ( 5.62) 
Venezuela 366.519 ( 2.19) 856.795 ( 6.17) 
1: As before 
2: of 
3: 
4: 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.15 Petroleum Exports (millions of US$ at 
1975 exchange rates) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
PX = -32974.389 + 19.174(WESTYt) + 493.980(P OIL) 
(3.02) (2.60) (1.30) 
R2 = . 958 
PXt = -7115.792 + 3.310(WESTYt) + 176.190(POIL) 
(. 69) (. 47) (. 27) 
R2 = . 870 
Country Heterogenities (1), (2), (4) 
1974-1977 1974-1978 
Algeria -32974.39 (3.02) - 
Ecuador -36224.73 (2.06) -7115.79 ( . 69) 
Gabon -12336.87 (2.27) -2667.92 (1.04) 
Indonesia -11171.22 (2.77) 1957.31 (1.33) 
Iran 4920.86 (4.88) - 
Iraq3 -1483.40 (3.13) 5762.32 ( . 88) 
Kuwait -13210.56 (2.57) -293.79 ( . 88) 
Libya -2002.23 (3.01) 5953.98 (1.22) 
Nigeria -28049.90 (3.44) 1612.24 (3.68) 
Saudi Arabia 15728.79 (6.29) 28318.95 (4.47) 
U. A. E. -29093.60 (2.43) 154.03 (3.26) 
Venezuela 78.45.71 (5.25) 16318.59 (2.91) 
1: As before 
2: " 
3: 
4: 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.16 Oil Exports (M. of barrels per year) 
Results from Pooled Model 
1974-1977 estimates: 
PXt = -248.194 + . 392(WESTY) -2.317(OIL 
(. 39) (. 91) (-. 11) R2 = . 977 
PXt = -13.734 + . 087(WESTY) -5.687(OILp 2 
(. 04) (. 39) (-. 27) = . 978 
Country Heterogenities 
(1), (2), (4) 
1n-7 A-IQ77 1Q7A-1Q7R 
Algeria -248.19 ( . 39) 
Ecuador -538.74 (3.17) 
Gabon -36.77 ( . 40) 
Indonesia 244.83 (1.08) 
Iran 1661.215 (4.23) 
Iraq 
3 708.427 (1.63) 
Kuwait 499.943 (1.67) 
Libya 566.667 (1.36) 
Nigeria 132.95 (4.58) 
Saudi Arabia 2669.24 (6.48) 
U. A. E. 68.021 (3.40) 
Venezuela 438.701 (1.52) 
v 1 J/ ZI _Ff 
-13.734 ( . 04) 
114.566 ( . 43) 
463.729 ( 1.73) 
828.215 ( 2.74) 
692.205 ( 2.88) 
688.121 ( 2.07) 
652.461 ( 8.88) 
2863.713 (11.49) 
599.753 ( 8.69) 
609.370 ( 2.45) 
1: As before 
2: of 
3: 
4: 
* All t statistics are in brackets 
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Table 4.18 F Statistic for Heterogenity Assumption 
Variable Being 
Determined (Dependent) F-Value 1974-77 
Gt 1.564 
It 6. 408* 
Ct 14. 648* 
Mt 3. 653* 
Vt 12. 054* 
ORt 27. 416* 
NORt 5. 590* 
DOt 63. 885* 
PXt(volume) 163. 284* 
PXt(value) 91. 010* 
F-Value 1974-78 
2.832* 
9.634* 
3.071* 
3.768* 
2.630* 
16.979* 
7.165* 
1.653 
230.959* 
36.113* 
* All significant at the 1% level. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE DISPOSAL OF THE SURPLUS. 
RESULTS FROM THE PORTFOLIO MODEL. 
This chapter presents the estimated results for the 
two phase portfolio model of the disposal of the OPEC surplus, 
specified in Chapter 3. All variables are defined in the 
Appendix 1. 
5.1 Data Reliability and Estimation Techniques 
We suggested in Chapter 3 that the empirical analysis 
was limited due to the availability of data. To some extent, 
the empirical analysis has also been restricted by the quality 
of the available data. 
Most researchers discover that published data is 
usually subject to some degree of error, which may diminish 
over time as more information becomes available. However, in 
the field of-the balance of payments of the OPEC countries, 
the reliability of the data is more questionable than in most. 
This is partly due to the lack of relatively sophisticated 
statistical collection agencies in the OPEC countries, and 
perhaps more importantly, the secrecy surrounding the disposal 
of the OPEC surplus. For example, we have already indicated 
that only financial assets held in the UK and the USA are 
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reported in the accounts of these countries' statistical 
machinery. For assets held in other developed countries, 
data is difficult, if at all possible, to obtain. From the 
investing countries, foreign assets are only reported as an 
aggregate and not on an asset by country basis. 
Due to the lack of data availability and the possibility 
of some degree of error in that used in the analysis, we must 
accept at the outset that the results should be interpreted 
cautiously, particularly if they are to be used for 
1 
recommending policies. 
Ideally, the appropriate estimation technique to be 
employed using a model based on the theory of portfolio 
selection should be that used by Parkin (1969). In his rigorous 
model of commercial bank behaviour, Parkin introduced many 
restrictions on equation coefficients in order to be 
consistent with balance sheet constraints of the banks, and 
the underlying theory. He then proceeded to estimate his model 
using a. maximum likelihood (ML) estimating procedure. However, 
given the unavailability of data for some asset holdings and 
the unreliability of that which is available, the usefulness 
of such a rigorous approach here is not apparent. When the 
problems concerning interpretation of the Parkin type procedure 
are considered, this approach seems even less applicable. 
2 
1: Some variables were 'constructed' from the available data: 
see data appendices. 
2: Parkin includes many interest rate variables in his equations. 
As a result multicollinearity makes interpretation of the 
equations difficult. 
- 133 - 
As an alternative, simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
was employed. Although there may be some degree of simultaneity 
in the equations estimated, it is likely that the resulting 
bias in the results would be very small since OPEC holdings 
of any given asset are unlikely to determine the rate of 
return on that asset. 
5.2 The Stage One Model: Results 
This section presents the results estimated for the 
first branch of the portfolio model discussed in Chapter 3. 
All equations were estimated, using quarterly data, in the 
general form described in Chapter 3, i. e. 
DAýt =X(a1+bir1+b2r2+c1Xe+d1Wt) + (1-X) DA, t_1+eSt_1 
1) 
where all variables are defined as in Chapter 3. The actual 
number of interest rate variables used in the analysis was 
eventually restricted to two, in order that problems 
associated with multicollinearity are reduced. The presence 
of multicollinearity between explanatory variables tends to 
result in large standard errors, and consequently results in 
the rejection of possible significant variables1. To reduce 
such problems further, differential rates were also employed. 
The expected exchange rate variable was constructed 
using the De Leeuw type technique, where values of X=0.25,0.55 
1: see J. Johnston (1972) for a further discussion. 
2: see De Leeuw (1965) 
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and 0.9 were tested. The length of lag used in the experiment 
varied from 0 to 11 quarters. In nearly all cases, empirical 
evidence supported a value of >= 0.25, which suggested most 
recent exchange rates to be important in determining the 
expected exchange rate. 
5.21 OPEC Holdings of US Dollar Accounts 1973(4) - 1980(4) 
The results for the equation estimated for OPEC holdings 
of US dollar accounts are shown in Table 5.1. 
Interest rate data was obtained from the Bank of 
England Quarterly 
rate was used as 
The Treasury Bill 
averaged for each 
expected exchange 
to the pound) was 
England Quarterly 
Bulletin in general 
1. The 3-month inter-bank 
a proxy for the rate offered on bank deposits. 
rate was the official allotment rate, 
quarter, in both the UK and the USA. The 
rate between, the dollar and sterling (dollars 
also calculated using data from the Bank of 
Bulletin. 
To calculate, the 'real' rate of interest, the following 
formula was employed: 
Rt R= (Rt A- Ie 2) 
where Ie = 14, F 1-X 
where RR = real interest rate at time t 
Rt = actual interest rate at time t 
1: The 3-month inter-bank US rate was obtained from the US 
Treasury Bulletin. 
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where it = expected inflation rate 
It = actual inflation rate 
A=0.25,0.55,0.9 
and F= number of periods considered. 
5.211 A Statistical Interpretation 
Equations 1) to 4) describe total nominal holdings of 
dollars. Equations 5) to 7) describe holdings as a proportion 
of the total portfolio wealth held in Western assets. This 
is equivalent to assuming that desired holdings of all assets 
remain a constant proportion, as total wealth increases. In 
practise, all dollar magnitudes are deflated by the wealth 
variable, Wt. 
Equations 1) to 4) differ in that alternative methods 
of incorporating the interest rate effect are employed. 
Otherwise, they include the expected exchange rate between 
dollars and sterling (Xe), the wealth constraint (Wt), the 
lagged wealth constraint (St_1), the previous quarter's asset 
holdings (Dt_1) and a constant term. In all cases, the 
expected exchange rate coefficient was significant at the 1% 
level with a negative sign, which confirmed apriori expectations. 
(Critical value for t=2.52 at the 1% level). The wealth 
constraint, W. was also significant at the 1% level with a 
positive sign. The lagged constraint was generally insignificant 
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which was probably due to multicollinearity amongst the 
wealth variables. The lagged dependent variable was also 
found to be statistically insignificant. 
On apriori grounds, interest rates were thought to be 
important in determining asset holdings. However, in all 
cases, the actual or differential interest rate employed was 
statistically insignificant. Only in equation 4) was the 
differential bank rate, corrected for inflation expectations, 
significant and this was only at the 10% level. This 
equation also provided reasonable results for R2 and the 
first order autocorrelation test variable, the Durbin Watson 
statistic . 
One of the most surprising results was the high value 
obtained for the constant term. In all four equations, this 
coefficient was significantly positive at the 1% level. The 
size of the coefficient was much higher than that obtained for 
other variables. 
Equations 4) to 7) reproduce equations 2) to 4) except 
that all dollar magnitudes are deflated by the wealth 
constraint, Wt. A similar pattern of results is obtained 
statistically, with both the constant term and the exchange 
rate expectations variable being the most important. 
1: The D-W test proved inconclusive. Not too much emphasis can 
be placed on this test however, due to the presence of a 
lagged endogenous variable. see Johnston (1972). 
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5.212 An Economic Interpretation 
Given the data problems outlined earlier, any 
econometric interpretation of the results must be cautious. 
Such problems may have led to the peculiar coefficient 
obtained on the lagged dependent variable in equations 2) 
and 4). The negative sign implies that OPEC investors have 
an increasing divergence between their actual and desired 
asset holdings in each quarter, which suggests that the 
adjustment principle to be misplaced. 
In spite of the data problems, the high value for the 
constant term, and expected exchange rate variable have 
interesting implications. The highly significant constant 
term suggests that OPEC investors will hold dollar denominated 
assets, irrespective of other determining factors. Given that 
most oil payments will be financed in dollars, this suggests 
investors may either not be able to, or not concerned about, 
diversifying out of dollar accounts. 
The significant exchange rate variable was expected on 
theoretical grounds, but its relative importance to interest 
rate variables was not expected. This would suggest that 
investors are more concerned about exchange rate fluctuations, 
than the rate of return available on an asset. To the extent 
that exchange rate fluctuations have been large scale in the 
period of estimation, this result may not be surprising. 
TEXT 
CUT OFF IN THE 
ORIGINAL 
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This result has interesting implications for research in 
other areas of international capital movements, as previous 
studies attach little importance to exchange rate expectations1. 
Little evidence is obtained for the importance of 
interest rate variables. Real differential rates are found 
to be slightly more important than other variables, although 
the evidence suggests interest rates, either nominal or real 
are given little importance in allocating the OPEC surplus to 
dollar accounts. Again this result has implications for other 
research, which has generally found statistical evidence for 
interest rate considerations 
2. 
The expected sign on apriori grounds for the wealth 
variables was obtained, which confirms evidence of previous 
research. Little weight can be attached to the coefficient 
of the lagged stock variable, as the estimation technique 
3 
employed involves difficulties, of interpretation. 
1: see Bryant (1975) for a discussion of previous research on 
capital movements, and the importance of exchange rate 
expectations. 
2: see Bryant (1975) also. This result is somewhat surprising 
since most transactors in international capital movements might 
be expected to be primarily interested in the interest rate 
available on assets held. However, OPEC investors have little 
historical financial market experience. In addition, the 
absence of domestic financial markets means they must invest 
their wealth abroad, but perhaps they are not concerned with 
the rate of return offered on an asset. 
3: see Johnston (1972). The use of OLS results in a bias on the 
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5.22 OPEC Holdings of Sterling 1973(4) - 1980(4) 
The general form of the equations estimated was similar 
to that employed for OPEC holdings of dollars. The results 
obtained are presented in Table 5.2. 
5.221 A Statistical Interpretation 
Equations 1) to 4) describe total nominal holdings of 
sterling, and equations 5) to 7) describe holdings as a 
proportion of the wealth variable, Wt. 
Again, equations 1) to 4) differ only in their 
incorporation of interest rate variables. All four equations 
report a highly significant exchange rate variable with the 
expected positive sign. Again, the wealth variable, Wt is 
significant at the 1% level. In all four equations, the lagged 
wealth variable, St_1 has a negative coefficient, and is 
significant at the 5% level. Once again, the constant term 
is highly significant. 
As with the results in Table 5.1, Table 5.2 shows little 
significance for the interest rate variables. In each of the 
equations, the coefficient obtained is either incorrect on 
apriori grounds, or statistically insignificant. 
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Equations 4) to 7) report inferior results. 
Statistical significance is attached to only the constant 
term, the lagged dependent variable and the lagged wealth 
constraint, with neither interest rate variables nor the 
expected exchange rate apparently significant in any of the 
equations. Furthermore, the R2 remains high, and there is 
no evidence of first order autocorrelation, suggesting that 
all important determining variables are present in the equation. 
5.222 An Economic Interpretation 
Once again it is important to emphasise that economic 
interpretation of the results is cautious. However, a similar 
pattern of results emerges to those obtained for holdings of 
dollar assets in the USA. 
The expected exchange rate variable appears to be more 
significant than interest rate influences in determining OPEC 
holdings of sterling. This result again contrasts with 
research in other areas, although direct comparison is limited 
due to the nature of the capital movements under consideration. 
When sterling holdings are expressed as a proportion 
of wealth, the expected exchange rate no longer appears to be 
important. In fact, most of the variation in OPEC holdings of 
sterling assets appears to be explained by the wealth variable, 
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the lagged dependent variable, and the constant term. This 
suggests that sterling holdings are determined by non-financial 
factors. Possibly, UK assets are held as some oil payments 
are financed in sterling, and resulting adjustment of holdings 
in any quarter are made arbitrarily, irrespective of interest 
rates, although to some extent, exchange rate expectations 
are taken into consideration. The highly significant wealth 
variable however, suggests that OPEC countries, due to the 
lack of domestic financial institutions, choose the highly 
developed financial centre of London as a haven for some of 
their surplus funds, on the grounds that since their wealth 
must be kept somewhere, it might as well be in a relatively 
secure financial centre. The significant lagged dependent 
variable, and the significant lagged stock variable can be 
interpreted as implying that some adjustment out of sterling 
is made over time, but this 'diversification' is based on 
other factors than interest rate considerations. 
5.23 OPEC Holdings of Eurocurrencies 1973(4) - 1980(4) 
As indicated in Chapter 3, OPEC holdings of Euro- 
currencies are only published on an aggregated basis, and 
not dissaggregated by currency. Consequently, the empirical 
results contain a statistical bias, as it was not possible 
to include all possible currencies as possible explanatory 
variables. However, the majority of these assets are assumed 
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to be held in Eurodollar accounts, as it is commonly 
suggested that this market plays a predominant role1. The 
estimated results are presented in Table 5.3. 
5.231 A Statistical Interpretation 
Equations 1) to. 4) describe nominal holdings of 
Eurocurrencies, and equations 5) to 7) describe holdings as 
a proportion of wealth. 
As earlier, equations 1) to 4) differ only in their 
method of incorporation of the interest rate effect. All 
four equations report a high R2, and with the exception of 
equation 2), inconclusive evidence of first order autocorrelation. 
This suggests a good degree of explanation has been obtained. 
As with the previous results, both wealth variables are 
significant at the 1% level, with Wt carrying a positive sign, 
and St_1taking a negative sign. In addition, the constant 
term and exchange rate variable are significant at the 1% 
level, although the latter was expected to have a negative 
sign on apriori grounds. 
Once again, the interest rate effect was not detected 
statistically in any of the equations. In equation 8) OPEC 
holdings of Eurocurrencies were estimated, excluding the 
1: see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, June 1980. 
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exchange rate variable. The result was to make the Eurodollar 
3-month interest rate significant at the 1% level, although 
the equation showed some evidence of first order autocorrelation. 
In equations 5) to 7) and 9) to 10), OPEC Eurodollar 
holdings were estimated as proportions of wealth. In 
general, this transformation led to a lower value for both 
R2 and the D-W statistic. In each of the equations, the 
constant term is highly significant with a positive value. 
The lagged stock variable remains significant at the 1% level, 
carrying a negative sign. 
Given the unexpected result of a positive coefficient 
on the exchange rate variable on apriori grounds, the equation 
was re-estimated, excluding the variable. The result of this 
exclusion is shown in equations 9) and 10). In both cases, 
the actual Eurodollar rate, and the differential rate between 
Eurodollars and US bank deposit rates were significant at the 
1% level with the expected sign. Also, an improved D-W value 
was obtained in both equations, although the evidence of no 
autocorrelation was not conclusive. The R2 was generally 
unaffected by the exclusion of the exchange rate variable. 
5.232 An Economic Interpretation 
Given the predominance of the Eurodollar market for 
OPEC funds, theoretically we expected the Eurodollar rate to 
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be quite significant in the determination of OPEC holdings 
of Eurocurrencies, particularly as the Eurodollar interest 
rate is usually higher than a comparable domestic rate of 
interest in the USA1. In equations 1) to 4) the Eurodollar 
rate is insignificant in all cases. 
The coefficient of the expected exchange rate variable 
is also surprising on apriori grounds. We expected that the 
coefficient would be negative, as it was for domestic dollar 
holdings (both domestic and Eurodollar holdings would benefit 
from a fall in the £/$ exchange rate, as dollar accounts are 
worth more internationally). There are three possible 
explanations for this surprising result. Firstly, OPEC 
investors may have an illusion concerning the role of the 
Eurodollar market. When the £/$ exchange rate falls, they 
regard domestic dollar accounts as a more attractive asset 
than Eurodollar accounts, and vice-versa. However, this is 
unlikely given the advice OPEC investors are likely to 
receive from experienced international banks. Secondly, OPEC 
investors may interpret high lagged and present values of the 
exchange rate as implying the future rate is likely to fall, 
and therefore a positive sign would be the correct apriori 
assumption. However, this suggest that OPEC investors still 
regard the exchange rate effect as being different for domestic 
US assets from Eurodollar accounts. Thirdly, our equation may 
1: see S. Frowen (1979) for a discussion of the Eurodollar 
market. Also see P. Einzig (1972). 
- 145 - 
be mispecified. Given the fact that interest rates are 
Eurodollar accounts are always likely to be higher than those 
on domestic accounts, and the vast amount of oil payments 
made in dollars, OPEC investors are primarily interested in 
the actual rate on Eurodollars, or the differential rate 
between Eurodollars and domestic dollars, and exchange rate 
considerations are given a limited role. When the exchange 
rate variable was neglected, as in equations 8) to 10), a 
significant positive coefficient on the Eurodollar rate, 
and its differential (equations 9) and 10) respectively) with 
the domestic rate, is obtained without leading to an inferior 
overall statistical fit of the equation. 
However, these equations still exhibit highly significant 
values for the constant term, which implies as earlier the 
OPEC countries choose the Eurodollar market as a home for 
their funds autonomously of other factors. Furthermore, the 
high significance of the lagged wealth constraint, St_j, suggests 
investors have a desire to diversify out of Eurodollar accounts 
over time, but in combination with the other results this may 
be based on other considerations than interest rates. 
5.24 OPEC Holdings of 'Other' Currencies 1973(4) - 1980(4) 
We suggested in Chapter 3 that the stage one analysis 
of non-dollar, non-sterling currencies had to be restricted by 
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the lack of data available to empirically examine the 
'other' currency holdings by OPEC countries as an aggregated 
unit. The results of the equations estimated for 'other' 
currency holdings are presented in this section. The 
equations were estimated using the same general framework 
as earlier, except that the expected exchange rate variable 
was constructed for a dollar-mark rate as it was suspected, 
accounts in Deutschmarks formed a high proportion of 'other' 
currency holdings1. A value of 
X=0.25 again provided the 
best result for this variable. The results are shown in 
Table 5.4. 
5.241 A Statistical and Economic Interpretation 
Given the data limitations, an interpretation of 
these results must be particularly cautious. Equations 1) 
to 4) describe nominal 'other'. holdings and equations 5) to 
7) describe holdings as a proportion of wealth. All of the 
equations report a high R2 and a reasonable value for the D-W 
statistic. The best result is given by equation 3) where the 
differential between the US and German bank deposit rate is 
significant at the 5% level, with the expected negative sign. 
The differential between the dollar and yen rates was 
insignificant however. The expected exchange rate was also 
significant at the 5% level, as was the constant term, and 
1: see Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin June 1980. 
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wealth variable, Wt. 
The significance of the exchange rate variable appears 
to confirm the earlier evidence of the importance of exchange 
rate expectations in the stage one branch of the model. 
However, the significance of the US-DM interest differential 
implies OPEC investors to give some attention to interest 
rate considerations when moving into non-dollar, non-sterling 
considerations. Support for this notion is provided by the 
relative unimportance of the constant term in determining 
'other' holdings, as opposed to its high significance in 
earlier results. It does appear therefore that OPEC investors 
pay more attention to economic theory when choosing non-dollar, 
non-sterling currencies to hold in their portfolio. However, 
more disaggregated data is required to provide a more complete 
analysis of such asset holdings. 
5.3 The Stage Two Model: Results 
This section presents the results estimated for the 
second stage of the model. All equations were estimated using 
quarterly data from 1973(4) to 1980(4). 
5.31 OPEC Holdings of Assets Within the USA 1973(4)-1980(4) 
The equations were estimated in the general form described 
in Chapter 3. The results are presented in Table 5.5. All 
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interest rate effects are reported as differentials only 
due to the problem presented by multicollinearity between the 
rates over time. The following table shows the correlation 
matrix for the various rates of return. 
Table 5.7 Correlation Coefficients Between Interest 
Rates in the USA (1973-1980) 
RTB RBD RGB RCB RNBD 
RTB * . 969 . 885 . 828 . 959 
RBD * . 829 . 802 . 998 
RGB * . 945 . 809 
RCB * . 785 
RNBD 
The table indicates the high degree of correlation 
between the actual interest rates. It shows the closer the 
substitutability between assets, the higher is the degree of 
correlation. For example, the coefficient between the Treasury 
Bill rate (RTB) and the corporate bond rate (RCB) is 0.828, 
whereas the coefficient between RTB and the rate on bank 
deposits (RBD) is 0.969. To avoid the high degree of correlation, 
differential rates were used. 
The wealth constraint, Tt is equal to the total of all 
the assets held (i. e. equal to the dependent vairable in the 
stage one model) thus providing the linkage with the stage one 
branch decision model. 
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As suggested in Chapter 3, a variable to capture 
expectations of possible capital gains or losses was 
constructed in the same manner as that adopted by de Leeuw 
(1965) where: 
RE t 
where RtN 
where RtE 
R tA 
RtN 
(Rt 
A- Rt N) 
Fl>% Rt- i 
expected rate of return at time t 
actual rate of return at time t 
normal rate of return at time t 
0.25,0.55,0.9 
and F= number of periods considered 
5.311 A Statistical Interpretation 
Equations 1) to 10) describe normal holdings of the 
different assets in millions of US dollars, and equations 
11) to 20) report the results for holdings as a proportion of 
wealth, Tt. 
Equations 1) to 10) report the best two results for 
each asset held, the equations differing in that the variable 
for bond rate expectations is incorporated in one equation 
(equations 2,4, '6,8,10). 
Most of the results obtained in equations 1) to 10) 
report a high R2, and a reasonable value for D-W, (although 
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the equations for bank deposits 3) and 4) show the presence 
of first order autocorrelation). 
In nearly all cases the differential interest rate 
is significant at the 5% level, with the correct sign, 
although adverse results are obtained for the holdings of 
non-financial sector assets (non-bank deposits and corporate 
bonds). 
Little evidence was obtained to support the inclusion 
of the 'expectations' variable on the bond rate. 
In most cases, the expected sign was obtained on the 
wealth variable, Tt, although the statistical evidence for 
non-financial sector assets is not clear1. 
Equations 11) to 20) describe holdings as a proportion 
of wealth. The general effect of this transformation is to 
leave the results unchanged on statistical grounds. In most 
cases, a significant, expected coefficient was obtained on the 
relevant interest differential. Again, no evidence was obtained 
to support the inclusion of the expectations variable. The 
value for R2 remained generally high, although the D-W values 
were inferior than obtained in equations 1) to 10). 
1: for example, equations 7) to 10) suggest the wealth variables 
to be generally insignificant in determining asset holdings. 
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5.312 An Economic Interpretation 
In general, the statistical evidence indicates OPEC 
investors appear to pay more attention to economic theory at 
stage two of the model, than in stage one where interest 
rates were generally insignificant. However, not too much 
attention can be paid to the coefficients obtained due to the 
statistical problems present. For example, compare equations 
3) and 4). In equation 3) the coefficient of the differential 
between bank deposits and government bonds is approximately 
eight times smaller than that in equation 4) for the same 
dependent variable. The equations only differ in that equation 
3) excludes the expectations variable. Clearly, multicollinearity 
between this variable and the differential rate between bonds 
and bank deposits, has led to this vast difference. 
Consequently, interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients 
is restricted. 
The evidence does not provide support for the inclusion 
of the expectations variable, which suggests investors are not 
concerned about capital gains, or losses. This result gives 
some confirmation to the general implication of the results in 
the stage one model, that OPEC investors have not appeared to 
give much attention to economic theory in their investment 
behaviour in the past. 
The coefficient on the lagged constraint variable, St-1' 
provides an interesting implication. The negative sign on the 
- 152 - 
shorter term assets can be interpreted as a desire by 
investors to move out of shorter term assets over time. In 
contrast, the positive sign on the longer term assets suggests 
OPEC countries have an increasing desire for bonds, both 
government and corporate, over time. This implies more 
attention may be given to possible capital gains in the future1. 
5.32 OPEC Holdings of Assets Within the UK 1973(4)-1980(4) 
The results for the equations estimated are presented 
in Table 5.7. Interest rate effects are again reported as 
differentials only, due to the familiar multicollinearity 
problems. The matrix of correlation coefficients between the 
relevant rates is shown in the table. 
Table 5.8 Correlation Coefficients Between Interest 
Rates in the UK (1973-1980) 
RTB RBD RGB 
RTB * . 966 . 865 
RB D 
RGB 
* . 866 
* 
Once again, the table shows the degree of correlation 
1: The positive coefficient on the lagged constraint variable for 
bonds, and its implication is consistent with the data (see 
Chapter 2) and the declared aim of OPEC investors (see 
International Herald Tribune, January 15th 1982). 
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is greater, the closer the degree of substitutability between 
the assets. 
Results are reported for only three assets, as data 
was unavailable for holdings of equity and any other assets. 
5.321 A Statistical Interpretation 
Equations 1) to 6) describe nominal holdings of various 
assets in millions of US dollars. Equations 7) to 9) describe 
holdings as a proportion of the wealth variable, Tt. 
Equations 1) and 2) report the results for holdings of 
Treasury Bills. There is no evidence for the significance of 
either interest rate effects or the expectations variable. 
In addition, the D-W statistic suggests the presence of first 
order autocorrelation. Most of the explanatory power 
(indicated by the R2 appears to be provided by the wealth 
variables, Tt and St-1' 
Equations 3) and 4) describe nominal holdings of bank 
deposits. Again, statistical evidence doesn't support either 
the differential interest rate, or the expectations variable. 
Most of the explanatory power is provided by the constant term, 
and the wealth variables. 
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A similar picture is painted for bond holdings by 
equations 5) and 6), where the wealth variables are the only 
statistically significant regressors. 
In equations 7) to 9), holdings were estimated as a 
proportion of wealth, Tt. This transformation had little 
impact on the performance of the explanatory variables, with 
the constant term and the wealth variable, St_,, providing most 
of the explanatory variation in asset holdings. 
5.322 An Economic Interpretation 
The lack of significance of interest rate differentials, 
and the expectations variable, supports the evidence found in 
the stage one branch analysis of OPEC countries' holdings of 
sterling. It appears that OPEC investors have held sterling 
assets mainly on the grounds that since their wealth must be 
invested somewhere, they might as well, on grounds of 
convenience, hold some of it in the financial markets of London. 
The diversification amongst assets within the UK does not appear 
to have responded to interest rate differentials, suggesting 
that individual asset holdings are decided on a somewhat 
ad-hoc basis, with little reference to economic forces. 
The contrasting sign on the coefficient of the lagged 
wealth variable, St_1 between the shorter term Treasury Bills 
- 155 - 
and bank deposits, and the longer term government bonds, 
again suggests OPEC investors have had a desire to move 
out of more liquid assets over time, although the relative 
rate of return on any of the assets appears to have been of 
little relevance in this process. This implies that 
government bonds are likely to provide a higher proportion 
of the UK portfolio held by OPEC countries in the future, 
which may lead to more concern about possible capital gains 
or losses to be made by investors. 
al 
3 a 
i 
N 
M 
00 
N c la 
co 
f O ý[1 
4) " " 
I I 
O u 
41 C Lfl 
N N 
G 
O 
H N 'J 
A x N M 
U ro a vo ä q 
O ß 
"ý w 
w 
N 
rt1 p 
H 
H a O w 
w 
w 
O 
N 
E+ 
r a ""4 w 
w 
O 
° 00 H er rn ý 
1 
r- 
Ln N 
(YI r lp ý 
" "-+ a 1 1 
ro 
rn 
" A 1 1 
ro M Oý 
UI M in 
O 
N 
11 
- 156 - 
N 
1 
Co 
O 
alý 
M 
d' 
10 
N 
N 2 i 12 I 7 
N N N N N N 
N 
Co 
N 
Co 
M 
Co 
l0 
O 
M 
00 
O 
M 
N 
C 
In 
l:! 
O 
" 
Z 
N 
N 
O r. 
l0 1ý 
O 
' 
61 
O 
O 
" 
- 
l0 
' 
Lfl 
CO 
O 
, 
m 
vý 
CO 
00 
O 
" 
. -. 
M 
V' ^ 
Ln 
O iO 
1 . - I 
I 
I 1 
- 
1 N 
I 
1 N 
I 
1' 
r` 
M 
ýr 
O 
Nc 
M (V M 
N 
/0 
N 
N 
0 
"" 
If'1 
00 
V' 
M- 
O Oý 
N 
N 
lo 
N 
I, 
lo 
O 
Co 
N 
O 
N 
O 
Co 
M 
NN 
o l: ) 
O M OM CO M 1" fV I N 1N 
N 
41 
O 
N 
N 
ý 
N 
Ln 
O in 
OO 
1 ý 1N 
r 
N 
o 
Co 
r O 0 v M 
.. 
in 
a) M 
tl1 
o 
O O 
O O N 
h 
"'-' 
O 
O- 
0 
N 
O 
N 
. - 
N 
fß'1 
O 
. -, 
r 
N 
h 
O 
M 
- 
h 
N 
61 
Oý 
N 
( 
h 
h 
r 
r 1p 
1.0 
Lf 
; 
N 
N 
1o 
h 
f`') 
O 
M 
^ 
U1 
M 
ON 
IV CO 
0 
In 
h 
01 r Ln 
IV 
h 
In 
N 4 .4 N 1; `. ' ry N 
" " 
'd' 
. 
v 
W; 
U 
A 
II 
$A 
ý 
II 
Q 
II 
pq 
a 
II 
04 
A 
0 
a 
M '4' V1 10 h 
ui 
ro 
7 
ro 4J 
Qa 
+J Q) 
U 'ü 
v a 0) 
x Q4 
0) v 
b 
Q) 
4 
aý rn 
a ýo 
s, C) 
ro 41 
U 
-ý O 41 
4J 
NG 
4i fO 
4J 
HN 
rt O 
4J 0 
a) 
w ao 
0 a 
v, u, 
o ""4 N 
0 
" II Gl 
U) .C 41 41 
C) - 
UNo 
l0 N 
ÄÄw 
t0 U 
C "rl RS 
r1 3ý 
ba 
+1 +1 $4 HRU 
ob3 
aU 
(l "r4 U) 
$4 WA 
H0 
to C ". 1 
U b+ iJ 
4J U) "1.1 
W $4 
", - fA 14 
41 4) N 
to 11 Gl 
4J 0 14 
NG 
N0 
4 ca z 
1-4 
- 157 - 
N Oý N M N 
Oý r" V' O Q) O M O 
(] N N N N r c- . -- . -- 
-e ON Ql N M m 
C' V' V' M O r N r 
NI Ol Oý Oý Ol 01 cý c1 
is is is is is Oý N N O M O 
r M r N N M N N (N N W N ýD N M N In 
O ý- O cc O O O . - - NN l- e- < , - 
" ý " " " " ý 
(n I M I NN 
1 
1 M 
1 
N 
I 
1 N 
I 
I oO 
I 
1 N 
1 
1 
1 
U) V' M V' N N tf1 
rý 4J O t0 O C O ýO O N 
O 
"rl N N N r 
r-1 
"r1 is is is is M O N 
.0 m m C-) V1 I- O N N . --" N Q - M . --" o- 
W r a-- V M M M W Vý O Oý O CO O 00 O Oý 
to fR 
Cl) to N In N to N In - ... 
ZD 
S~ (ý 
`' fZ W N 
fY. O 
W N V O ifl 
W 0 01 O M 
"ri "r"I ý ý 
ri p I I I-i 
N 
+J p O0 
In Gp o 
a N o 
W W V M O 00 
Q W 0 N CD Cl 
N p I 
m '17 E rn 
. -t a m r. o O 1+"+ Ln O \o 
4-+ o kD CD 0) 
" ý " 
U p 1 . - 1 1 
o ON a o o 0 
N (ý ý fx I N 
L 
-. 
N O 
r-1 Q . - M 
A W o N 
(a " " H 1 1 
co In N Oý V' d. M V' 
o ä, q, Ln In 0 o ö %D OD N co ao o 1 l0 lD ýp N 1p O kp N lfl N In 'V' to - Ln V' 
p M Ol IN I- 10 9 
W 
0 
4J N C') r- O lD 01 'cY' N (1) "- l0 r In U1 U1 . - U) al C . - O1 N Qý r to r O r a0 r 
" 
Oý 
O 
o 
M 
I 
4 
M 
1 
4 
N M M 
4 ' 4 v ý 1 v I 1 1 I . .. 
II 
w 
p 
II 
W 
11 
W 
II 
W 
II 
a 
W 
II 
aw 
II 
04 W 
11 
a w A p p A A A A 
N M d' Ln %D r CO 
- 158 - 
' 
v 
N 
u1 
61 
(N 
Ol 
LI) 
r 
Cl) 
'V' 
00 
In 
r 
N 
to 
N 
N 
pý 
ch 
r ' lf) N M to r V' N N 
A . - r r . - r r r r ý- r w 
0 
co t- co N N N tO N 00 
N 
m 
rn 
a 
m 
m 
m 
m 
m 
N 
N 
OD 
N 
Ln 
N 
CA 
rn 
N b' 
N N . 
Ol CO 
* 
N _ 
is 
ý . -. 
is 
1- 
* 
to . -. 
. Ic 
to - 
* 
to .ý 
ý 
lfl 
0 
4J 
4J N r O N 'r 61 0 O 61 Ol L7 LI) N N M 
r 
" 
r trý r 
" 
0) `- 
" 
. - 
" 
c- - I O N c- Lf1 r N 
ý 
N rý 
In I c M I M I M I 1" v 1" V I" ul I" 00 I" to 
I I I 1 1 1 b 
4. ) 
M 
kD 
61 
in 
o 
in 
T 
to r 
t 
'T 
to 
to 
CO 
Ln 
lzr 
to 
ro 
U) . ö , _o 1 o 6 
r O N 00 ""' T Ln m O N 00 00 N 0) In N sa 
'v' M r N to : M CO O r O r O to ?r 
A >C ýr v ýr v v to M . - 
' 
N In 
p 0 O 
ä 
W r- -T U 
{ I W r O) rl 
" ., i O Ol 3-I 
r In 
UI . -4 
±-I fa O ^ 
l1 
r- I 
ä N r O 
W N 
. 
tf) 
. 
z 
0 w 1 ro v o w 
7-i 
A w 
U) 
W 
O . -+ 
ca 
CO 
CC) . -. a ^ 
C) 
U1 C) IT 
O 
ON O N 4-) 
ZA ý " 
C) to U 
ý W I O 
i r ý 
ý - R4 
k 
Cl) 
0 
'" ro m 
ö ä ro 
P7 O - O . -. r . -" N -- 
in 
AI 
W 
N 
to 
en 
C 
to M 
' 
O co O 
. . 
O) 
r 
N 
. --. 
61 
M 
O CO 
En 
4J 
$4 
ra 
1.1 
z 
a " - 
mot 0 O ! - M ý 0 to aJ o U U 
r-4 
ý L 
ý - 
V In U U) C 
A Co . r 
(a V a) 
rtf 
[4 
O Ln 
1, 
rn 
M 
O w A 'A A 
04 
N ä O r ro 'o 
r i _I ^q i4 Ri 
(a 0) 
1 
to ý. 
' 
O . -. r O . -. CO . 00 . -" M . - C . ". lý ^ ^ 
b 7 0) 
O 
I 
11 
to 
O 
'l 
Hfl 
N 
r O 
N 
O 
N 
r 
N 
O 
In 
N 
L) 
N 
M 
19 
Ln 
N 
' 
1- 
N 
N 
O 
IT 
M 
N 
N V' 00 M hfl 1 " 1' O M CO 1ý M 4 0 z i 
v .. v r v v N 
v 0 
04 
(a 
0 
RS 1- tT ýD N co N fýl Oý 
U1 
r 
^ LI) 
r 
r. 
tý 
co 
f- to 
^ 
lfl `- in N 
N 
N 
_ 
to 
:1 W 
dJ 
fA 
N CO to to M r r 00 V 00 C' . - M i l ' 0 
N 
U 
C, 
O' 
11 
M N to t0 In Ch 1 
., I (Cl 
1 v . U) 4 
U) c 
II II II II II II 11 II II 41 O O II (a +) o 
A 
w 
A A A A A A q q 
+, 
q 
4) N 0 O C1 
A w A w A w A 04W A aw A ww A N aw aw 4J q q q 
'd' l! '1 l0 (ý dp 
ý Ö ý""1 
W 
0 
.. 1 
' -I 
r-1 
tH 
N 
4J 
N 
N 
Cl) 
4-1 
O 
w 
0 
N 
'0 
-4 
0 
U 
W 
P4 0 
ýi 
A 
(Cl 
H 
0 
N 
iI 
En 
4J 
z 
x 
roz 
aýw 
w 
w 
ro 
C) 271 
aA 
w 
w 
z 
w 
roz 
vw aý+ 
al a1A 
aaw 
ro 
ZA 
AI 
ro 
O 
U 
CO Co 
1- 
N 
o io 
o 
. -- lp 
ýK 
v 
N dý 
Lf1 N 
ýT N 
M lfl 
Iý 
r 
M 
I" ý 
rn 
M ýr MO 
lD . -. 
to - 
ýN Ol 
r e1ý 
CO O 
ON 
II 
0 ca 
rn ý N G '1' N 
0 0ý cn 
co 
O1 G1 
rn o O N lf) 
O O r O 
0 aT ' 
01 N O 'J M 
o N o 0 U) 
to co O co 
O V Lfl M N 
" " " 0 
r 
1 
I 
- 
'V' 
I 
N 
I I 1" 
CO , -. M N 
. - 
1ý 
O1 
I" 
N- 
mr 
o Ln 
L ._ C) Ln M In 
o 
rr 
v0 
N 
o, m 
Nr 
sr 
to 0 
'V' r- 
N 
N lý 
N N N 
ýr M U1 M M 
Ql G1 Cl 
CO 
to M M O 
ýt O O r1 
ý 
N N I I 
"W kD O V N 0a O tf1 
co Ln 'w 0 
N 
0 "F 
0 
I 
r 
v. 
to 
o rn 
0 Ln 
Cl) - 
O l0 
ON 
o 00 
C! ui 
(D - N 6) 
OO 
Ln - 
cm 
rN 
ý 
1 
r 
CO 
NM 
Mr 
Lt) O N M r M 
Co V' r N M r lD LIl N l0 r 
w Co en O ýO Co Co 0 .OM Oý M 
"- N N hfl M l: ý 
Mm ul O1 01 0O 01 r 
M 
Vý M rr 
ýo d' o m ýn ýo 0o r o0 or1 
O . - M .. - r ý- .ý ... 
H 1i II 
x 
11 
ax 
II 
ax 
11 
ax ö ö ö ö ö ö 
A 0 Cý 0 0 o 
N 2 v2 2 2 r 
- 159 - 
C) 
0 
41 r- 
ro 
+J 
0 U 
N 
0 
N 
U 
rt1 
'--I Ra 
N 
d 
N 
A 
0 
. lq 4) 
U 
?4 
4J 
N 
4) 
k 
0 
z 
tp 
N 
23 
C) 
4-1 
U 
W 
04 x C) 
0 
U 
U) 
N 
r-I 
.G 
4j S4 
N (C 
U 
(Z 4J 
Sa Q) 
ß r3 ý 
UA 
0 -4 fri 
s4 
U) 0 rd 
U0 
., -1 ., -1 
lJ N 4j 
N0 
NN 
1) N 'O 
m 1W 0 
+1 0 4) 
NG ß4 
C) C1 
41 Cý 10 
- 160 - 
O ID rn in in 1 0 co V' co M M 1 O O Ol O hfl ßf1 to 
Q N r r r r r N 
N m C) 00 r N N 00 CO CO Ol Ol Oý G1 
Io: 
. 
r O O', r Ol O O C V . - -T O co 
'- M O L1 03 r M M - N 
r N U1 N co hfl O Ln - 1" I" 
" 
cr 
+ý N I N I '- 1 N 1 1 
to 
is is 
r- - CO r- co - 00 - .4 (N co lJ O ul N al 61 O 0 Oý 
. -1 1ý O Oý Cl) 00 lD C. m O r O 
-1 E-4 " 1 N 
G 
r 
C 
1 
00 .D M U1 O 
N " 
CO I 6r in I 
U) C7 O (N `- I 
A a r r 
N 
U 
CO a 41 
a, q 
N U 
Cn a 
W 
O ON 
Cl, rn ä Cl' 
.ý v 
b 
r-4 - O A 
C'"-" q is O is CO 
V. 00 Cl' . - U1 
U 
W CA t M 
ßý C7 En I O I O a "T ý- Cl) -- 1 
Lf [1 is is r r a en kD l0 r O 
r--1 q N N r r 00 
A c7 O I ýr ON rn 
m a M - N E-ý ý- I 
N N . -. 00 ul O m l0 kO m to lo r 6N r Ln m 
1 O0 1o C0 v <- M r V' r N r 1ý 1O 
l0 N 
fö 00 l0 Ql C %D W CO e m O co co 
41 " N O 1 M 1 N N N N OD 
N IV O - M - O, % 1 01 1 r- 0 ul Ln ON M M eP U 
II II 
1 
II 
I 
II 
. - 
I 
II 
I 
II II 
co m A A 
A A A A A A A 
N M '0' to l0 r 
U 
J-) 
G 
0 
U 
v 
4J 
r4 
0 
u 
LO 
vi 
A 
H 
- 161 - 
Ul 
M 
U1 
ýT 
C) 
M N N 
M 
N 
. N N 
N N N r 
NI 
(N 
a) 
Il 
a) 
a) 
0 
co 
O 
lf) 
N 
OD 
co 
N 
CO 
co 
r- 
W 
I C4 
lt] 
N 
lO 
l0 
O 
U) 
O 
Iý M 
'q' M 
K 
fit' 
l0 
N 
k r 
N 
N 
e- 
'V' 
Ol 
61 
(N 
N 
lD 
En 
M r Vý 
N 
M N f`') 
N 
(N 
ýr 
l0 
1 
N 
"T 
\O 
I 
li 
V '- rr 
Q1 
O N 
N 
OO 
V .. 
O co O CO O 1- 
l0 CA mot' In Ln N 
r 
o 
O N 
M 
Ln C) Ln 0) 
q 
u 
l0 
CO v 
OD . - -. 
N d 
U 
a (N 
N 
a- 
O 
co lfl 
W l0 N NN 
Lf, N 
q 
z o 
ü, 
I 
CA 
uý 
N 
ä 
Q M 
r 
. -. 
N 
Ch 
l0 l0 
Pa 
O 
" 
lJ O 
' ä 
_, 
I r1 
v 
I 
1 
w 
H IC o, .. IC ON 
ß7 
C7 
C) 
O 
' 
io 
N 
o 
o 
' 
. - 
M 
a I cri 
1 
I (' 
1 
_ 
1 
M 
00 
ko 
. -. 
N 
N 
l0 
CO 
Ln 
.ý 
1- 
m 
M 
IT co 
Un N 
C 
co 
OD 
a% 
OD 
(0 
co 
Oo 
1- 
1 
0 
. - 
t0 
O 
N 
0) 
O 
. - 
o 
Q %. 0 in Ln Co 
ý 
o 
Ra OA 
O 
C) 
T 
U) 
V' 
('M O) 
O1 N 
r 
M 
'- 
CO 
61 
. - 
61 
l0 
O 
. - 
01 
N 
41 
d-r " " " " U) 10 v CO 
OD 
v '. O - 
O 
N '. D M 
r 
" 
N 
O 
U 
Vý 
II 
N 0 
. - 
... 
A 
Q 
II 
Ä 
11 
Ä 
II 
P4 
II 
a 
II 
a 
II 
a 
Ä Ä Ä ö 
0) 
0 U 
- 162 - 
G) 
0 
0 U 
Ln 
N 
. -i 
ro 
H 
r r 1 -e .D 0-, co .0 rn 1, 
1 
m O co r N n 
r r N Co l0 lD 
L(1 In co co 
`" rn rn r r rn rn la 
Ic is iC 
O N 1,0 C r M M M r m r V 
r N to N N "ý r : N M cM V 
Ol N O (N d' N M N M 
N N i I I 1 
v 
+J 
H 
W N to - N O O 
O CO O N O in 
LQ 
U 
a M 
O r 
2 
W O O O O 
1 1 
v v ý 
A 
cri . - I ri O N N 
O O 
1 O N O O Zj 
O O O r 0) 
" " ý " . IJ a 1 1 I 1 0) 
q x 
im a v ý 
0 
a o - o co o 0 0 o Cq . . V 
N N ä " N 
N G) 
:ý (IS 
U "4 rn - rn o - ro la o c of o . 
- 
r O '. o rn 11 ro 00 M co l1 O 00 O co a OO M R . 
A , - 0 . - r - ao Co Co r. 4-) 
. . 
'" ... ... ... ., z 
. tu -p a) u in . -. 00 .7 ul . -. M . -. C1 . -. M .. i 1- ". i ý0 M M M ýT '- M r O N U1 N O (S 1 4 +ý O M O T O ýp O C O M O M - "r1 " ý " N b L: I e- I '" I 1 . O 1 1 v I I I U o 11 N 
N 
II II II 11 II il +i G) 
ro ++ a a a C) r4 04 41 0 
ö z u u v Q o ca a ca +.. A 
G G n iz -l 
r I-- N Q, is 
- 163 - 
O 
0 
N N 
Co 
ý- I- 
CO 
M 
(`') 
N- 
m 
U) N 
w 
0 
N CO 
U) 
O N 
rn 
M 
N 
M 
N 
cr 
CO 
O 
C% 0 
O O 
a) 
NI CO 6ý Ql a0 00 
0 ýr 
00 
rn 
CO 
O 
b 
v 
is r. dc ý. - ý. "k 4c .k is r. is r 
U 
ro rn ý- o 0 0 o r M rý . - ý N ý ý , d, d . Co 
(n 17 
V' V' CO N l0 O N lý f2 CO M O CO V' 00 0( U1 
1~ 
1 
4.1 M M M M . 1, Ve ýo M N M N N N N C . --" c- v O U] I I I 1 1 1 1 I - - 1 1 1 I - 
IC # * - N ti~ 
4A ým rn m 
LO 
0 M 
m 
r o -, 0 Un CO m M N (Cl ," N NN M O M Q, M rý O LX) O 41 
a HI V' Ce OD N N (N ., i 
O eN ý- M N N 
O 
O 
z2 
. - 
M 
O 
. 
crý 
N 
O CO 
G) 
}. 1 
N N 
M ý1 CO CO LX) O O CO O N 
O 
ro 
a N 
(44 
o ö 
N ým 
r 
CO 
- 
V' O 
.ý 
N LX) 
.. 
CO N 
.ý 
N 
N 
O 
2 
t! ) 
CO 
O 
. -. 
N 
V' 
s- 
- 
' 
{U. ) 
0 1 CO 
ý 
O 
ý 
Vl (V LX) N 
ý 
Ul O O O O N- v 
b 
/s: 
I I V 
. 
1 N Iý I x 
- c l 
1 
M 
v 
- 1 
O v ai 
U +) A 
W 
a " tr+ rl 
ro 
o m U) 
ä ö ( : ; v > N r + 
Iý ý ro ro " U) rn i I 
v ro U .0 N I~ 
A ro "a -a a H A v 
'd lü 'b 
1- (Cl CO CO O N CC) V' CO O O1 
; 
U) O CO hfl N N 
. -- 
I 
N N N CO . - O "- M CO CO 2 O N N N N CO CO 0 > 0% 
ro 
v U la 
4-1 N Iý M 
_ 
CO N 
_ 
CO CO 
_ 
Co U) 
_ 
CO N 
_ 
N 
O 
1, 
- 
N 
m 
Ln CO 
M 
WD N 
3a 
N 
"-I 
4.1 
O 
C. 
ro 
(Cl " Ln V' 00 V' 
. 
N N V' CO Ul 1, c4 CO M N O Co "rl ' 
N N 
v to 
N 
r 
Co 
(") V' M r r r r 
. 
M \O r 
m 
U 
1~ 
bý 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
r - «m 
U) CO 
m 
v 
1 
v .. .. "ri 
43 
"ri 
U) 
f0 
4) 
1 N CO 
"rI N 0 
+1 v O 
11 II II I 41 U I II II II II II 4-) 0 
Q Ä C) A U) W 
aU0 aA iL N N 
L1 
C A 
C1 1ý A +1 L) L] A A C] 
N M t1 l0 (- 00 0% 4 it 
- 164 - 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables 
Table 5.1: (all current prices) 
D$ = OPEC holdings of dollars in billions of US dollars. 
Dt_1 = lagged value of D. 
RTB t= Treasury Bill rate (91 days) at end period in the US. 
RTBUK = Treasury Bill rate (91 days) in the UK. 
£I 
It 
= expected exchange rate between sterling and dollars. 
Wt = wealth constraint. (sum of D$ +. D£ + DED + DOTH) 
in billions of US dollars. 
St_1 = total OPEC surplus at t-1 in billions of US dollars. 
DiffRTB t= 
differential rate between RTB t and R,, BUt. 
RBD t= Bank Deposit rate (3 month 
interbank rate). 
UK 
RBD, t = Bank Deposit rate (3 month interbank rate). 
DiffRB, t = differential rate between RBD, t and RBDUt. 
D$ = D$ divided by W. 
DiffRTBLt DiffRTB, t adjusted 
for inflation expectations in 
the USA and the UK. 
DiffREALt= DiffRBD t adjusted 
for inflation expectations in 
the USA and the UK. 
NB. When dependent variable is DP, all explanatory variables 
denominated in dollars are divided by Wt also. (same in 
Tables 5.2 - 5.7). 
Table 5.2: 
D£ = OPEC holdings of sterling in billions of US dollars. 
Dt_1 = Lagged value of D£. 
D£ =DE divided by Wt. 
All other variables defined as in Table 5.1. 
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DED = OPEC holdings of Eurocurrencies in billions of 
US dollars. 
Dt_1 = lagged value of DED' 
RED, t = Eurodollar rate of interest (3 month rate). 
DiffRED, t differential rate 
between RED, t and RBD, t. 
DiffRERED, t= differential rate adjusted 
for inflation 
expectations in the USA. 
DED DED divided by Wt. 
Table 5.4: 
DOT = OPEC holdings of 'other' currencies in billions 
of US dollars. 
Dt-1 DOTt-1 lagged one period. 
RDM, t - 3 month interbank rate on deutschmark accounts. 
RYEN, t - 3 month interbank rate on Yen accounts. 
XDM, $, t - expected exchange rate between dollars and 
deutschmarks. 
R 
A 
t adjusted 
for inflation expectations in Germany. R t DM DM, 
RREAL _ adjusted for inflation expectations in Japan. R Yen, t Yen, t 
DiffRDM, t = differential rate between 
RBDt and RDMt. 
DiffRYen, t = differential rate between RBDt and 
Ryent. 
Diff 
REAL 
= RDM, t differential rate between RBDt and 
R adjusted for DMt 
inflation expectations. 
Diff 
REAL 
= RYen, t differential rate between R_ RBDt and Rýý adjusted 
for 
-Pent 
inflation expectation. 
DOT DOT divided by Wt. 
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Table 5.5: 
DTB = OPEC holdings of US Treasury Bills in millions 
of US dollars ($millions) 
DBD = OPEC holdings of US Bank Deposits in millions of 
US dollars. 
DGB = OPEC holdings of US Government Bonds in millions 
of US dollars. 
DNBD = OPEC holdings of US Non-Bank Financial Intermediary 
Assets in $ millions. 
DCB = OPEC holdings of US Corporate Bonds. 
Dt_1 = lagged value of D TB, DBD, DGB, DNBD' DCB. 
Tt = wealth constraint (DTB + DBD + DGB + DNBD + DCB) 
in billions of US dollars. 
RIB = expected rate of return on bonds. 
RGB, t = rate of interest on government bonds (5 year). 
RBD, t = rate of interest on bank deposits (3 month interbank). 
RTB, t = rate of interest on Treasury Bills (91 days). 
RNBD, t = rate of interest on Federal Funds. 
RCB, t = rate of 
interest on Corporate Bonds (5 year). 
DTB, etc = DTB divided by Tt, etc. 
NB. When dependent variable is DTB, all explanatory variables 
in dollars are divided by Tt also. 
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Table 5 .: 
DTB = OPEC holdings of UK Treasury Bills in millions 
of US dollars. 
DBD = OPEC holdings of UK Bank Deposits in millions of 
US dollars. 
DGB = OPEC holdings of UK Government Bonds in millions 
of US dollars. 
RTB = rate of interest in UK Treasury Bills (91 day). 
RBD = rate of interest on UK Bank Deposits (3 month 
interbank). 
RGB = rate of interest on UK Government Bonds (5 years). 
RGB = expected rate of return on bonds. 
Tt = wealth constraint (= TB + DB. + GB) in billions 
of US dollars. 
DTB, t etc 
DTB, t divided by Tt, etc. 
Data Sources: 
1. Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, 1974-1981. 
2. UK Financial Statistics., 1974-1981. 
3. US Treasury Bulletin, 1974-1981. 
4. US Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1974-1981. 
5. IMF International Financial Statistics 1974-1981. 
6. Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Annual Report 1974-1981, 
7. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company. World Financial Markets 1974-198, 
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Appendix 2: The Generation of Expectation Variables 
In Chapters 4 and 5, we discussed the role of expectations 
in the generation of certain variables, namely inflation, interest 
rate, and exchange rate expectations. To generate such expected 
values, an adaptive expectations type mechanism of the type 
introduced by De Leeuw (1965) was formulated. In general: 
Rt = 1-h ý^ 
1_1 Rt-1 
1_F 
where Rt = expected rate at time t 
Rt = actual rate at time t 
x=0.25,0.55,0.9 
F= number of previous quarters used in generation 
Interest Rate Expectations 
In stage two of the model, we postulated that individual 
asset holdings may depend on the 'expected' rate on government 
bonds. The variable was generated as above, except that the 
variable generated was the normal rate on bonds, from which 
investors would expect the current rate to either tend towards 
or deviate. 
Re = t 
N where Rt = 
ie. 
Rt A_ RtN 
X 1-1 Rt-1 
1-X F 
- 169 - 
eg. for the expected rate for 1973, quarter 4 for the 
expected rate on UK government bonds, with = 0.25 
RtN= 1-0.25 
11 
f C(1 x 12.5) + (0.25 x 11.57) + (0.252x 9.23; 
1-(0.25) + (0.253 x 9.47) + ... (0.2510 x 6.83J 
= 10.99 
Expected Inflation Rate 
In stage one of the model we postulated that real rates 
of interest may be 
RA Rt = Rt 
where Ite = 1- % 
14 
It = actual inflation rate (consumer 
price index) 
For example, in the fourth quarter of 1975 in the UK with 
= 0.55 was: 
ite = 1-0.55 
1- (0.55)11 
Expected Exchange Rate 
r (l x 14.95) + (0.55 x 13.73) L 
+ (0.552 x 15.94) + ... 
= 9.50 
(0.5510 x 15.84) 
In stage one of the model we suggested that exchange 
rate expectations were an important determinant of OPEC asset 
important in allocating OPEC funds, where 
e 
t 
It-1 
where It = expected inflation rate e 
holdings; 
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where Ete = 1-X \ 1-1 Et_ 
where Ete = expected exchange rate 
Et = actual exchange rate 
For example, in the fourth quarter of 1977, the expected 
dollar-deutschmark rate, with ) =0.9 was; 
EeDM =1-0.9 ý 
C(1 
x 2.105) + (0.9 x 2.307) 
1, 1-(0.9) 
+ (0.92 x 2.338) + ... (0.910 x 2.355) 
= 2.332 
CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSION. 
-1 71 - 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
In Chapter 1 it was agreed that the balance of payments 
current account surplus of the OPEC countries of the magnitude 
that persisted during the 1970's had undesirable effects on 
the world's economy, both the developed and developing countries. 
In particular, the surplus may have contributed to a lower level 
of world economic activity as depicted in the following 
diagram, which reproduces Figure 1a) from Chapter 1. 
Rb 
R3 ý-- -- 
R2 ý--- - 
R1 F___ 
._ 
Si 
I2 
11 
y2y1 Y6 w 41ý 
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The diagram shows some 'world' income positions on 
the horizontal axis, and some 'world' rate of interest on the 
vertical axis. A world savings schedule is represented by 
S1 which rises from lower income and interest rate positions, 
to higher levels in the top right-hand corner of the diagram. 
A world investment schedule is represented by I. which falls 
from lower income and higher interest rate levels, to the 
bottom right-hand corner of the diagram. Equilibrium income 
is at YV The OPEC surplus is depicted by an increase in world 
savings, therefore the savings schedule shifts upwards from 
S1 to S2 creating a new equilibrium at Y2, a position of lower 
world economic activity than Yý, 
We suggested in Chapter 1 that a more desirable situation 
could be achieved either by a shift of the investment schedule 
from I1 to 12 or a shift of the savings schedule from S2 back 
to S1, in order that the original equilibrium position of Y 
may be regained. Consequently a study of the disposal undertaken 
was designed to throw some light on the likelihood of a shift 
in I from 11 to 1 2. Similarly, the possibility of S2 moving 
back to S, will be determined by the existance of the surplus. 
Consequently, a study of the possibility of the surplus 
persisting is useful. An attempt to shed some light'on these 
two possibilities was provided empirically in the previous 
chapters. 
Ideally a general equilibrium approach should provide 
the basis for such a model to be tested empirically. For an 
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individual OPEC country, the return on its oil assets should 
be considered in the same framework as the return on all 
non-oil assets, particularly the return on financial assets. 
However, given that the price of crude oil, which 
largely determines the surplus, is beyond the control of 
individual OPEC countries, such a framework may not be 
applicable. Consequently a partial equilibrium approach was 
adopted, in which a macroeconomic model based on the absorptive 
capacities of the OPEC countries, first determined the size 
of the surplus; and then a portfolio selection model was 
utilized to consider the disposal of funds. 
The results from the macroeconomic model used to 
determine the surplus were presented in Chapter 4. It was 
suggested that time series analysis of the data in the usual 
manner would neither provide stable estimates of the parameters 
of the model, nor be a satisfactory basis for forecasting 
future components of the macroeconomies, due to the structural 
shifts which have occured in the OPEC countries resulting from 
the 1973-74 and 1979-80 crude oil price rises. An alternative 
was provided by the combination of cross-section and time series 
data from 1973 onwards. This pooled model allowed reasonable 
estimates to be obtained statistically, but led to 
interpretational problems on economic grounds. Firstly, the 
estimated coefficients from a pooling procedure are difficult 
to interpret as they reflect a combination of short term and 
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long term elasticities. Consequently their use in a 
forecasting model is unhelpful. Secondly, a fundamental 
assumption of the pooled model is homogeneity amongst the 
OPEC countries. This would appear to contradict the account 
of the low absorbing and high absorbing members of OPEC 
presented in Chapter 1. Lastly, given these two problems, 
due to the great instability over time presented by oil price 
movements, it is unlikely that any econometric model would 
be useful to provide forecasts of aggregates for the OPEC 
countries. 
The author would suggest tentatively that on the basis 
of the last point, any forecasts for the world energy market, 
should not be provided using an econometric model, given 
the importance of OPEC in the world energy markets. A more 
successful method may be provided by the less rigorous energy 
'balance' approach which substitutes the formality of the 
econometric approach with a richness of institutional and 
governmental detail1. The more formal approach may give some 
understanding of the underlying economic principles of the 
world energy market on which the less theoretically demanding 
method can be superimposed to provide forecasts. 
Despite the inability of our model to provide any 
suitable forecasts of the surplus, we can perhaps conclude that 
1: see S. Hammoudeh (1979) for a discussion of alternative 
methods of modelling energy markets. 
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the surplus is likely to persist in the immediate future, 
on the basis of the forecasts provided by the less formal 
approach summarised in Table 4.18. Furthermore, a simple 
glance at the data shows a large growth in imports is 
required in order that the OPEC surplus will disappear. 
For example, Saudi Arabia, the leading contributor to the 
surplus would require an annual 50% growth in import values 
on the 1979 total in order to record a balance of payments 
deficit by 19811. Such a simple analysis assumes that 
export receipts remain at the 1979 level when the crude oil 
market price was under $17 per barrel. By November 1981, the 
official price had reached $34 per barrel. Furthermore, for 
the latest year that data is available (1979), imports 
grew by only 25% in value terms. 
The results of the two stage portfolio selection model 
are presented in Chapter 5. These results give some guidance 
to the likely pattern of the disposal of the surplus, given 
its likely persistence in the immediate future. In additibn, 
the results have some implications for the domestic economic 
policies of the recipient countries in the developed world. 
Furthermore, the results may have implications for other 
areas of research into international capital flows. 
The results at the stage one level show a highly 
significant constant term, and exchange rate expectations variable, 
1: Using data from IMF, IFS 1980 Yearbook. 
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whereas interest rate effects are generally insignificant. 
This type of result is particularly true for holdings of 
non-dollar currencies, and suggests both that the surplus 
is invested on a somewhat ad-hoc basis and also that 
diversification amongst currencies pays little attention to 
the rate of return available. On the contrary, OPEC investors 
are concerned more with exchange rate fluctuations in 
allocating their wealth. The frequently occuring high constant 
term suggests some inertia on behalf of the investors in that 
their wealth must be invested in certain financial centres, 
and so OPEC investors are content to stay with the most 
developed centres, irrespective of the rate of return. This 
decision may be helped by the form in which oil payments are 
made by the consuming countries, namely in US dollars. 
One implication of these results is that any proposals 
for a 'recycling' mechanism must take into consideration the 
importance placed by the OPEC countries on exchange rate 
fluctuations, in contrast to the interest rates on different 
assets. Taken in conjunction with the apparent desire for 
liquidity by the OPEC countries , this implies that simple 
index linked bonds2 may not be the most suitable form of 
recycling the OPEC surplus. On the contrary, it implies that 
any rigid mechanism which requires the OPEC investors to 
operate on a longer term horizon will have its difficulties. 
1: See data appendix. 
2: As suggested by W. Levy (MEES, April 7th 1980). 
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This conclusion is supported by the lack of statistical 
significance obtained on the interest rate expectations 
variable at the stage two level of the portfolio model. 
The results and the data suggest that there has been 
some diversification out of dollar and sterling and that 
this is likely to persist in the future, although the degree 
to which this will continue may be limited by the unavailability 
of other currencies on such a scale. Clearly, this will 
reduce the susceptability of the dollar to any short term 
shifts in holdings by the OPEC countries, and may result in 
a more stable external effect on its value. 
It would appear that to develop a co-ordinated recycling 
mechanism, would be a difficult objective on the basis of the 
above discussion. Perhaps a 'new' currency consisting of a 
basket of existing currencies would be the best alternative, 
given the results obtained in this thesis, although justification 
of such a scheme for just oil payments would be difficult. 
Difficulties involving the use of such a 'petrocurrency' to 
buy goods and services may also evolve. It may well be that 
market forces which prevail at present are the only practical 
tool to recycle the surplus, despite their limitations1. 
Perhaps the only solution will be the erosion of the surplus, 
which can be only achieved by a contraction of demand for 
OPEC oil by the developed countries, on the evidence of this study. 
1: See discussion in Chapter 1 and references. 
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The results obtained also have some implications for 
the domestic economic policies of the developed countries, 
which receive substantial amounts of 'OPEC' money. The 
results suggest that a high interest rate policy to attract 
foreign funds, certainly funds of the OPEC countries, is not 
a significant strategy in the inflationary conditions that 
have persisted since the early 1970's. On the contrary, 
investors may be more concerned about the movement of exchange 
rates since the introduction of the floating exchange rate 
regime in 1971. Consequently a more stable exchange rate 
may attract overseas funds and assist balance of payments 
problems. Perhaps more research into other areas of inter- 
national capital flows may give support to this notion, as 
little appears to have been published since the introduction 
of floating exchange rates. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
We must now turn to consider from these conclusions, 
what avenues future researchers should take in the field to 
improve existing knowledge and provide closer, perhaps more 
clinical analysis of the OPEC surplus and its disposal. 
One of these avenues may be to develop the lines of 
research used in this thesis in various ways. For this to be 
possible, more detailed data must be provided both quantativelY 
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and qualatively. We suggested earlier that an ideal extension 
of the approach used here would be to develop a more general 
equilibrium type model in which the disposal and the emergence 
of the model can be examined together, as opposed to examining 
the two issues separately. In such a model, the desired 
holdings of certain assets and currencies would be elements 
of the same model as the consumption function and other 
macrofunctions of the OPEC countries. Such an approach would 
require either a greater time horizon to have passed to provide 
sufficient data on an annual basis for estimation, or the 
publication of data on the national accounts of the OPEC 
economies on a quarterly basis, in order that sufficient 
degrees of freedom may be available for estimation of such a 
model. Unless there was more stability in the world energy 
markets, such a model may present similar difficulties to 
those encountered in Chapter 4 however. In addition the 
insignificant interest rate variables obtained in this study 
suggest such an approach to be not worthwhile. Perhaps an 
improvement on the research undertaken here would be to 
consider two pooled models of the OPEC economies, in order to 
arrive at an estimate of the OPEC surplus, one model for the 
low absorbing member countries and the other for the high 
absorbers. Again, to achieve such an improvement, greater data 
availability of the type suggested above would be necessary. 
Thirdly, it may be fruitful to disaggregate the analysis 
further, not just to take account of the two groups of absorptive 
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capacity countries, but for all the OPEC countries as there 
are perhaps enough country heterogenities to warrant such an 
approach. This disaggregated analysis could be of either 
the general equilibrium approach, or the partial equilibrium 
approach adopted in this study. Such a detailed study would 
be particularly useful in allowing the researcher to examine 
the role of Saudi Arabia in the emergence and disposal of the 
surplus, as it is the major contributor to the surplus. 
Furthermore, this level of disaggregation would allow closer 
interpretation of the results, as any aggregation bias will 
have been removed. 
Within the framework of the research adopted in this 
study, the estimation of the portfolio selection model could 
be improved with better data. As suggested in the previous 
chapters, a more rigorous test of the theory of portfolio 
selection would be obtained by applying a Maximum Likelihood 
estimation technique where constraints, consistent with the 
underlying theory, enter the model. This would allow more 
consistent interpretation of the coefficients, with respect 
to the Markowitz-Tobin principles. However, more detailed 
information on the holdings of equities and non-financial 
assets by the OPEC countries would have to be provided to 
warrant such a procedure. In addition, more data on the 
holdings of non-dollar, non-sterling currencies would be required 
also. Again the benefits of such an approach may be limited on 
the basis of the insignificant interest rate variables obtained 
in this study. 
- 181 - 
A tangential approach to that adopted in this study, 
would be to consider the surplus from the point of view of 
the form and method of payments for OPEC oil by the consuming 
countries. Some of the results in this study, particularly 
the re-occuring high constant term, suggest that such an 
approach may give some clearer ideas as to the currencies and 
assets held by the surplus OPEC countries. Research of this 
nature may have its difficulties however. Firstly, information 
on the method and form of oil payments may not be forthcoming 
from either oil companies or banks. Secondly, if such 
information is available, problems may be encountered in its 
collection. Thirdly and finally, it is difficult to see how 
such an approach would explain the holdings of wealth in non-bank 
deposit form. Presumably the OPEC countries. are not paid in 
government bonds by the oil companies! 
Perhaps a combination of the 'methods of oil payment' 
approach and that adopted in this study would give some greater 
insight into the problem. 
Another alternative approach, which perhaps has closer 
links with this study, would be to construct a questionnaire, 
which would consider how the major financial institutions view 
the problem of the OPEC surplus. This questionnaire could be 
sent to the IMF, the BIS, the World Bank, in addition to the 
international banks to obtain a broad selection of views. A 
variety of questions could be included in order to capture an 
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idea of the importance of certain variables such as interest 
rates, and the majority opinion of those in the 'market' as 
to both the likelihood of a persistent surplus and the 
optimum recycling method. 
Again, such an approach would not be without its 
difficulties. Once the appropriate sample of institutions had 
been chosen, the problem of an adequate and reliable response 
would be encountered. In my own research I have found banks 
not to be particularly co-operative in the provision of 
suitable data, and the suggestion of a questionnaire met with 
some cynicism. 
Apart from these problems, the interpretation of the 
replies would present some difficulties also. Although an 
'informed' majority response on the best method of recycling 
the OPEC surplus could be obtained, little accuracy of the 
response to changes in relevant variables could be measured 
from such an exercise, unless extremely specific questions were 
asked. In addition the 'informed' majority may not provide the 
most appropriate solution to the recycling of the OPEC surplus 
on economic principles. Nevertheless, such an approach may 
yield some insights in addition to those from the more formaal 
methods of analysis suggested, and that adopted in this study. 
DATA APPENDIX 
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G. D. P. in OPEC Countries in Billions of Local Currency 
(Current Prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq* 
1960 13.2 14.14 31.7 - 328.4 601.4 
1965 15.2 20.15 50.8 24 478.2 913.8 
1970 22.9 34.66 93.1 3,340 841.5 1,251.2 
1971 23.5 40.76 NA 3,672 1,014.3 1,433.8 
1972 27.4 47.73 108.5 4,564 1,268.4 1,440.9 
1973 32.1 64.33 161.1 6,753 1,868.6 1,626.4 
1974 48.5 94.73 371.7 10,708 3,137.0 3,378.0 
1975 56.3 109.49 462.4 12,643 3,561.1 4,022.4 
1976 68.5 131.46 719.1 15,467 4,606.6 4,856.8 
1977 81.9 161.40 690.2 18,706 5,393.3 NA 
1978 NA 187.06 600.2 21,788 NA NA 
1979 NA 229,28 NA NA NA NA 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
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G. D. P. in OPEC Countries in Billions of Local Currency 
(Current Prices) 
Kuwait* Libya* Nigeria* Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 NA 125 2,400 NA NA 25.67 
1965 751 560 3,361 10.404 NA 37.92 
1970 961 1,426 5,621 17.399 NA 51.44 
1971 1,346 1,627 7,098 22.921 NA 57.09 
1972 1,521 1,798 7,703 28.257 6.6 63.11 
1973 2,157 2,246 9,001 40.551 11.4 76.10 
1974 3,511 3,883 16,962 99.315 31.1 127.74 
1975 3,226 3,780 20,232 139.600 33.4 125.35 
1976 3,672 4,907 24,704 164.526 43.6 132.50 
1977 3,885 5,750 27,924- 205.056 54.5 153.57 
1978 4,188 5,912 28,888 223.747 53.4 170.32 
1979 6,431 NA NA NA NA 210.22 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
N. B. Data not available for Quatar. 
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Private Consumption in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq* 
1960 7.2 10.12 14.3 - 231.2 285.9 
1965 9.6 14.87 25.4 21 320.4 455.1 
1970 12.2 23.90 37.4 2693 537.2 578.6 
1971 12.8 28.03 NA 2833 566.9 633.2 
1972 14.1 31.60 36.3 3402 686.6 NA 
1973 17.2 38.61 73.6 4791 879.7 NA 
1974 19.2 53.86 91.8 7259 1127.8 NA 
1975 26.8 65.93 108.7 8745 1316.0 NA 
1976 31.9 77.14 118.3 10464 1532.5 NA 
1977 38.9 96.61 162.1 12312 2160.8 NA 
1978 NA 112.81 211.1 14535 NA NA 
1979 NA 132.90 NA NA NA NA 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
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Private Consumption in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait*- Libya* Nigeria* Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 NA NA 2,137 NA NA 14.35 
1965 191 201 2,590 2.909 NA 21.69 
1970 245 464 4,143 5.859 NA 27.58 
1971 254 469 5,090 6.412 NA 29.03 
1972 287 543 5,267 6.914 0.9 32.10 
1973 316 703 6,018 7.896 1.5 34.34 
1974 423 927 9,109 9.828 2.2 43.62 
1975 592 1,194 12,378 17.897 4.0 54.55 
1976 735 1,337 15,265 23.738 5.1 65.19 
1977 986 1,490 16,491- 34.148 10.4 78.53 
1978 NA 1,657 18,289 50.995 11.6 93.86 
1979 NA NA NA NA NA 108.80 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
N. B. No data available for Quatar. 
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Tat&ý Investment in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq* 
1960 3.4 1.90 12.4 - 55.4 120.2 
1965 2.4 2.41 12.7 2 85.5 129.8 
1970 7.6 5.21 27.6 455 167.3 185.1 
1971 8.6 9.88 NA 580 216.7 194.7 
1972 10.2 9.96 52.2 857 287.4 217.1 
1973 13.3 12.58 60.4 1208 363.3 288.6 
1974 17.7 18.58 192.4 1797 562.0 628.6 
1975 24.4 27.20 289.7 2572 1065.6 1068.0 
1976 31.2 29.76 528.5 3205 1477.9 NA 
1977 39.3 37.96 400.8 3726 1831.9 NA 
1978 NA 44.68 266.9 4422 NA NA 
1979 NA 54.86 NA NA NA NA 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
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Yotol Investment in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait* Libya* Nigeria* Saudi Arabia U. A. E. 
1960 NA 53 258 - NA 
1965 95 158 615 1.712 NA 
1970 109 232 883 2.597 NA 
1971 119 288 1,283 2.932 NA 
1972 113 437 1,401 3.403 1.8 
1973 124 636 1,506 5.694 2.1 
1974 176 979 3,231 8.400 4.1 
1975 246 1,055 4,939 17.841 8.9 
1976 460 1,226 6,335 33.705 12.5 
1977 1,007 1,368 8,243 51.416 18.4 
1978 1,450 9,031 67.136 18.4 
1979 NA NA NA NA 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
N. B. No data available for Quatar. 
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Government Consumption in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq* 
1960 4.1 1.81 4.6 - 32.4 107.1 
1965 2.9 2.18 8.4 1 65.9 178.6 
1970 4.0 4.59 17.6 293 141.6 268.9 
1971 4.3 5.13 NA 341 189.4 308.9 
1972 4.5 5.84 19.2 414 252.6 NA 
1973 5.0 7.75 25.1 716 325.4 NA 
1974 6.2 12.85 34.4 841 628.3 NA 
1975 8.4 16.74 56.5 1254 807.4 NA 
1976 9.5 18.17 76.0 1591 1003.6 NA 
1977 11.6 23.19 124.9 2019 1073.8 NA 
1978 NA 27.01 105.9 2332 NA NA 
1979 NA 36.60 NA NA NA NA 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
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Government Consumption in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait*"Libya* Nigeria* Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 NA NA 141 NA NA 3.68 
1965 101 80 222 1.654 NA 4.68 
1970 202 260 578 3.421 NA 6.89 
1971 250 318 631 3.798 NA 7.76 
1972 277 359 798 4.285 0.9 8.50 
1973 281 465 819 5.335 1.3 9.59 
1974 432 865 1,122 9.864 2.7 12.77 
1975 504 1,044 2,623 15.911 3.6 15.94 
1976 635 1,185 3,083 28.883 4.8 19.78 
1977 604 1,378 3,587 41.033 6.4 22.96 
1978 1,590 3,634 47.034 7.2 25.16 
1979 NA NA NA 28.96 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of local currency 
N. B. No data available for Quatar. 
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Exports of Goods in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador* Gabon Indonesia* Iran Iraq 
1960 NA 146 11.69 841 63.9 . 167 
1965 3.146 164.1 25.90 708 98.8 . 254 
1970 4.980 221.1 39.87 1108 198.7 . 302 
1971 4.208 221.1 49.43 1234 289.8 . 402 
1972 5.854 342.6 58.90 1777 306 . 369 
1973 7.479 547.9 84.73 3211 425.8 . 588 
1974 19.594 1134.8 184.34 7426 1459 1.949 
1975 18.563 987.0 201.92 7102 1367 2.450 
1976 21.660 1293.0 271.45 8547 1651 2.738 
1977 24.579 1223.3 329.84 10853 1712 2.850 
1978 25.164 1516.2 249.85 11643 1564 3.267 
1979 31.556 1975 367.86 15590 1348 6.350 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
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Exports of Goods in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 . 344 . 004 . 339 3.67 NA 7.720 
1965 . 458 . 373 . 529 5.69 NA 10.926 
1970 . 605 1.013 . 885 10.62 2.428 10.550 
1971 . 809 1.024 1.303 15.60 3.964 12.814 
1972 . 841 . 815 1.433 18.90 4.745 12.571 
1973 . 981 1.032 2.317 28.44 7.198 18.632 
1974 3.029 2.111 6.014 110.91 25.305 45.200 
1975 2.507 1.789 4.792 98.51 27.638 35.668 
1976 2.874 2.459 6.321 128.62 34.248 37.593 
1977 2.806 2.890 7.594 145.26 37.372 39.106 
1978 2.874 2.814 6.689 128.73 35.337 37.518 
1979 5.016 4.510 10.690 199.43 51.728 57.790 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
N. B. No data available for Quatar. 
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Imports of Goods in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador* Gabon Indonesia* Iran Iraq 
1960 100.3 6.99 522 38.6 . 126 
1965 3.069 144.2 13.18 632 59.2 . 147 
1970 5.745 238.3 19.16 889 112.4 . 162 
1971 5.581 297.4 23.11 984 126.7 . 221 
1972 6.198 274.9 29.40 1401 163.0 . 210 
1973 8.828 344.6 30.63 2448 208.0 . 241 
1974 15.223 589.8 68.87 3403 328.0 . 625 
1975 21.854 806.9 82.23 4210 625.3 1.111 
1976 20.206 
. 
860.7 103.46 5020 808.2 1.028 
1977 26.898 1288.7 151.72 5504 887.1 1.181 
1978 30.624 1365 119.98 5974 648.0 1.111 
1979 29.900 1683.8 100.89 6431 612.8 2.012 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
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Imports of Goods in OPEC Countries 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. 
1960 . 075 . 055 . 389 . 960 NA 
1965 . 135 . 104 . 496 2.07 NA 
1970 . 223 . 180 . 681 2.83 1.156 
1971 . 232 . 226 . 986 3.29 1.355 
1972 . 262 . 309 . 892 4.18 1.921 
1973 . 311 . 486 1.103 6.54 2.982 
1974- . 455 . 737 1.579 8.70 6.136 
1975 . 693 . 945 3.359 12.87 9.160 
1976 . 972 . 857 4.647 25.60 11.955 
1977 1.387 1.009 6.444 44.54 17.912 
1978 1.266 1.228 7.317 59.64 18.877 
1979 1.485 1.900 5.901 24.420 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
N. B. No data available for Quatar. 
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OPEC Petroleum Exports in Billions of Local Currency 
(Current Prices) 
Algeria Ecuador* Gabon Indonesia* Iran Iraq 
1960 NA - 2.47 86 33.3 . 158 
1965 2.432 2.1 3.53 169 67.9 . 238 
1970 3.360 .8 13.76 446 205.6 . 280 
1971 3.016 1.2 21.65 565 256.4 . 379 
1972 4.614 59.5 18.53 913 365.2 . 340 
1973 6.030 282.1 37.66 1609 1336.3 . 555 
1974 17.838 692.8 157.36 5211 1245.2 1.921 
1975 16.936 515.9 167.37 5311 1539.0 2.415 
1976 19.814 565.2 213.82 6004 1539.0 2.691 
1977 22.954 478.2 242.41 7298 1592.4 2.807 
1978 23.066 519.9 181.14 7439 1469.4 3.204 
1979 28.950 930.1 299.15 8871 1227.7 6.288 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
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OPEC Petroleum Exports in Billions of Local Currency 
(Current Prices) 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 . 268 NA . 008 3.08 NA 3.620 
1965 . 365 . 370 . 130 4.83 NA 7.236 
1970 . 483 1.010 . 510 9.10 2.307 6.932 
1971 . 650 1.021 . 963 . 
13.92 3.803 8.403 
1972 . 676 . 813 1.175 16.90 4.541 8.132 
1973 . 764 1.032 1.933 25.98 6.953 11.614 
1974 2.341 2.110 5.665 102.46 24.966 27.946 
1975 1.994 1.787 4.593 90.79 27.035 24.797 
1976 2.152 2.457 5.894 118.99 33.044 24.045 
1977 2.081 2.886 7.046 135.95 35.897 25.629 
1978 2.156 2.810 6.033 120.01 33.538 23.806 
1979 3.782 4.507 10.034 187.71 48.783 35.775 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
N. B. No data available for Quatar 
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OPEC Country Government Revenues 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq 
1960 NA 1.363 NA . 536 NA NA 
1965 2.790 1.998 NA . 923 NA NA 
1970 6.704 3.716 20.00 359.6 188.5 . 404 
1971 7.086 4.423 24.52 442.3 275.3 . 539 
1972 9.358 5.514 31.00 623.0 323.3 . 574 
1973 10.925 7.981 38.87 993.1 491.2 1.654 
1974 23.752 11.394 89.19 1792.8 1427.3 2.984 
1975 24.190 12.273 167.39 2271.1 1626.8 3.207 
1976 27.910 14.653 189.06 2950.7 1895.5 5.045 
1977 32.565 16.543 NA 3633.9 2075.6 5.998 
1978 36.901 19.057 NA 4339.5 1611.8 7.169 
1979 NA 23.085 NA NA NA 9.028 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
OPEC Statistical Bulletin 
UN Yearbook of National Accounts 1978 
UN Statistical Yearbook of Asia and the Far East 1976 
UN African Statistical Yearbook 1977 
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OPEC Country Government Revenues 
Billions of Local Currency (current prices) 
Kuwait" Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 NA NA NA NA NA 4.968 
1965 . 258 . 085 . 190 3.961 . 681 7.264 
1970 . 374 . 490 . 463 6.380 . 861 9.498 
1971 . 424 . 632 . 969 10.782 1.651 11.637 
1972 . 629 . 599 1.023 13.200 2.181 13.309 
1973 . 715 . 736 1.769 22.810 4.211 17.231 
1974 2.750 1.050 4.190 98.247 14.176 44.579 
1975 2.580 1.562 4.712 95.847 15.015 42.941 
1976 2.954 1.785 5.523 110.935 18.401 40.556 
1977 3.033 2.103 6.265 146.493 NA 43.705 
1978 3.097 2.480 5.645 130.000 NA 44.0,12 
1979 NA NA NA 160.000 NA 51.179 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
OPEC Statistical Bulletin 
UN Yearbook of National Accounts 1978 
UN Statistical Yearbook of Asia and the Far East 1976 
UN African Statistical Yearbook 1977 
- 199 - 
Oil Production in OPEC Countries 
Millions Barrels Per Year 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq 
1960 66.297 
1965 203.916 
1970 375.622 
1971 286.686 
1972 388.802 
1973 400.497 
1974 368.139 
1975 358.649 
1976 393.487 
1977 420.577 
1978 423.824 
1979 NA 
2.730 
2.849 
1.480 
1.354 
28.579 
76.221 
64.605 
58.721 
68.750 
66.941 
73.668 
NA 
5.626 149.910 
9.100 175.430 
39.729 311.546 
41.836 325.617 
45.830 395.573 
54.811 488.553 
73.548 501.693 
81.397 476.855 
81.545 550.319 
81.030 615.427 
76.176 596.848 
NA NA 
390.766 355.829 
696.520 479.099 
1397.585 565.239 
1656.918 536.375 
1838.455 736.589 
2139.229 719.275 
2197.901 825.531 
1952.787 NA 
2153.141 NA 
2066.922 NA 
1913.212 NA 
NA NA 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
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Oil Production in OPEC Countries 
Millions Barrels Per Year 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 619.193 6.642 6.367 480.734 - 1041.675 
1965 861.527 444.862 100.065 804.936 98.610 1267.602 
1970 1091.189 1211.086 395.331 1386.659 283.605 1353.420 
1971 1166.796 1007.692 558.888 1740.633 385.002 1295.403 
1972 1201.446 819.619 664.546 2201.962 440.188 1178.483 
1973 1102.446 793.854 749.820 2772.605 555.567 1228.590 
1974 929.341 555.291 823.064 3095.088 616.668 1086.350 
1975 760.733 540.129 650.885 2582.535 606.411 856.363 
1976 785.216 707.336 756.449 3139.274 707.405 839.737 
1977 718.685 753.129 761.062 3366.960 726.350 816.817 
1978 777.961 723.613 692.405 3029.865 662.950 790.408 
1979 NA NA NA NA 657.803 NA 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
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Oil Exports from OPEC Countries 
Millions Barrels Per Year 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq 
1960 58.955 - 5.681 81.576 237.829 331.345 
1965 179.072 - 9.390 . 
96.104 535.456 451.880 
1970 355.620 . 219 30.624 228.271 1207.895 545.967 
1971 250.974 . 256 35.040 239.586 1452.335 590.899 
1972 364.829 25.112 38.325 299.095 1646.414 524.177 
1973 362.518 71.212 43.508 369.526 1926.032 702.917 
1974 326.675 59.897 65.956 378.359 1959.758 674.885 
1975 320.288 53.217 74.935 363.066 1704.915 751.462 
1976 345.650 61.342 71.613 449.288 1908.214 818.002 
1977 377.593 50.443 65.773 483.881 1776.601 791.101 
1978 366.022 44.786 63.328 462.893 1623.192 870.306 
1979 350.546 44.749 60.152 409.895 878.555 1195.485 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
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Oil Exports from OPEC Countries 
Millions Barrels Per Year 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 550.116 - 6.157 388.922 - 766.923 
1965 769.635 428.622 96.961 676.178 98.610 889.789 
1970 941.664 1208.917 383.542 1174.169 283.605 888.629 
1971 1012.948 1002.801 542.536 1528.182 385.002 844.576 
1972 1070.550 810.397 642.733 1992.541 440.188 780.458 
1973 964.184 793.693 722.007 2560.329 555.567 775.078 
1974 804.168 543.960 795.481 2891.676 616.668 645.430 
1975 658.241 522.352 625.355 2409.402 606.411 537.353 
1976 655.469 675.856 736.831 2939.639 707.405 500.160 
1977 593.052 709.195 741.023 3142.066 726.350 482.165 
1978 642.838 677.002 666.892 2812.690 662.950 454.279 
1979 760.332 717.590 806.687 3218.497 657.803 516.329 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
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OPEC Oil Revenues in Millions of Local Currency 
. 
(current prices) 
Algeria Ecuador Gabon Indonesia Iran Iraq 
1960 NA NA 104 - 285 200 
1965 NA NA 185 - 514.1 274 
1970 271.9 NA 1205 65.8 1,109 521 
1971 321.0 NA 26303 99.2 1,851 840 
1972 613.0 29.7 4564 140.7 2,396 575 
1973 987.7 128.8 6551 230.4 4,399 1,843 
1974 3,299.2 413.9 41528 303.7 21,443 5,700 
1975 3,261.8 292.8 NA 653.7 18,870 7,500 
1976 3,699.0 532.7 800 1,571.1 21,837 8,500 
1977 4,253.7 499.3 600 1,947.3 20,735 9,631 
1978 4,589.1 500 600 (5,200)* 21,880 10,200 
1979 7,000 800 900 (7,200)* NA 19,200 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
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OPEC Oil Revenues in Millions of Local Currency 
(current prices) 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1960 159 NA 2.4 333.7 - 2,639 
1965 216 125.4 45 664.1 29 4,937 
1970 298 482.6 176.4 1,214 233 6,194 
1971 354 593.7 603 1,884.9 431 7,538 
1972 507 514.0 735 2,744.6 551 8,367 
1973 531 663.6 1,368.6 4,340 900 13,037 
1974 2382 1776.0 4,184 22,573.5 5,536 39,720 
1975 1687 (5101)* 4,568 25,675.8 6,000 29,858 
1976 2111 (7500)* 4,834 30,754.9 7,000 29,328 
1977 2182 (8850)* (9,600)* 36,538 9,030 26,991 
1978 2187 (8400)* (7,900)* 39,074 8,200 25,196 
1979 3241 (13000)*(15,900)* NA 11,500 37,995 
Source: OPEC Statistical Bulletin 1980 
* Millions of US Dollars 
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Exchange Rates in OPEC Countries (end of period) 
Algeria 1 Ecuador 1 Gabon' Indonesia 1 Irani Iraq 2 
1960 4.9371 15.00 246.85 - 75.75 2.800 
1965 4.9371 18.00 246.85 2.35.00 75.75 2.800 
1970 4.9371 20.917 277.71 365.00 75.75 2.800 
1971 4.6440 25.00 277.03 393.42 75.75 2.8305 
1972 4.5560 25.00 252.21 415.00 75.75 3.0039 
1973 4.1850 25.00 222.70 415.00 68.882 3.3064 
1974 3.99770 25.00 240.50 415.00 67.625 3.3862 
1975 4.1250 25.00 214.32 415.00 67.639 3.3862 
1976 4.3590 25.00 238.98 415.00 70.222 3.3862 
1977 4.0350 25.00 245.67 415.00 70.617 3.3862 
1978 3.8345 25.00 225.64 442.05 70.475 3.3862 
1979 3.7555 25.00 212.72 623.05 70.475 3.3862 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
1: local currency per 1 US $. 
2: US $ per 1 local currency. 
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Exchange Rates in OPEC Countries (end of period) 
Kuwait'- Libya1 Nigeria1 Saudi Arabia2 U. A. E. 2 Venezuela2 
1960 2.8000 2.8000 1.4000 4.5000 - 3.3496 
1965 2.8000 2.8000 1.4000 4.5000 - 4.4998 
1970 2.8000 2.8000 1.4000 4.5000 4.7619 4.4983 
1971 2.8085 2.8200 1.4043 4.4868 4.7480 4.5007 
1972 3.0400 3.0400 1.5200 4.1448 4.3860 4.4000 
1973 3.3898 3.3497 1.5227 3.7014 3.9963 4.3045 
1974 3.4104 3.3778 1.5904 3.5500 3.9591 4.2845 
1975 3.4483 3.3778 1.6248 3.5176 3.9613 4.2850 
1976 3.4203 3.3778 1.5959 3.5300 3.9531 4.2899 
1977 3.4898 3.3778 1.5514 3.5251 3.9033 4.2925 
1978 3.6362 3.3778 1.5745 3.3996 3.8712 4.2925 
1979 3.6203 3.778 1.6591 3.3608 3.8157 4.2925 
Source: IMF, IFS Yearbook 1980 
1: US $ per 1 local currency. 
2: local currency per 1 US $. 
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Crude Oil Prices in OPEC Countries ($ per barrel) 
Algeria Indonesia Iran Iraq 
1974 16.22 12.60 11.48 11.67 
1975 13.0 12.8 11.62 11.53 
1976 14.3 12.8 12.81 12.69 
1977 14.1 13.55 12.81 12.60 
1978 14.80 13.95 13.45 13.52 
1979 33.0 27.50 30.0 27.76 
Kuwait Libya Nigeria Saudi Arabia U. A. E. Venezuela 
1974 11.15 15.77 14.69 9.76 12.24 11.48 
1975 11.3 12.32 12.81 10.72 11.92 11.86 
1976 12.37 13.81 14.35 11.51 12.51 13.54 
1977 12.22 13.85 14.12 12.40 13.26 13.54 
1978 12.83 14.59 14.82 13.34 14.01 14.22 
1979 27.50 34.67 29.99 26.0 29.46 26.90 
Source: Petroleum Economist 1974-1980. 
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G. D. P. in Selected Countries in Billions US $ (1975 prices) 
France Italy Japan Netherlands 
1974 338.19 199.3 495.09 83.66 
1975 338.82 192.05 501.87 82.80 
1976 356.34 203.32 534.31 87.21 
1977 366.34 207.18 563.13 89.27 
1978 379.49 212.51 596.21 91.48 
1979 391.53 223.05 631.41 93.49 
U. K. U. S. A. W. Germany 
1974 232.14 1541.25 428.2 
1975 230.38 1526.51 420.3 
1976 239.96 1621.72 442.0 
1977 242.28 1695.24 455.4 
1978 251.08 1770.51 470.5 
1979 253.05 1881.57 492.0 
Source: OECD Economic Indicators 
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